For Democracy

By the
'People and Freedom'
Group

FOR DEMOCRACY

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Edited by the
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Group

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'What I know of history gives me reason to believe that democracy is the natural term of political progress.'

OZANAM.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER, Lic. ès Lettres (Paris). Contributor to *Dublin Review*, *Catholic World*, *Contemporary Review*, *l'Aube*, etc.

JOSEPH CLAYTON, F.R.Hist.S. Editor of the *Labour Chronicle* (1896–8) and *The New Age* (1906–7). Author of *The Rise of Democracy*, *Economics for Christians*, *The Rise and Decline of Socialism*, etc.

ANGELO CRESPI, D.Sc. (Paris), Ph.D. (Genoa), D.Litt. (Milan). Lecturer in Italian at Birkbeck College, London. From 1904 to 1922 London correspondent of various Italian newspapers. Author of *La Funzione Storica dell' Impero Britannico*, *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, etc.

VIRGINIA M. CRAWFORD. Associated with the Christian Democratic Movement since publication of *Rerum Novarum* (1891) both in England and on the Continent. A founder of the Catholic Social Guild and a constant contributor to its publications.

REV. S. J. GOSLING. On staff of Cotton College, 1909–14. Chaplain to the Forces, 1915–19. Editor of the *Sower*.

ALFREDO MENDIZÁBAL, LL.D. (Madrid). Professor of Law in University of Oviedo. Founder of the International Institute of Philosophy of Law and Juridical Sociology. Secretary of Spanish Group of Catholic Union of International Studies. Chairman of Spanish Committee for Civil Peace (1937–9).

ANTHONY MOORE, B. ès Lettres (Aix-en-Provence). One of the principal speakers for the League of Nations Union.

JEAN FREDERIC NEUROHR, Agregé de l'Université. Formerly contributor to *Abendland*, *Schildgenossen*, and other German Catholic papers.

E. R. ROPER POWER, Ph.D., F.R.Econ.S. Author of *Population Prospects*. Contributor to *Sociological Review*, *Tablet*, etc.

DON LUIGI STURZO, D.D. (Rome). Professor of Philosophy and Sociology. Secretary-General, Italian Catholic Action (1915–18). Founder and leader of the Italian Popular Party. Author of *Italy and Fascismo*, *The International Community*, *and the Right of War*, *Politics and Morality*, *Church and State*, etc.

LOUIS TERRENOIRE. Secretary of South-Eastern Union of Christian Trade Unions (1929). Editor of *l'Aube* since 1932. Member of control board of *Nouvelles Equipes Françaises*.

MAURICE VAUSSARD. Member of Central Board of *Semaines Sociales*. Editor of *Bulletin Catholique International*. Principal of Collège de Normandie.

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FOREWORD

THIS book For Democracy *is edited by the People and Freedom Group.*[1] *This association is in close touch with Continental movements among Catholics for constructive democratic and Christian solutions of present problems, and the Group identifies itself with a democracy which draws its vitality from Christian principles. It is in a tradition of thought which is more than a century old and which is inspiring some of the finest political utterances on the Continent to-day.*

All the contributors to For Democracy *are either active or corresponding members of the Group. Though the authors are many, the book is not a symposium. It is a unity and constructed to be read as a whole. Each chapter has a separate author, but falls into place as part of a general plan.*[2] *The aim is to clarify the position of the Group and its friends as against those who attack not only democracy as a system of government, but the moral values it implies or tends to acquire.*

The thanks of the People and Freedom Group are given with warmest appreciation to all the contributors, to Don Sturzo for

[1] The principles of the Group are defined as follows :

(1) The primacy of morality in political life and economic and social relations.

(2) This morality to be that founded on the Christian tradition and on respect for human personality and its rights.

(3) The necessity for civil and political liberty with a just balance between liberty and authority, as well as between the individual and society, in every type of modern state.

(4) The necessity for permanent union and co-operation between States on a basis of morality, with the progressive formation of international law.

(5) The conviction that war should no longer be recognized as a legitimate means of settling international disputes and must be replaced by a system of voluntary or compulsory arbitration, or by the decisions of an international court of justice as the case may be. (*Constitution passed at inaugural meeting, 27th November*, 1936.)

[2] The footnotes, moreover, in all cases are editorial.

the co-ordination and for undertaking the main burden of editorship, to Mr. Conrad Bonacina and Mr. James Langdale as translators, and to Mrs. V. M. Crawford the Chairman, and to Miss B. Barclay Carter the honorary secretary.

DOROTHY SCOTT STOKES.

I

INTRODUCTION

WHAT WE MEAN BY DEMOCRACY

By Barbara Barclay Carter

THE case against democracy has never been put in a manner more striking to the imagination than in *Coriolanus*. Our sympathies are with the hero. How intolerable it seems that one so evidently born to rule, who has rendered such signal services to the State, should have to beg the votes of the 'many-headed monster,' a mob too poor-witted to know its own mind—if it has a mind to know—and which proves its instability by acclaiming him at one moment and at the next howling against him ! How noble he appears in his defiance, and how sordid and petty his opponents ! It is only when we analyse the position in the chill light of reason, against a wider background of history, that other considerations arise. We see then, in Coriolanus and his supporters in the Senate, a ruling class, noble in its tradition of valour and honour, but which, in egotistic exclusiveness, will sacrifice even Rome to its pride and interests. And in the tribunes and their humble followers, we may discern a new class rising to consciousness that it, too, has right of city—not yet ennobled by tradition (though, outside the play, the Gracchi stand to remind us that its rise is not untouched by glory), presenting at first the common needs of the common man who has no stomach for war, whose stomach, in fact, is primarily empty, but whose share in the commonwealth, whose contribution to Roman greatness would be perpetuated in the device carried on the banners of the legions, S.P.Q.R.—*Senatus Populusque Romanus*.

It is, in fact, the familiar case of what *1066 and All That* calls 'Wrong but Romantic' versus 'Right but Repulsive.' The tribunes, repulsive as Shakespeare makes them, were devastatingly right. Right not only in their realization, in the nick of time, that a great general of avowedly reactionary views might prove a dangerous ruler (a lesson England would learn over two thousand years later, with the Duke of Wellington's sharp opposition to parliamentary reform and Catholic Emancipation), but because they stood for that broadening of the commonwealth in default of which aristocracy petrifies into oligarchy and the life of the body politic dwindles. 'It is the struggle between the Plebs and the Senate,' notes Machiavelli, 'which made the Roman Republic free and powerful; for the laws that guarantee general liberty would not be made if there were not at least two parties to desire it one against the other.' Through various historical circumstances Rome never became a real democracy,[1] but in the clash between Senate and People we see democracy on the march.

The example we have taken shows, too, how democracy can be potentially working, as a ferment, a tendency towards a better or more equable social order, even where it is destined to stop short. It is, indeed, only as a tendency that we know it, for always its realization is incomplete. Whether we define democracy in Lincoln's famous phrase: 'Government of the people, for the people, by the people,' or by a more precise and comprehensive formula, as a *political and social system based on the free and organic participation of the whole people for the common good*, we must acknowledge that here is an ideal of which the attainment is still far off. Like all ideals, indeed, we must not look for its attainment in full and final form. Always its embodiments will be marred by human shortcomings, distorted by an only partial vision, shaped by historical circumstance in a mould in which good and evil mingle, bringing a continual incentive to that quest of a 'better good,' which gives its dynamism to human process, with the ever-renewed 'hope of the City of God at the other end of the road.'

[1] See Chapter II.

Our criterion of democracy in practice must therefore be a relative one : whether the movement of men's minds and of the social structure is towards that ideal or away from it. The progressive awakening of wider and wider circles to awareness of a right of co-responsibility in the affairs of the community is part of the dynamics of social progress. Till modern times, this process stopped short at a given class. For long periods it seems to be arrested, even reversed. Often when a new and a better order has seemed on the verge of realization, all has been overthrown, its very principles called in question, but those moral values that have gained acceptance in the human conscience are never entirely lost. Democracy is at once a tendency towards a political system and a content of moral values ; the tendency may be checked, but the values remain, if only as memory, as standards, as spurs to renewed achievement.

Wherever authority and liberty meet in the rule of law,[1] wherever there is a sharing of power and a possibility of its widening, wherever men can collectively arrange their own affairs through free discussion, even within a limited compass, we have the elements, the seeds of democracy. We find them therefore at the very roots of our civilization, in the Greco-Roman-Jewish legacy as in the customs of our forefathers, whether Celt, Gaul, or Teuton.[2] We find them flowering in medieval institutions, in a conception of society as based on reciprocal loyalties, in the formation of the guilds and self-governing cities, in the birth of parliaments, in such widening guarantees of personal rights as the Magna Charta, which, though framed in intention for the benefit of a ruling caste, would be a lasting safeguard for the whole people against arbitrary government.[3]

Here was a growth the absolutism of later centuries would check only in part ; despotism was never so complete but a tradition of liberties remained and evolved, bringing open conflict where any degree of political freedom could

[1] See Chapter VI.

[2] Even though the chiefs of the Angles were not ' presidents of " farmer commonwealths " clad in little else than the primitive integrity of their liberal principles,' and ' did not bring over, as some would have us believe, a rough draft of the Declaration of Rights of 1688.' (See R. W. Chambers, *Man's Unconquerable Mind.*)

[3] See Chapter III.

be vindicated, gathering explosive force where it was denied.

Twice before modern times had democracy explicitly established itself as a political system. The first experience was that of Greece, typified by Athens.[1] The second was that of the medieval republics, and here, too, a democratic State emerges of particular grandeur—Florence.[2]

The case of Florence holds particular interest. Though students of political history usually pay little heed to it, it is so instructive, in many ways so near to us, that it is worth following in some detail. We must remember what medieval Florence was—a City State, the equal in power to the great kingdoms, courted by the kings of France, financing the kings of England, wielding a European influence not only through the ramifications of her economic power ('the fountain-head of gold,' Boniface VIII called her), but through the matchless political ability of her citizens, so that every kingdom employed Florentines as ambassadors in important negotiations. And it cannot be doubted that this high level of political education was both effect and cause of Florentine democracy. Yet, if we take any single one of the multiple Florentine constitutions between 1260 and 1378, and still more if we observe them in practice, we shall have a hundred reasons for declaring 'This is not democracy.' It is when we see not facts in isolation but the spirit behind them, that we see how fiercely the democratic leaven was working, through the whole period. Amid alternations of oligarchy, tyranny, proscriptions, faction-wars, the Greater Guilds, those of the merchants and manufacturers, thrust their way into government at the expense of the old landed nobility. After years of bitter struggle the Lesser Guilds (the craftsmen) gain like enfranchisement—or rather, regain it, for it had been theirs for a brief period under the constitution of 1260. By the middle of the XIV century, the proletariat, as we should

[1] See Chapter II.

[2] Venice, indeed, among the sea-board republics, rose to first-class power and stood for seven hundred years, anticipating England as ruler of the seas, but the Venetian Republic, though on an elective basis, came more and more to provide a perfect example of aristocratic, indeed oligarchic rule. Her competitor, Genoa, was more democratic. In the same way the Dutch Republic must be classed as aristocracy.

say to-day, wage-slaves denied even elementary rights, rise in demand of the right to form their own guilds and to take their share in government. Their revolt in 1378, the 'Revolt of the *Ciompi*,' or of 'God's People,' as they called themselves (and which was paralleled by similar risings of the common people all over Europe, for it is round these years that the medieval democratic impulse reaches high-water mark: it is the time of 'Piers Plowman'), had momentary success. For six weeks the Florentine constitution was democratic in the full sense, with the organized participation of the whole people.

The epilogue follows a pattern which we shall find repeated, *mutatis mutandis*, more than once in the history of democracy. Till 1378 the Guild State of Florence was a capitalist State in a very modern sense, with extremes of wealth and poverty. Between great capitalists and small there was a certain solidarity of interests, mitigating their divergence, but the advent of the masses to a share in power, both economic and political, meant a social revolution. Florentine democracy had reached the critical point where it must either embrace the whole people or collapse. The clash of interests was too great.[1] The failure of the hopes of the masses, the precariousness of the middle-class share in power, the alarm created in the dominant plutocracy, brought an atmosphere of crisis in which a Cosimo de' Medici could edge his way to personal power, and the life drains out of political institutions for a hundred years.

Yet what had been established in the consciousness of the people was not lost. The democratic spirit remains latent, tempering the tyranny of the Medicis (infinitely more liberal than that of other Italian rulers), bursting to the

[1] See J. Luchaire's masterly study, *Les Démocraties Italiennes*. He adds —and his words, written in 1920, when they could have no topical bias, may serve as warning to modern advocates of the Corporative State—that the real crisis came from the identification of the economic and political structure. The economic corporation, or guild, has its own very definite and exclusive interests, which are bound to clash with those of others, and 'if there is no political life independent of corporative life, drawing the citizens on to another plane and grouping them according to other principles,' the only solution is either the defeat of one of the adversaries or the intervention 'of an absolute power which appeases the irremediable discord by suppressing political liberty.'

surface a century later, guided by Savonarola,[1] with the old rallying-cry of 'People and Freedom!' One of the last proclamations of the Florentine Republic, before it fell before the combined forces of Pope and Emperor in 1530, presents the pure democratic ideal: 'The truly free and democratic State is that in which all citizens without distinction have access to all offices; it is not by their birth or by their wealth, but by their qualities, that is, by their moral value, that men must be appraised.' Meanwhile Florence had produced a crop of political theorists, the founders of modern political science, chief among them Machiavelli, who, passionate defender as he was of liberty for his own city (like Englishmen who admire dictatorship in other countries), noted with unerring observation and for all time the receipts by which power can best be seized and held, despite the people.[2]

Florence had remained a last oasis of liberty in an age of absolutism; during her three hundred years of history, she had brought greater gifts to civilization than any city since Athens.[3] Her achievement would remain a memory that centuries later would help to inspire the makers of the New Italy. In the meantime democracy as a political system disappears for two hundred and fifty years, to be reborn only in 1776 in the New World.[4]

Yet, as we have noted, in every country in greater or

[1] It is amusing, in the face of those who believe a capacity for democracy the special attribute of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, to find Savonarola reviving the theory of St. Thomas that whereas Southerners, who have little energy because of the hot climate, and Northerners, who have 'much energy but little intelligence,' will submit to be ruled by a single head, the Italians who have 'both much energy and much intelligence' are better suited by the 'government of the many.'

[2] If Machiavelli's teachings, unfortunately, hold good to-day, it is because, living in a democracy, like other Florentine political theorists he paid an attention to be found nowhere else to public opinion—if only as something that the 'Prince' must use all his skill to manipulate. Note, particularly, his advice to avert criticism of the Government by keeping the minds of the people occupied by some great enterprise, such as a war.

[3] A consequent temptation to establish a close connection between culture and democracy must be avoided. Certainly the glories of Athens and Renaissance Florence were the outcome of a general spirit of liberty, for only where there is freedom can art and thought flourish. But history has many instances of the existence of cultural freedom in the absence of any wide political freedom. Such indeed was the case of Florence under the Medicis, and of Renaissance Italy in general.

[4] See Chapter III.

less degree, what we may call elements of democracy survived and evolved. The Declaration of Independence and of Rights appeared as an unprecedented novelty. Here was democracy applied not to a City State, but to a great modern State (indeed, a Federation of States), on a basis no longer corporate, the representation of given social orders, but individual—something new indeed, but the fruit of ideas that had been long ripening, with roots stretching far into the past.[1] In the insistence that all men have equal and inalienable rights to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,' that it is the task of governments to assure these rights, and that governments draw their authority from the consent of the governed, we have an example of those moral values rooted in human personality, which Christianity revealed and quickened, and which stage by stage through history find realization.[2]

. . . . . .

The first European State to follow the American example was France, but the main sweep of the democracy proclaimed in 1789 was checked by the Terror. Not till 1848 would it fully reappear, this time with support from explicitly Christian democratic currents (it is the time when priests blessed the Trees of Liberty, planted in symbol of the new era, and the Dominican Lacordaire was elected to the Chamber), but again it was short-lived. With the attempts at social reform and their failure, capitalists, middle classes, masses, knew the same emotions as those of Florence in 1378, with Louis Napoleon in the role of the Medici. French democracy, as we know it, dates from 1875, from a constitution framed for a restoration of the Monarchy, and which was designed to give preponderance of power to the middle classes. The oldest democratic constitution in a modern European State is that of Belgium, which dates from 1830, though even here for fifty years the middle

[1] It is a curious and interesting detail that while some historians believe that the constitutions of the Dominican Order had a certain influence on the birth of the English Parliament in the XIII century (see Chapter III), those same constitutions helped to inspire Jefferson in shaping the Constitution of the United States.

[2] See Chapter VII.

classes kept a fast hold on power in order to block the social reforms that democracy implied.

Though the ideas that found practical expression in the Declaration of Independence had matured in England, England was slow to take the path towards democracy. Shortly before, Hume had written: 'The tide has run long with some rapidity to the side of popular government, and is just beginning to turn towards Monarchy.' Looking back, with the telescoping of periods that distance brings, on the contrary freedom seems to broaden down, with the inevitability of gradualness, though in a manner that exemplifies Cromwell's typically English maxim: 'None goes so far as he that knows not whither he is going.' But in the fifty years that follow the American Secession, not only, in the alarm created by the French Revolution, would democracy be as ill-sounding a word as Bolshevism to-day, but the basic political liberties would be in jeopardy. Freedom of speech and of meeting, freedom of the Press which had come into being in 1695 when the Commons refused to renew the censorship, personal freedom, safeguarded by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 (embodying a right recognized at common law since the Middle Ages), were all minimized by a narrowed interpretation of sedition, culminating in the notorious Six Acts of 1819.[1]

Only by a bitter struggle would these liberties be revindicated; then the fact that they re-knit a tradition rooted in the law of the land would enable democracy to advance without revolutionary upheavals, but it would be long before realization dawned that what was advancing was democracy.

Revolutionary change came indeed with the Reform Act of 1832, which not only enfranchised the bulk of the middle classes (so that government ceased to be the almost exclusive business of Monarchy and aristocracy), but from that date, as had already been established in France by the July Revolution of 1830, Ministers begin to be responsible not to the Crown, but to Parliament. It was an essentially democratic principle, but in the years that followed member-

[1] Though the Habeas Corpus Act had been amended to cover political charges in 1816.

ship of the Democratic Association was deemed subversive, the Chartists appeared as vain and dangerous dreamers, the 'Tolpuddle Martyrs' were deported for attempting to extend the very limited range allowed to trade unionism. No democracy, and yet (as we saw in XIV-century Florence) the tide of democracy was sweeping forward, here as the ideals of enlightened thinkers, there as an obscure consciousness of rights to be vindicated. Hence an agitation that resulted in the widening of the suffrage in 1868 by Disraeli, and again in 1884 by Gladstone, when it became nearly universal.[1] By this time the principle, the denial of which had produced the American Secession, 'that a nation can never abandon its fate to an authority it cannot control,'[2] had been taken for granted in the case of other British colonies; the foundations had been laid for the free British Commonwealth we know to-day. Yet still England did not look on herself as a democracy. The watchword of the day was imperialism. Democracy was confused with republicanism, and though a few advanced Radicals were republicans, national feeling was against them. The Court was still the hub of foreign policy, in relation with other courts; in spite of the profound differences, and though Queen Victoria might note in her imperial grandson an autocratic behaviour she characterized as 'silly and vulgar,' there was little awareness in the ordinary public of what we should to-day call an ideological distinction between England and Germany. Democracy was still an undergrowth, albeit a vigorous one, showing itself in the development of local government, the increasing force of trade unionism, the emergence of a Labour Party, no longer the tag-end of the Radicals, but with its own personality. Yet not till our own century do we find the working classes with a real if initial participation in parliamentary life. It is in our own time, under Edward VII and George V, that the great transformation takes place. Complete universal suffrage, extending even to women (though not till 1926 on equal terms with men)

[1] The Act of 1884–85 corresponds to that passed in Italy in 1882, which gave the vote to all save the illiterate, of whom, however, the number was considerable.

[2] Acton, *Essays on Liberty*.

would come in 1918, but by then England could be already accounted a democracy, and the Monarchy—far from being incompatible with democracy as was once believed—a democratic institution.[1] As such it is acclaimed to-day even in the United States Republic.

To-day we find even Conservative leaders, such as Earl Baldwin, speaking of democracy as a great national heritage, as though they were the heirs of the oldest democracy in the world—that of the Swiss cantons. Instead, we must realize that democracy is still at its beginnings. With universal suffrage and the guarantees afforded by civil and political liberties the field is clear for democracy to develop, but it cannot do so without conflict with established interests. We have reached indeed the critical point (and again we may recall Florence of 1378) where, as the masses become articulate, their needs must receive full consideration as a part of that ' common good ' that is the aim of government : where democracy must become social democracy.

By the end of the Great War this stage had been reached in nearly every country (the men in the trenches had become more clearly conscious of their rights in a country that demanded of them such overwhelming duties, and this feeling was reflected in the neutral nations also), in the new-born democracies as in those of gradual growth. Hence the ' crisis of democracy.'[2]

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Lincoln's formula, though it cannot satisfy us as a scientific definition of democracy, seizes its substance. ' Government *of the people*,' that is, of the community, a far richer idea than that of the State, which is, properly speaking, the machinery of government and is too often to-day made a mythical abstraction. ' *For the people* '—it is the old idea set forth by the medieval schoolmen, of the common good, which excludes both the practice of absolutism, when the interests of the reigning house were paramount, and government for the main benefit of a restricted section.

[1] This had long been the position in Belgium. It would be that of Italy after 1912, of Holland, Denmark, and Sweden after the War.

[2] See Chapter V.

'*By the people*'—that is, by the whole people, so that every individual and every class has a share in responsibility for the rest.

Government by the people thus implies universal suffrage, but universal suffrage is rather the token, the instrument, the scaffolding of democracy than its content. Its content lies in the collective consciousness of membership of a community as implying not only rights to be safeguarded but duties. Without this consciousness, democracy is only a name, and votes will be worth the drinks for which they can be trafficked. It can come only as an historical growth, moulded by the idiosyncracies of each people ; its soil is liberty, it cannot be imposed from above and retain a human value, though it may, indeed must, be fostered by leadership. In its fullness it will be found only in the political élites,[1] who, in a democracy, form leading élites for this very reason, but when, even in a dim and rudimentary stage, it becomes more or less general, government by the people begins to be a reality.

Compare the position under autocracy. A compassionate person in France under Louis XIV, at the spectacle of the butchery of the Huguenots, would have told himself 'It is the king's will,' and he had nothing he could do about it. The average German to-day,[2] in the face of the organized atrocities against the Jews, reassures himself 'The Fuhrer must be right,' and placates his conscience (for by a democratic residue that dictatorship has not wholly obliterated[3] his conscience is involved) with specious arguments. Democratic opinion in England in 1922, learning of the behaviour of the Black and Tans in Ireland, insisted (just as the King was insisting) : 'These things shall not be done in our name.'

It is not the sentiment that is new, but its diffusion through every class, indeed its particular intensity among

[1] See Chapter VI.

[2] Contrary to what one would wish to believe, there is all too much evidence that this is the point of view of the average German. Those who find this incredible forget how much our moral judgements owe to mutual support. Where there can be no discussion for fear of delation, and there is, moreover, the continual mental impact of scientific propaganda, only those of rather exceptional spiritual strength can reach independent conclusions.

[3] See Chapter X.

the working classes. The sentiment is the touchstone of the moral health of any form of constitutional government; we find its working in the abolition of the Slave Trade in 1811, in the Liberal opposition to coercion in Ireland, in the outcry against the concentration camps in the Boer War —each time in widening circles. In democracy, the idea of co-responsibility which it implies penetrates the whole people.

Lord Acton's ideal of a free State as one in which there is 'freedom of the governed to complain of wrongs and readiness in rulers to redress them' is therefore Liberal, not democratic. The democratic ideal would be 'a general freedom to complain of wrongs and a general readiness to redress them.' Such a 'general readiness' would imply a collective conscience at a high stage. No more than the individual consciences of which it is composed will the collective conscience be always alert and enlightened; always its formation will be only partial, impeded by the blind spots induced by particular interests. But the very fact that every section of the community has the means of vindicating its rights (though how successfully will depend on a complexity of circumstances, including political ability), is of itself a guarantee of more equal justice. The famous article in Magna Charta, that a man should not be judged save by his peers, is a realistic recognition of the fact that the 'rulers' rarely escape the bias of class or position. The very Government that abolished the Slave Trade was blind to the misery of the English working classes, and these would obtain little redress till they could politically command it. It was the sight of social evils that they could not amend so long as they were withheld a share in political power that was the mainspring of the women's suffrage movement. ('You can tear up all women's letters,' was the advice given to a young man entering Parliament before the war, 'they have no votes.') The immense progress achieved in labour legislation on the one hand, in questions affecting women on the other, is tangible proof of the value of democratic participation in power.

Democracy does not obviate the conflict of interests, but allows it to resolve itself eventually into give-and-take

solutions, through which a common patrimony of ideas comes into being. (Even Colonel Blimp would hardly to-day propose to abolish trade unions or women suffrage, much as he may still dislike them in his heart.) There are limits to the extent to which a majority can impose its will on a refractory minority—witness the failure of Prohibition in the United States. As the Fathers of the American Constitution truly saw, democracy must work through a system of checks and balances, bringing not enforced unison, but a harmonizing of diversities, so that from the clash of contradictions something emerges, in time of decision, that may truly be called the will of the people.

This will can be formed only in various stages,[1] implying an organic social structure on the one hand, and freedom of association on the other. The original sin of modern democracy, which is at the root of the drift to totalitarian forms, is individualism; the isolation of the individual before the State can easily lead to his absorption into the State. In the United States this has been counterbalanced by the ramifications of the two great parties, in Great Britain by the party system, by the framework of local government, and by the host of private organizations often with official or semi-official recognition embracing every ideal and tendency; in France the lack of consistency in the parties and the excessive centralization of government remains a source of weakness.[2]

The individual as such is helpless before the State. His imagination is daunted by its vastness, the millions in which he is submerged. Only through a widening circle of association (either private or an organic part of the Constitution) can he assert himself politically. And it is well here to remember the sociological law noted by Don Sturzo as the *Law of Individuality-Sociality*[3] to the effect that only in association with others does the individual develop his own personality, and the fuller such development of personality, the wider his range of association. This law applies equally to social groups. Our ideal of democracy is one in which each individual, each township, each craft or

[1] See Chapter XIII. [2] See Chapter VI.
[3] *The International Community and the Right of War*, Chapter I.

calling, each class, each region, has the fullest personality, building up the State-community into an organic whole, which, by the richness of its associative forces, would find further integration in the community of peoples. The attempt in many Continental countries for the past century to foster national life at the expense of local life has been a radical error; so too the belief, fairly widely held in the years just after the War, that national personality must pale into a grey internationalism.[1] It is not by accident that the advance of democracy, implying as we have seen a deepening and widening of the collective consciousness, with the rounding of human personality, coincided with a growth of both national and international feeling.[2]

The years that saw the widest acceptance of the fundamental democratic ideas were the years most fruitful in international relationships. Not only those officially organized in the League of Nations and the I.L.O., but the innumerable international congresses, the constant contacts between the trade unions of the various countries, the interchange of visits between leaders of political parties of kindred programmes, between the mayors and town councillors of capitals and leading cities, the wide-flung fraternity of the universities and learned bodies, the free interflow of tourists of every class. Here were so many threads to bind together the peoples in one community.[3]

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To-day the world is divided between the democracies and the dictatorships. But it is well to realize that totalitarianism is not so much an alternative system as a disease of democracy, a disease eating away the vital tissues and banishing the spirit, which is liberty.[4] Even England is

[1] The idea of internationalism as integrating and enriching national loyalties was behind a saying of old Bob Smillie at Geneva. (It was the time of the first Miners' International after the War, in 1920, which ended in a kind of Eisteddfod on the roof of the International Labour Office, the Welsh and Germans leading the singing.) 'I am Scottish,' he said, 'and I am proud of it. I've married an Irish wife, so I feel that in a way Ireland is my country, too. And I'm proud of that. But I'm proudest of all to be an internationalist.'

[2] See Chapter IX.

[3] The discrepancy between the democratic ideas and aspirations in the international field, and their practical realizations, will be fully dealt with in Chapter IX, 'Democracy and the International Order.'

[4] See Chapter X.

not wholly immune. Here, as always, 'the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.'

Too readily the defeat of democracy in other countries has been ascribed to a congenital unfitness for freedom.[1] In reality the forces that produced that defeat are active in our own midst, and the decisive battle is yet to come. In Italy (where till 1922 the development of democracy had followed the same rhythm as in England, though usually a few years ahead) it was the alarm of the propertied classes at the dawning sense of political power in the masses that opened the way for the Fascist dictatorship. That alarm was not confined to Italy. 'Mr. Mandragon the Millionaire,' whatever his country, may at a pinch tolerate that his factory hands should vote, so long as their vote does not inconvenience him. As the supertax rises, his doubts grow; if he sees in the distance a threat to the power his wealth gives, they are doubts no longer. And the political power wielded by finance to-day is intolerable in a democratic system. If democracy is to advance, it must penetrate the economic sphere, storming the entrenched citadel of plutocracy and creating a moral environment more fitting for the labour of free human beings. We have the anomaly of a democratic polity side by side with an economic organization that democracy has barely penetrated. There is indeed a certain trend towards that 'self-government in industry' which must be the basis of what the Christian Democrats of forty years ago described as Corporatism,[2] and which, in some form or other, we hold to be an essential feature of organic democracy.

The fact that democracy in its advance calls for profound economic changes, and, especially, that Socialism openly demands such changes[3] (though on lines that, to our mind, attribute too much to the State; nationalization, though necessary for national undertakings, is not universally

[1] It is the same attitude which, as Professor Chambers has shown, is found towards our own history. 'The Normans won the Battle of Hastings. Therefore, it is argued, they must have deserved to win: it must have been all in the inevitable order of progress. The Normans must have been progressive; the Anglo-Saxons must have been decadent.' (*Man's Unconquerable Mind.*)

[2] See Chapter XII. The Corporatism of Christian Democracy is not to be confused with that of the so-called Corporate State.

[3] See Chapter XI.

applicable), has aroused the resistance not only of Mr. Mandragon and his fellows, but of all those whose interests appear bound up with the present system.

We have seen between 1936 and 1938 how violent was the reaction aroused in France by the social legislation of the Popular Front Government, though to us in England such laws for the most part seemed normal and natural, save for the forty-hour week, which was enforced prematurely, without waiting for an international agreement that alone would have made it feasible. But the Socialists themselves to-day recognize that the resistance of the French middle classes was exasperated by undisciplined behaviour of the French workers in both economic and political fields.[1] There was, too, the fatal error of the use of the economic weapon of the strike for political ends (an error for which the Socialists of Italy, in 1922, paid dearly, as, to a lesser extent, did our own Labour organization in 1926). In England, the grand tradition of the trade unions maintains a sound discipline in the economic and social field, but there is insufficient political preparation. Labour has been able to supplant the Liberal Party as an alternating party in power, but in its two attempts to govern alone as a minority party, with Liberal assent, it remained the prisoner of the others, and was feebly backed by public opinion. Till, with the crisis of 1931 MacDonald was forced to form the National Government, breaking away from the mass of his party and remaining with only a small group of faithful friends.

Since that date, Labour developments have raised the problem whether, as a Socialist party on a class basis, centring round the trade unions, it will be able to win majority support so as to restore the rhythmic alternation of parties that is essential to a healthy democracy. In eight years it has not made much progress in this direction, whereas the Conservatives, in the guise of a National Government, have not only consolidated their hold on power, but made it almost a monopoly. To-day we find that while on the one hand Parliament and the public at large, with the expansion of democratic consciousness,

[1] See Léon Blum's speech at the Socialist Congress at Nîmes, May, 1939.

are claiming as their domain matters formally reserved for the Cabinet, such as foreign policy, as vital issues affecting the whole people, on the other with the system of the 'inner Cabinet' there is a disquieting trend to an almost personal government, tending to ignore public opinion or to render it ineffectual. Here is the danger. If Labour is to win over average English opinion, it must make it plain that it takes its stand on an integral and free democracy, and not on a purely economic democracy as a prelude to a class dictatorship.

With all these factors, even in England there is a crisis of democracy. At bottom it is because we are in a period when a ruling class, impoverished in ideas, retains its hold on power, and the new classes rising have not yet the political experience or education to assert themselves. If the progress of democracy has been checked or slowed down, a very real cause is the weakness of the political *élites*, and hence a lack of leaders.

Leadership is essential to democracy. It is a quality implying a vision of a goal and a power of touching mind and heart, of interpreting the needs of the inarticulate or apathetic. Leadership in the sense in which Gladstone and Disraeli were leaders, or Lloyd George in his 'red-hot Radical' days, or MacDonald in his prime, or Keir Hardie, or John Burns, or Mabon. In part this lack comes from the War, the outcome of which was prophetically foreseen by the poet Wilfred Owen, where the ghost of the dead German tells him that for want of such as he :

> 'Now men will go content with what we spoiled.
> Or, discontent, boil bloody and be spilled.
> They will be swift with swiftness of the tigress,
> None will break ranks, though nations trek from progress.'

No one reading the letters of the young men killed in the War can doubt that many of them, had they lived, would have made their mark on the time.

But another and present cause of lack of leadership lies in education. Hence the continued prominence of men formed at Eton and Harrow, where education had the definite aim of preparation for government.[1] The old

[1] See Middleton Murry, *The Price of Leadership*.

classical education meant at least a contact with mature minds; men acquainted with Cicero and Thucydides would at least be immunized against certain political ineptitudes. Science has yet to be integrated in culture. Too generally to-day it is a case of 'where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?' Most of all, a spiritual impulse is lacking, and 'Where there is no vision the people perish.'

Without a finality, personal and general—the old idea of a duty to God and man, with the idea in the name of which Arthur Griffith demanded freedom for Ireland, that 'every nation has a task to fulfil in the world, that is why it is a nation'—democracy must disintegrate. Without a keen and widespread sense of basic values, truth, freedom, justice, conscience, we shall have an apathy like the Sleep of the Men of Ulster, when Cuchulain was left alone to defend the ford.

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In the present book we trace the development of democracy through history, from the dawning experiences of Athens and Rome to the post-war crisis. In a second section, we analyse democracy itself, its underlying principles and implications. In a third, we consider present-day developments, the clash of opposing systems and the democratic solution to the impellant economic problem. Finally, the conclusion forecasts the lines on which democracy must advance if it is to remain true to itself, in a civilization that is in essence built on foundations of Christianity, and in which democracy will be the more fruitful the more it is inspired by Christian values.

It must be recognized that the battle to-day is not merely over systems of government, but for principles which, as has been recognized throughout the ages, must underlie all government worthy of the name. Dante was out of love with democracy when he wrote that 'all right governments purpose freedom, to wit, that men should exist for their own sakes. For the citizens are not there for the consuls or the subjects for the king.' We find the same thought in Lord Acton: 'Liberty is not a means to a higher

political end. It is itself the highest political end. It is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society and of private life.' And again in Pius XI : 'The State is not the end of the citizens, but the citizens of the State.' The idea of justice as the basis of any true commonwealth, of a law above the law-maker, echoes from Aristotle to Cicero, from Cicero to St. Augustine, and shapes the political life of Christian Europe. It is expressed in the old saw of the English lawyers : 'La ley est le plus haute inheritance que le roy ad ; car par la ley il même en toutes ses sujets sont rulés, et si la ley ne fuit, nul roy et nul inheritance sera.' The value of human personality, established and hallowed by Christianity, has slowly unveiled itself throughout the ages. Even in medieval times it was grasped but imperfectly ; though the poor man might turn into an angelic visitor and vanish in a blaze of glory, he was generally despised ('villein' has become 'villain' in every language) ; in the Victorian era the idea that 'the lower classes have not the same feelings' was widely held among the upper classes ; only in our own time and especially after the War—in spite of a lingering contempt for alien races—did it seem at last about to be fully realized.

In defending democracy to-day, we are defending a specific system the potentialities of which have yet to be unfolded, but we are defending at the same time these values, both in the name of democracy and *in* democracy.

PART I

IN HISTORY

II

THE EXPERIENCES OF ATHENS AND ROME

By Angelo Crespi

DEMOCRACY in Europe at the moment is not passing through a cheerful period, and there are those who might question the usefulness of another attempt to unearth the remnants of its glorious but short-lived career in the ancient world. What is it but intellectual dishonesty, it may be asked, to call by the same name the United States of America with their complicated federal constitution, and ancient Athens with merely a general assembly confined to free men, a council elected by lot and a herald to put questions?

This could indeed apply to every 'democracy,' ancient, medieval, or modern. And yet no mental attitude could be more unhistorical and unphilosophical, and therefore more unwise than this. For, as we have been taught by Croce, 'all history is contemporary history,' not only in the sense that we can conceive the past only in terms of our present experience, but also and above all, in the sense that the past lives on in the present;[1] so that narrative history is, in a way, only a stretching-out on the canvas of time of what constitutes the permanent substance of human life.

History thus delivers us from the tyranny of the impressions of the passing hour, enabling us, to a certain extent, to look on its contents from the standpoint of an ever richer, more inclusive eternal *now*, on an almost prophetic level, thus participating, in however infinitesimal a degree, in the very standpoint of God.

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Study of Greek politics and Greek political thought can thus help us to understand present-day events. Notwithstanding the immense difference between the political and

[1] See Luigi Sturzo, *In Praise of the Present*, Contemporary Review, July, 1933.

social structures of the United States of America and other medieval and modern democratic communities on the one hand and ancient Athens on the other, all these communities can legitimately be classed as democratic. For in all their political institutions and prevailing characteristics, in different manners and degrees we may recognize the development and expression of that self-same spirit that made possible the Athens of Kleisthenes, and the Athens that defeated the Persians and was exalted by Aeschylus and depicted by Thucydides in the great speech he puts on Pericles' lips. Compared with Persia and Sparta Athens was indeed a democracy. For the first time a community which was ruled not by kings or tyrants or oligarchies, but by equal and free men in their assemblies, felt itself a match, in the arbitrament of war, for kings and aristocracies. It attributed the miracles of Salamis and Marathon to its own distinctive political character.

Nor is this all. It was among the Greeks that tendencies and principles which we find as a leaven working since human societies began, for the first time prevailed over servile obedience, sheepish conformity, and mere traditionalism, though the spirit of reverence for tradition and law was ever maintained. They held that public affairs are not merely the concern of kings or nobles ; that people cannot in the long run be ruled with impunity without their consent ; or that the best can only be elicited from them in proportion as they are allowed, invited, encouraged by their very institutions and by the example of natural leaders, to realize their best selves and to co-operate in such realization in government and business no less than in crafts, arts, literature, and philosophy. It was among the Greeks, and especially in Athens, that for the first time reasonableness prevailed over force in settling common affairs and administering justice ; that aristocracy itself prepared the path for democracy by creating the type of the *best man*, of him who stands out as fittest in body and mind to promote the commonweal. In this way the greatest political discovery was made —that of counting heads instead of breaking them, and of obeying existing laws till by common consent they could be altered, thus making possible government by free dis-

cussion. In Athens it was that Socrates could arise and say that life without criticism is not worth living.

There Europe was born and a specific European way of living differentiated itself from the Asiatic. Even those hostile systems of thought which were evoked by the degeneration of Athenian democracy in consequence of the Peloponnesian War developed out of that free discussion. Even the Nocturnal Council in Plato's Laws would finally condemn the unrepentant atheist to death only after years of endeavour to convince him of his mistake by discussion. Again it was among the Greeks and especially in Athens that for the first time Law took the place of sheer force, and the idea of the equality of all citizens before law was increasingly cherished. And custom was still more fraternal than law, even in regard to slaves. As Sir Alfred Zimmern reminded us :

> 'The fifth-century Athenian with slaves about him in his daily business listened with a thrill to the story of Hecuba or Andromache or Iphigenia, and returned home from the theatre not yet critical or resentful of the institution of slavery, but resolved to be kinder and more patient with the uncouth young barbarians, who, by some strange sport of heaven, now formed part of his household. For there still rang in his ears, as a solemn and lasting reminder, the final words of the chorus as it slowly moved off the stage :
>
> 'There be many shapes of mystery
> And many things God makes to be
> Past hope or fear
> And the end man looked for cometh not,
> And a path is there where no man thought,
> So hath it fallen here.'

Everybody knew that, in a world so full of wars, except by the grace of the high gods he, too, might one day be a slave. Not in the fifth century but in the fourth, with political decay well advanced, could it become fashionable to think that slavery was good for the slave.

In a word, Athenian democracy, as Sophocles's great hymn reminds us, was the first community on earth characterized by an explosion of that same faith in Man as such,

which many centuries later inspired the early days of the French Revolution as sung by Wordsworth, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address which echoes Pericles. The general outline of the story is well known. The Homeric Monarchy yielded gradually, chiefly because the critical atmosphere of urban life produced weakness in the kings, to the rule of well-born chieftains and landowners, who must to some extent have realized the ideal of the 'best men' efficient in the performance of what was for the good of all, for later on such a rule was contrasted as *aristocracy* with mere oligarchy. Later still, their selfish use of their monopoly of ritual knowledge, of legal customs and wealth, brought about a reaction on the part of the trading and artisan and professional classes, which expressed itself in the demand for written laws and for guarantees against an exploitation of debt that could turn the poor into slaves. Finally, through Kleisthenes, the tribal organization and its religious aristocracy were broken up and set aside, and the assembly of freemen became at once the sovereign body, the bureaucracy, and the law court. We shall simply note the readiness with which the patrician families accepted the laws of Kleisthenes, as they had previously accepted Solon's laws, and the fact that the functioning of the City-State went on substantially untouched till the Macedonian conquest, showing the extraordinary reasonableness of all concerned. This native reasonableness at the same time made Athenian 'democracy' possible, and made of it not a hindrance but an opportunity for the greatest explosion of intellectual, artistic, political energy, individual and collective, that humanity had yet known. It was such reasonableness alone that rendered possible for the first time the existence of a polity in which 'distinguished citizens are preferred for public service only as a reward of merit,' and in which 'poverty was no bar and a man could benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition.' Behind Aristotle's definition of law as *reason without passion* stands the whole atmosphere of the Athenian *polis* from Solon onwards.

And yet even those wonderful fifty years only too quickly passed away, not through any malicious envy of the gods but, as Thucydides mercilessly points out, through the evil in

human souls. On the one hand, the ruling oligarchies of Sparta and Corinth resented the political power and commercial greatness of democratic Athens; on the other, the cupidity and arrogance engendered in the Athenian democratic rulers after Pericles caused them to yield to the temptation to exploit the presidency of the Confederacy of Delos, which was entrusted to Athens, and the Confederacy itself, to beautify the city and make her the metropolis of an Empire. Both impulses brought about a struggle between 'democratic' and 'oligarchic' city-states, so that the common good of Hellas was forgotten. Again, on the one hand in each single 'democratic' city-state the 'proletariat' used majority rule to exploit the rich for the benefit of the poor, while the wealthy opened the gates either to enemy city-states or, later, to the Macedonian or to the Roman. Through both processes Hellenism lost the opportunity of becoming a freely unified Greek world, and remained merely as a kind of cultural religion. Athens had truly been, in Pericles' words, a school for Hellas, but not to the extent of helping her allies by her example to rise to her own level of political wisdom and so to repress their own exclusive self-centredness.

It may be that Athens, or even the whole of ancient Hellas, was only a small oasis surrounded by a barbarian world and so sooner or later would have been submerged by it; but a deeper cause may reasonably be sought for the exclusiveness and self-centredness which made a free unification of Hellas impossible. The Greek city-state, being conceived by its citizens as only an expansion of a society of kinsmen, and having been built as a great stronghold and as an army, had no room within its ethos for the notion of individual liberty, for the notion of the citizen as endowed with a soul and an inner freedom; it was a whole of which each citizen felt himself an instrument. Even the greatest Greek thinkers have no word really equivalent to our modern *volition*. Even for them morality is to a great extent mainly a product of civic organization, a kind of drilling through which society instils its ethos into each of its members. Though what matters most is not the outward performance but the condition of the soul, this

condition is conceived more as a harmony of powers conferred by society than as a character shaped by each of us for himself through volitions in obedience to the light of conscience. In Socrates, in the *Crito*, there is a hint of this latter view, but it was not followed. So it is that there is no room in the deepest Greek thought of this period for the monologue of the soul with itself or for its dialogue with God, and therefore for a morality growing from within outward ; and hence for a self autonomous as against society, and for a society growing from the respect of each man for all others, as men with selves of their own capable of contemplating common objects. It has been shrewdly remarked that the Gospel saying, *Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's and unto God the things which are God's*, would have sounded unintelligible to a Thucydides.

Before a real democracy, at least, in principle and in embryo, can become possible, such a point must be reached ; and the Greek spirit was still very far from it. It had not yet passed through the individualism engendered by the decay of the city-state psychology, and more or less rationalized by the Stoics. One may doubt indeed whether that point has really been reached by many of us to-day. The hold of the rationalistic and racial spirit on so many contemporary minds may be due to the fact that the clan-spirit and herd-spirit have as yet only superficially yielded to the Judæo-Christian notion of personality as autonomous in regard both to society and even to God Himself. Through Alexander Hellenism may perhaps by itself have taken the first step in bridging the gap, which Aristotle could not bridge, between Greek and Barbarian, even before it was explicitly taken by the Stoics (though it is not unlikely that even Stoicism may be of Semitic origin). That step was after all not uncongenial to the generalizing Greek turn of mind. But what was needed to make democracy possible in principle, even within the limits of the national State, was a further step in *depth of soul*. It was necessary to see slaves and freemen, Greeks and Barbarians, not merely as sharing a common nature, but sharing a nature mirroring God Himself, created (and loved from everlasting) by God Himself, by a God who, unlike the Greek gods, could—in

contradiction of Aristotle—be a friend to men. And this step had so far been taken only by men of Semitic stock.

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When we pass from Greek to Roman history we cannot help, to this day, sharing the wonder and curiosity of Polybius as to how a city-state like that of the Romans, had succeeded within less than fifty-three years in subjecting to itself—a thing unique in history—almost the whole inhabited world. Not without greatly endangering its own existence had even the Persian Empire dared to overstep the boundaries of Asia. Sparta's rule over Greece hardly lasted twelve years. The Macedonian Empire even after the overthrow of Persia, still left outside itself most of the then known inhabited world. How was it that the Roman city-state had it in itself to become so different from any Greek city-state ?

Our problem is only slightly different from that of Polybius. On the one hand we can hardly think of Roman history without thinking of the struggles between patricians and plebeians and the Gracchi, and finding all this highly relevant to the history of democracy ; on the other hand, how is it that democratic ideas and institutions fell very short from achieving in Rome the triumphs they achieved in Athens ? The problem is of immense complexity.

Many have thought the answer to such questions to be in initial difference of race, of geographical situation, of economic activity. Without denying the element of truth in such conjectures, we prefer to look for our initial difference to what may reasonably be accepted as the origins of Rome.

There were certainly on what are now the Roman Hills more or less fortified villages inhabited by warlike clans of shepherds and herdsmen ruling over conquered and dependent tillers of the soil in the low-lying surrounding plain, long before any Etruscan invasion of Latium. It is certainly due to the approaching Etruscan menace that, at the end of the tenth century before the Christian era, such fortified villages appear as confederated loosely, and holding on the Latin shore of the Tiber, from an easily defensible hill, a position from which every movement of

the enemy on the other bank could be watched. In this sense it is certainly true and significant that the first colonization of the Roman soil was due to strategic and military reasons; and behind such anxious vigils we may catch some glimpse of the earliest influence at work in uniting, in spite of past conflicts, different origins, and economic frictions, the holders of the hills and the tillers of the plain. But it was the Etruscan conquest that transformed this advanced defensive stronghold of the Latin League into Rome, by turning it into the main Etruscan fortress in Latium and into a capital. Etruria was now in control of two-thirds of Italy; and as the Etruscans were mainly traders and artisans who needed men for their crafts and food for their towns, they learned to overcome the exclusiveness of the traditional city-state and began giving an example of how to assimilate and admit to the advantages of city life the dwellers of the country-side. Thus Etruria was an education to the Italians, especially of the western coast.

We make bold to say that it is from Etruria that Rome inherited and learned the art of compromise, of tactful and timely concession, whether in internal or in external policy. Arms and wits, however, met with ever-increasing and at last unconquerable resistance on the part of the Umbrian mountain tribes and of those south of the Tiber; the resistance turned into a victory, when the Etruscans were beaten by the Greeks at Aricia. This defeat became for all the Latins the sign for rebellion; and in Rome the patrician element—the ancient land-owning class in contrast to the trading, commercial, popular elements friendly with Etruria—rose against the foreign kings and inaugurated the Republic. Still, one hundred and fifty years of Etruscan domination did not pass without results of incalculable importance for Rome, for Italy, and for the world. A population of semi-nomad shepherds is now one of settled owners and tillers of the soil. What was once the Latin sentinel-fortress against Etruria, then the Etruscan fortress dominating Latium, is now a Roman fortress against its very allies of one hundred and fifty years before. The Roman patrician rulers will not forget that in the Etruscan days they shared the benefits of the Etruscan Empire, even

of the Etruscan mastery of Latium. Therefore they will never consent to return to any equality with their subjects of yesterday ; they will at once start vindicating for Rome the earlier Etrusco-Roman hegemony.

Moreover, Rome was now definitely a city, a city-state, the greatest offspring of Etruscan civilization ; a city with an inspiring past for all, patricians and plebeians alike. Such was the import of the revolution of 509, especially in its external aspect. But the internal aspect was not less fateful. With the disappearance of the iron hand of the Etruscan kings,[1] the two elements of the *urbs*—the patrician landowning order and the *plebs*, the trading, commercial, artisan, casual population inhabiting the new districts (Quirinal, Viminal, Aventine, Velabrum)—face one another. Each is greatly increased in power, without any central organ of control and conciliation ; and the struggle threatens now and then to become a rupture and a secession. The tendency of the patricians and of the common political instinct is obviously towards finding some new form of central power over all. But in its absence and in the actual condition of parties, within the limits set by the supreme necessity of preserving the body politic in its unity, compromise was the only way.

Such is the meaning of the XII Tables legislation, of the Valerian Laws, of the final organization of the system of classes and *centuriæ* and of the Licinian Laws ; such was the opportunity for democracy. As the numbers of the plebs grew probably far more quickly, though less obviously, than those of the patriciate, the demand for a definite and intelligible body of law as a part of the demand for ever greater security against oppression and exploitation, was inevitable and entailed an increasing elimination of the patrician monopoly in legislation. This was followed in due time by the demand for a share in government, for more equitable laws concerning debt and land, for marriages between citizens of the two orders ; and at last by the *Lex Hortensia* by which the popular assemblies were invested with unrestricted right of legislation and election,

[1] Their consecration by the Etruscan priesthood was perhaps at the root of the Roman *imperium*, the absolute quality of the supreme authority of the magistrates.

and the Senate was deprived of all power of ratifying (or refusing to ratify) laws and was left a mere advisory council which the magistrates could consult or not as they wished.

Apparently the triumph of democracy could not have been more complete. Actually it is just from such a moment that the authority of the Senate grows daily more unchallengeable ; simply because the same people, who insisted on having the final word on everything, never cared about it once they got it or about removing the ancestral customs which frustrated it in practice. The habit of voting by clans, tribes, or septs, instead of by majorities of individuals, which perhaps began in the earliest period of the Etruscan Monarchy, as a quick way of taking common resolutions in military matters, persisted to the end of the Republic. It was traditional, and it also provided a safeguard against demagogical snap votes, while it tended to give weight to wealth and men of age and experience. If a majority of the groups approved or rejected a law, nothing else seemed to matter, whatever were the number of voters pro or contra. And, as magistrates alone could summon the people and, apart from speeches, there was no real debate, and voting took place on other days than the speeches and all according to ancient rites, the issues were more often than not in the hands of magistrates. They usually were anxious not to endanger their chances of future membership of the Senate. And at any moment an augur could stop the proceedings or veto the resolutions. Thus the chances of democracy becoming real were minimized from the beginning by something in the character of the common people that inclined them to be deferential rather than critical of everything that came to them hallowed by the *mos majorum* and proposed by persons invested with *imperium*, as all magistrates were, for they had a power of life and death modelled on that of the *pater familias*.

The passing from the Etruscan Monarchy to the Republic, as Livy tells us, was a beginning of freedom only in the sense that it limited the consul's authority to a year, rather than any diminution of their power compared with the King's power (II, 1, 7). It was a beginning of *liberty*, in the sense of shared authority on the part of the patriciate, out of which

consuls and, initially, all magistrates and priests, were recruited ; a beginning in consequence of which each magistrate, during his tenure of office, was practically an autocrat ; and autocracy passed from a man to a class, to whose members all men owed obedience as soldiers on the battlefield, before owing respect as citizens. The civic discipline grew out of the military, hallowed by religious reverence.

And, in the process of time, democracy went on being daily more handicapped in its chances by all the contingencies that made for the growing ascendancy of the Senate.

While these struggles between patricians and plebeians are being fought with this result, patricians and plebeians alike are more and more being united into a single people by the wars for the reconquest of Latium and the neighbouring lands. Moreover, the wars against Pyrrhus and the Punic Wars are, most certainly, wars in which victory was mainly due to the Senate's wisdom and firmness in adversity, wars also in which more than ever the *plebs*, as common soldiers, learned to appreciate the patricians as leaders and officers, and the patricians learned to trust the common man and to inspire trust in themselves. The addition of new territories to the domain, the incoming of new elements into the population, the conquest of Sicily and the turning of the new province into a new source of revenue, with all the new Mediterranean problems, contributed to the creation of new magistrates and to the monopoly of diplomatic dealings by the Senate. Especially after the Punic Wars, a considerable section of the male Roman population, the most physically fit and mentally alert and enterprising, was out of Italy ; which means that while the quality of the senatorial element, recruited from all magistrates, ex-magistrates, prætors, quæstors, governors, etc., was steadily improving and making the Senate more and more representative of Roman character and ability, the quality of the popular assemblies must have steadily deteriorated. Thus in fact if not in name the people went on throwing away their chances of becoming the real rulers and let Rome and its widening Empire grow into an estate only too well governed by an army of efficient magistrates.

What was for a time an almost perfect aristocracy, began, especially after the Punic Wars, and the conquest of Greece and the expansion eastwards, to develop into a plundering oligarchy, monopolizing conquered lands in Italy and drawing revenues more for themselves, their clients and the knights than for the commonwealth, from annexed provinces, from mines, transport, and such sources. This process inevitably resulted, especially after the failures and the murder of the Gracchi, in a formidable reaction, by the Italians first and by the plundered provinces later, against the metropolis and the Senate. The Gracchi's movement and fate, the deafness of the Roman assemblies and of the Senate to the Italians' just claims, the Italian insurrection, the piracy in the Mediterranean, the ruling of Sicily by a Syrian runaway slave, the challenge to Rome by another army of slaves, the successive defeats of Roman consuls by the Teutons and the Cimbri and the successive victories of Jugurtha, converge with the victories of Marius, who was almost in spite of the Senate selected by the people as general against the northern invaders. Later on, the very victories of Sulla against Marius in order to restore senatorial government, tended to exhibit the inefficiency of the Senate both in peace and in war, and to hammer into everybody's mind the inexorable dilemma : either the Senate and the republican city-state or the Empire must go. They could no longer go on together. The two captures of Rome by Sulla exhibit assemblies, senates, tribunes, Rome itself at the mercy of one general commanding a loyal army. The republic was dead. Cæsar with his Gallic hosts and renown merely completed the process. The world's government had to be carried on, and Cæsar read the situation as pointing to him as the only man capable of doing justice to the provinces as against the *urbs*, to the whole as against one part.

In one sense, therefore, the forces in Rome which might have made for democracy failed because, on the whole, more often than not, their outlook was even narrower than that of the Senate and inclined to identify their own with the common good ; but also because, together with the Senate, they lacked the wisdom and human sympathy

necessary to deserve and provoke the consent of the world they had subdued. In one sense also Cæsar's triumph, whether he was aware of it or not, was a victory of at least one of the fundamental democratic principles, a vindication of the fact and idea that, in the long run, government depends on the consent of the governed.

We cannot explain otherwise why, though in fact it was an autocracy backed by the army and only formally resting on votes, the regime initiated by Cæsar lasted as no other personal regime has lasted in Europe before or since. No doubt, especially in its eastern and non-European parts, the Empire lasted so long because Cæsar was not only a captain and a statesman of genius, but also a profound scholar who had studied in Rhodes. From Posidonius of Apamea he had assimilated the Stoic philosophy and its consecration of the Hellenistic custom of deifying rulers which Alexander made fashionable. He did not hesitate to walk in Alexander's steps, and he saw the necessity of a world-religion for the new world-state. But it would be a great mistake to underrate the meaning of the fact that at least for two hundred years not the military but the civilian power was in control, and that we owe this to the great amount of Greek experience and wisdom embodied in Roman laws, inspiring Roman magistrates and acting as a guide to the politics of men like Augustus, Trojan, the Antonines and Hadrian. We owe this to the experience of the Greek Polis at its best as ruled from Solon to Pericles, as interpreted by Thucydides and as suggestive of the masterly critical analyses of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. There is pregnancy of meaning in Marcus Aurelius' mind, rising from the thought of Athens as the 'great city of Cecrops' to that of his empire as the 'great city of God.'

By putting Rome and Italy and the provinces on the same level, by universalizing their citizenship and by creating an efficient body of officials and magistrates under their own direct control, the Cæsars taught the civilized world the Greek idea of the supreme rule of law to such an extent as to make Roman Law almost synonymous with the rule of reason. They caused all subsequent centuries to acknowledge themselves its debtors, and made such rule,

and the notion that law should serve the common good, fundamental in all future conception of a civilized state.

Yet at last the moment came when the leaven of Greek 'democratic' ideas also could no longer act within the Roman world, and when, owing to the convergence of many military, economic, and technical causes—such as the lack of quick communications and transport between Italy and the rest of the Empire across Alps and seas—the problem of finding enough ability for defence and for efficient central and provincial government became insoluble. The hitherto veiled autocracy unmasked itself more and more as a military and fiscal despotism, increasingly unable to perform the last function which afforded some justification for it—that of at least giving to moral energies time to take root. Had it, at least, performed such a task the *Christian* Church might in the course of some centuries have created the spirit necessary to turn the dying body of the Roman *moles* into the framework of a living *Christian* Commonwealth. *Dis aliter visum.*

The last traces of the 'democratic' leaven ceased to act long before the spirit of individual responsibility to God, of mutual interdependence through membership in the same *corpus mysticum* of the Redeemer could become a force of co-operation and initiative on the part of the converted people in the venture of ruling the Empire and of transforming the ideas that inspired its best laws into living realities. The levelling work of the imperial legislation, following upon that of the conquering legions, had been, instead, too exclusively intent on uprooting local loyalties and pieties, thus leaving the individual to himself alone, without new tasks to claim his free self-dedication.

Democracy in the ancient world did not die; it had never taken root. To cement humanity on a higher plane of consent and co-operation required a faith in man and a reason for it which no ancient tribal religion or civic polytheism could give, and which could not be looked for in views of life denying meaning to the time-process, with no room for hope, no notion of the human soul as worthy of divine love and inwardly fed by the Infinite mirroring itself in it.

III

DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND MODERN TIMES

By Joseph Clayton

DEMOCRACY in the Middle Ages emerges in the form of self-government by elected representatives in cities of Italy and Spain, in trade and parish guilds, in England in the nation's parliament, in the early villages and cantons of Switzerland, in the Dutch and Flemish cities, in the parliaments of Hungary and Sicily. The first communal organizations with a civic personality and a basis of self-government appear, from the IX century onwards, in Venice, Pisa, Amalfi, Genoa, Messina, and in other minor centres. In the XI century certain of the larger communes of Northern Italy escape from feudal subjection and win autonomy, chief among them Milan and Florence, Brescia and Bologna. It is from Brescia that comes the cry of Arnaldo, in the XII century. The motto *Libertas* appears on the shield or banners of the Guelf communes. The two Lombard Leagues against Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II mark the period of the rise and greatness of the communes of Italy. Conspicuous above them all was Florence, the most democratic of the Italian cities.

Empirical is this medieval democracy, adopted for its practical convenience, based on no theory of civic or political rights—though theories of government, discussed by the philosophers and schoolmen influenced, no doubt, the minds of men—but chosen for the greater advantage of the whole. The community for its own well-being had the right to call on all its members. Democracy in the Middle Ages, it may be said, secured or at least promised to secure, the

common good ; it offered a safeguard against the arbitrary rule of tyrants within and the manœuvre of hostile forces without. It was based on the belief that the safety of the whole needed the co-operation of all for the common good.

The medieval conception of society was organic. The individual was framed in his group—family, guild, parish, commune, county. Every social form was essentially corporative. Take thirteenth-century Bologna, for instance, with its elected councils, special and general, composed in the main of nobles and the wealthier middle class, and the People's Party of the merchants and the guilds. The former chose the *podestà*—more resembling the burgomaster of Belgian and many pre-War German cities than the English mayor or lord mayor—and it was the rule in Bologna as in other Lombard cities that the *podestà* must be from another city, unrelated to any of the electors, without property in the city, a man of high family and ability, who standing outside all local politics would rule justly. The term of office lasted a year. The captain of the People's Party had the command of the city's military forces and presided over the councils of the Party as the *podestà* presided over the councils of the commune. In both cases the franchise was closely restricted, but then the strength of medieval democracy, in every case based on a very limited suffrage, was its claim to represent the whole, and serfs and landless men were necessarily excluded from voting when the whole meant a community of free men. In this organism, in the earlier period, there was no room either for the peasants, who were mostly serfs, bound to the land, or for workers who were not organized in the guilds, the hired men. It has been said that the communal democracies of the Middle Ages resemble those of Greece, in the cult of beauty no less than in intellectual activity. The great cathedrals and town halls in France, Germany, and Italy, are the fruit of the corporative and communal movement of the Middle Ages.

It remains to the credit of the city democracies of Northern and Middle Italy that the abolition of serfdom was effected. Just as in England a landless man could gain his freedom by residence in a town, so in the Lombard communes a year's

residence within the walls brought freedom to the serf. Bologna did more; its People's Party carried out the emancipation of all the serfs within the city's territory by payment to their masters. Florence, too, in 1286 abolished serfdom.

There is nothing we could call a theoretical democratic conception, in the modern nationalistic sense, that would correspond to the experience of over three centuries of the communal democracy of the Middle Ages. But all the premises of this outcrop (with its defects and deviations) are to be found in the tradition of the Church and in the enlightenment of Europe's thirteenth century, that great period of Catholic activity in philosophy, in development of doctrine and in the vital ordering of human affairs.

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In order to understand the Middle Ages we must distinguish between the city republics with their autonomies, which were jealously guarded even when subject to the recognition of distant feudal sovereignties, pope, emperor, or king, and the kingdoms with a parliamentary or representative system, which, originally, meant parliaments of military or ecclesiastical vassals, with the participation of shires, communes, and the big merchant and burgess guilds. The parliaments served to protect the citizens against the financial exactions of the kings, who in order to have money for their courts and wars, had to appeal to the guilds, shires, or communes. Gradually, according to the country and according to historical circumstances, the parliaments either widened their powers, forming an aristocratic dyarchy with the Crown, or decayed, or else transformed themselves into legal bodies, as in France.

The idea of liberties (when liberty, as we have noted, was becoming a motto for coats of arms) was confused with that of the rights of the autonomous bodies, and these rights, in the feudal system, were considered as privileges. Their basic significance lay in guaranteeing the weaker against the stronger—the guild against the commune, the commune against the knight, noble, baron, in a word, against the armed vassals of the kingdom, as also against the abbot and bishop, who were likewise feudal lords, and

such lords against the king, who was deemed a *primus inter pares*, but who sought to turn them into subjects.

The guarantee was provided by the laws of the kingdom which had to recognize the rights of each body and each order; and by appeal to parliament. Thus a system which was representative and parliamentary, but not in itself democratic, had its roots set in a democratic foundation. The corporate orders of citizens bound themselves to fealty and subjection to the king or lords, and these bound themselves to respect and guarantee the rights of the citizens or subjects and their corporations. Within each corporation the individuals themselves were bound by a principle of contract, which was the guarantee of their personality.

Obvious was the failure in thirteenth-century England of monarchical government when such a king as Henry III ruled without taking counsel of the chief men in the land. The need for a parliament that would represent the landowners and principal burgesses of town or city, and by means of these representatives put a stop to the gross mismanagement of the country, was felt widely and plainly expressed by a well-known contemporary writer, William of Rishanger, who wrote :

> 'The king that tries without advice to seek his country's weal must often fail, he cannot know the wants and woes they feel. The parliament must tell the king how he may serve them best, and he must see their wants fulfilled and injuries redressed.'

It was this need that drove Simon of Montfort, Earl of Leicester, to summon the first Full Parliament of 1265. To this parliament the burgesses of each city and borough were to send two representatives with two knights sent from each shire.

In itself this beginning of representative government in England, as in other countries, neither proposed nor contemplated legislation by the elected commons. What it did express was the conviction that the consent of the governed, the tax-paying governed, should be obtained by the ruling power. The mere legal maxim from the code of

Justinian—*ut quod omnes similiter tangit ab omnibus approbetur*—was transmuted by Edward I at the end of the thirteenth century into a great political and constitutional principle, and Edward's parliament created a precedent for parliamentary assemblies in the centuries to come.

The Spanish Cortes of Aragon and Castile had their town representatives a hundred years before Earl Simon's English parliament was elected.[1] From Spain had come the Order of St. Dominic, with its representative form of government, the friars in each priory electing their own prior at triennial elections, each priory sending two representatives every four years to the provincial chapter for the election of a provincial, and each province sending two representatives to the general chapter of the whole Order for the election of the master-general. (Such indeed was the practice of all the mendicant orders.) Earl Simon was in close association with St. Dominic's preaching friars. He saw the representative form of government at work, noted its successful working and introduced it into English political life. There was no alternative. Unconstitutional Monarchy had become an intolerable burden. Dictatorship was alien to the medieval mind. The great theologians of the Middle Ages distinguished between the constitutional king—'rex politicus'—who ruled according to law, and the tyrant who rules without it. (It was Lord Acton who decided that St. Thomas Aquinas with his constitutional theories was 'the first Whig.')

Historians have fastened on this summoning of a representative assembly in England at the close of the thirteenth century as a national event of decisive influence. Direction to parliamentary government was given which for the British people and all English-speaking peoples would be steadily pursued. Often obscured, thwarted, and denied, the British belief in the election of representatives to express the general will has endured. 'It is very evident that common dangers must be met by measures concerted in common,' ran the writ that called the bishops to the Model

[1] Sicily also. At Christmas, 1130, we find the first meeting of the Sicilian Parliament, at Palermo, which would have seven centuries of discontinuous and varied existence.

Parliament of 1295, and that sentiment is still held to be true.

At the same time the idea of universal suffrage is quite remote from medieval parliamentary government. The franchise is limited, strictly limited, and is not granted as a right but rather imposed as a duty. Ownership of land brought a voting qualification when it came to the election of knights of the shire. The freeholders, large or small alike, who composed the existing medieval county court or shire-moot that chose the county coroner, were the persons appointed to choose the man to be sent to parliament. (And, of course, the big landowners had a considerably greater influence than the small freeholder at the election of the knight of the shire, an influence enjoyed till within our own times.) The medieval county franchise in England was a simple and straightforward matter. The act of Henry VI in 1430, ordering that electors must have free land or tenement to the value of forty shillings a year remained in operation for four hundred years, till the Reform of 1832. On the other hand, the method of electing parliamentary representatives from the boroughs was a very haphazard business. The sheriff was ordered to provide for the return of two members from each city or borough in his county, but the towns to be regarded as boroughs were not named. Many a town had no wish to be taxed for the wages of its parliamentary representative, and it had no one who could afford to go at his own expense. Such a town did its best to come to some arrangement with the sheriff and thereby win exemption. The franchise itself was as arbitrary as the selection of towns to be represented. A few towns had a really wide franchise, the majority restricted the vote to members of the corporation and freemen of the town.

Yet in spite of vagaries of borough franchise, arbitrary choice of towns to be represented and predominance of the mighty lords in the county court, these early medieval parliaments really did represent the nation—peasants and artisans excluded. (And the artisans had their own experience of democracy in their self-governing religious and trade guilds and in the parish assembly with the various

parochial officers that had to be elected.) Our English parliaments of the Middle Ages might be unsymmetrical realities, elected anyhow, a chance collection of influential Englishmen, but their very character made them far more representative, far more genuine counsellors of a king who really needed to keep in touch with the nation, than the carefully designed and no less carefully packed parliaments of the Tudor regime. The medieval parliament was not fashioned by the Crown, nor managed by the administration. The medieval House of Commons was elected to vote money for national purposes and to petition for the redress of grievances. Legislation was not its work until the fifteenth century.

No modern anti-feminist notion obtrudes until a far later date. Abbesses being landowners, as the abbots were, summoned as a matter of course to the convocations of clergy in the reign of Edward I, were commonly excused attendance. Peeresses of the realm, that is peeresses in their own right, were always permitted to be represented by proxy in parliament. The offices of sheriff, high constable, governor of a royal castle, and justice of the peace, have all been held by women in the later Middle Ages. In fact, the lady of the manor had the same rights and duties as the lord of the manor, joining with men who were freeholders in the election of knights of the shire without question of sex disability. (The word 'male' was inserted before 'persons' in the charters of English boroughs in 1832. For the first time 'male person' appeared in a parliamentary statute. The privilege of abstention was thus converted into the penalty of exclusion.)

The payment of Members of Parliament by their constituents, by the freeholders who chose them, made certain small freeholders just as anxious to get their names off the electoral roll, as many a freeholder was anxious not to be sent to parliament. Four shillings a day, including the journey to and from London, for the knight of the shire, and two shillings a day for the borough member, were the wages fixed by law in 1323. It was considered fair that all who were excluded from voting should be exempt from contribution to the parliamentary wage fund, and to many

a small freeholder this exemption from payment seemed far more valuable than the privilege of voting.[1]

England, then, with its parliamentary representatives chosen by county and borough, with its self-governing guilds of artisans and craftsmen, its parish assemblies and their duly elected officers, did make and enjoy experience of democracy in the Middle Ages. This was also more or less the case in other countries of Christendom, in the feudal, religious, and popular conception of the time.

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The religious and political mind of medieval Europe saw Christendom as an universal society comprehending at once the supernatural and the natural. Two imperishable principles emerge : (1) That of the People as source of a right which had passed to authority (an idea derived from Roman tradition) ; and (2) that of a military Monarchy limited by peers or vassals and by the popular bodies, a principle said to be derived from Germanic law, to find fulfilment in government by consent of the governed. *Universality*, *limited authority*, and *government by consent*, these notions Christianity made its own. Although from time to time they might fall into abeyance or be obscured, they would never become utterly extinct.

Medieval democracy, indeed, passed with the passing of the Middle Ages. Medieval Catholic philosophy fell into disrepute, was forgotten, ignored, despised by the humanists of the Renaissance. The Protestant Reformation through the teaching of its founders, Luther and Calvin, would have none of it. European politics became power politics, strife between rulers of nations, wars for power. With the invasion and conquest of new lands in America, power in the eyes of the ruling sovereign was the instrument for imperial purpose. Catholic philosophy no longer remembered, a new doctrine of statecraft was required. Not St. Thomas Aquinas but Machiavelli provided the textbook for kings and statesmen, even though they professed to

[1] There are stray cases of the payment of members in the early years of the eighteenth century, but the poet Andrew Marvell, who sat for Hull in the reign of Charles II, drew his salary with regularity from the mayor and aldermen of the borough. In return, Marvell wrote letters from London describing passing events.

repudiate and denounce him. Protestant and Catholic rulers agreed that the sovereignty of the State allowed but one form of religion in the nation. The religion of the State must be the religion of all within the State. Parliaments existed to decree the will of the sovereign.

Yet what we may call the democratic idea still had its adherents. Banished from politics, without serious influence in local government, groups of Protestant sectaries cherished the idea of Christian democracy, a community united in the bonds of family affection. Moravians, a Society of Friends who came to be called Quakers, and others may be named. Calvinists assured of God's election while refusing the right of citizenship to Christians of the 'old religion,' judging them incapable of citizenship, denying indeed toleration of worship to Catholics, learnt the business of self-government in the English colonies of North America.

But even from the religious struggles and wars of religion, the new theoretical and practical values were emerging which would prepare the way for the modern democracies. With the collapse of the unity of Christendom, the need arose for a new Law of Nations. Modern international law is born with the Dominican Vitoria, the humanist Alberico Gentile, the Jesuit Suarez, and the Protestant Grotius, to mention only the greater names. Toleration was seen in its modern light by Erasmus, but also by the Socinians and later by the Arminians of Holland.

The struggles to defend the right of religious minorities revived the popular spirit of the communes of the Middle Ages; the free cities still resisted encroachments on their rights on the part of the princes, even while they often fell into the hands of oligarchies. The traditions of the seaboard republics and of the free cities of the Hanseatic League were maintained in the midst of many difficulties, with continuous risings in the name of liberty. Catalonia resisted the Kings of Aragon on behalf of its rights. The Cortes of Aragon and the Sicilian Parliament were still being called. The parliaments of France from time to time entered into conflict with the Monarchy. The States General did not fail to set a certain limit to the power of the Sovereign.

In England latitudinarianism, the fight for freedom extolled by Milton (his anti-Catholic hatred apart), the struggle of Parliament with the Stuarts, assisted the movement towards modern democracy. The intolerance that drove many to seek refuge in the New World brought the need of attempting two things together—colonial self-government and a religious toleration. The attempt ripened an American consciousness which, when the time came, would bear fruit. Colonists of the original thirteen States on the Atlantic seaboard of North America enjoyed home rule in practice at the outbreak of the War of Independence, and, trained to manage their own local affairs, acquired an aptitude for democracy.

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Modern democracy established in the independence of the thirteen United States is secular. Its dogma was the rights of man, its inspiration the *Contrat Social* of Jean Jacques Rousseau. The historic Declaration of Independence explained and justified the separation from Great Britain; it also affirmed the faith of modern democracy, the faith on which America has built its constitution.

'We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of those ends it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to reinstate a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.'

Thus the American colonists, 'representatives of the United States in general Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World, "did" solemnly publish and declare that these united colonies are and of right ought to be Free and Independent States.' Self-evident—not apparent to the senses, undemonstrable by law of science, but to be accepted by faith, as the dogma of

Christian theology that all men are equal before God must be accepted by faith—the doctrine of human equality and 'man's inalienable rights' was approved by American colonists as the basis of political society, and with it the secondary proposition that government 'derives its just powers from the consent of the governed'; that, in fact, the general will of the community is the supreme temporal authority in the State. Both propositions have of course been denied, derided, and ignored in America, as in many another free republic that has made them its basis. Nevertheless, in the United States the majority of its citizens have never frankly rejected the doctrine of an inalienable right, a fundamental and natural right to take part in the election of representatives, a right that belongs to personality and depends neither on material possessions, nor on mental or moral qualities. In similar fashion the doctrine that sovereignty resides in the People—still affirmed even by those who usurp political power and rule as dictators—remains a fundamental axiom of democracy.

The history of the United States has proved that a democratic theory of government can survive the distraction of internal civil war, harmonize the conflicting theories of sovereignty that caused it, extend the bounds of democracy over immense territories and absorb millions from other lands, continuously welding into a nation the alien elements. In a phrase, 'Government of the people, by the people, for the people,' one of the greatest of America's presidents interpreted the democratic formula, without always being scrupulous as to the means of expressing the general will or over nice in the methods employed in the choice of representatives.

France, the very home of Rousseau and the *Contrat Social*, not uninfluenced by the independence of the United States, also achieved democracy by appeal to arms. But the sovereignty of the people in France has never found rest in the parliament of elected representatives. From its passionate and triumphant explosion in the French Revolution, the sovereignty of the people has overturned governments, restored monarchies, and continuously threatened the existing political order. The present French Republic

is now nearly seventy years old and its stability appears assured. With the rapid changes of its ministers, the forming and re-forming of cabinets, the coalescing and divergence of the various groups of politicians—in all these things the centre of government is seen as something apart from sovereignty. France may have its universal suffrage—for males only, the one civilized land of parliamentary institutions where women have no vote—but the Chamber of Deputies elected on this suffrage does not express the sovereignty of the people. For the tradition of the Revolution has placed that sovereignty in the people as never to be transferred to elected representatives. The feeling cannot be eradicated, at least, so French writers tell us, and history would seem to confirm the statement. A plebiscite of the people transferred the sovereignty of the French nation from the assembly of elected representatives to the Emperor Napoleon III in the middle of the nineteenth century; and royalists still seek in France the restoration of Monarchy.

In England the oligarchy that deposed James II and put William III on the throne in 1688, accomplished what was called 'the Revolution.' It established the sovereignty of parliament that has remained. Democracy was very far from the vision of the wealthy landed gentry who governed Great Britain for nearly a hundred and fifty years. Political theory was of no interest to British statesmen. The philosophy of Locke influenced thought in France, directly influenced Rousseau; it did not disturb the mind of the ruling class in Great Britain. The proclamation of American independence and talk of the rights of man were outside practical politics. Parliament, controlled and largely owned by the ruling class, was the voice of the nation. So great and wise a man as Edmund Burke was satisfied that the settlement of 1688 was final. The French Revolution with its violence and massacres shocked and estranged from democracy the liberal minds that had welcomed the fall of the Bastile.

Yet a faith in democracy was kindled in England; and in that faith men clamoured for the reform of parliament, and would not rest till parliament itself in 1832 passed the

Reform Bill and brought a middle class into the seats of the mighty in the British House of Commons. Modern democracy begins in England with that reform of parliament in the year 1832. The municipalities that governed the towns and cities were swiftly changed by act of parliament from coteries of corrupt and inefficient men into responsible bodies of elected representatives ; and in the administration of local government they learnt slowly, often reluctantly, the business of honest management of public money. Extension of local government, increase of municipal powers and civic rule, continuous in Great Britain for the last hundred years, never impinged on the sovereignty of parliament. The personnel of the House of Commons might change—it did change—with an electorate that came to include not only the mass of the working class, but in the twentieth century the hitherto unenfranchized women of the country. The House of Commons survived the changes, its sovereign authority undisputed. For democracy, as for a previous oligarchy, the parliament of Great Britain represents the sovereignty of the people. That man is born with an inalienable or self-evident right to vote ; that any political theory, or philosophic doctrine is required to justify the franchise ; that, in short, democracy rests on a supernatural or mystical covenant—on all such matters the British citizen is completely agnostic. The vote is regarded as a right conditioned by residence ; an opportunity to take part in the choice of a representative to the sovereign assembly of the nation ; with the knowledge that on the composition of that assembly depends the kind of government that will rule for the next four years. The elected representative is not a delegate of the majority that has voted for him ; he may be the spokesman of his Party, but he is the representative of the whole constituency. (A preference for party government, and not more than two parties at that, is traditional in England. Sometimes a vital issue divides the parties ; at other times it is not clear what grave difference of policy exists.)

Democracy is stable in Great Britain because the mass of its inhabitants are convinced that government through elected representatives is a sure and simple device for

securing law and order at home and the safety of British subjects abroad. Voting is congenial to British people. It offers a guarantee of personal freedom at the least expense. In the trade union and friendly society the workman learns the responsibility of electing officers who will look after his welfare and of dismissing them when they fail. We are forever forming committees and electing officials whom we can trust to carry out our wishes and our plans. Great Britain also abounds in men and women who are ready to be elected to any office proposed to them, whether it be the candidature of a seat in parliament, membership on a local governing council, or the secretaryship of a society for promoting some good cause. The amount of disinterested work, done in Great Britain without financial remuneration and from public spirit for social, religious, philanthropic, humanitarian, and political causes, is positively amazing. And it is just this readiness to serve the common weal without reward that is the strength of modern democracy in English-speaking lands.

To nineteenth-century Liberals the British Constitution, with its limited Monarchy and parliamentary supremacy, appeared as an ideal form of democratic government for all nations. It provided representation of the people, by the people, for the people in a secular state. Great Britain might have its established churches in England and Scotland, because these existing institutions no longer curtailed the political liberties of persons dissenting from the Anglican and Presbyterian faiths. When the British colonies—Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa—became self-governing dominions, ruled by their own parliaments, they endowed no State Church and required no profession of Christian belief from their elected representatives. (To-day the King of England alone has to suffer a religious disability attached to a political office. His Britannic Majesty is required at his coronation to swear allegiance to ' the Protestant religion ' and to be a member of the established Churches of England and Scotland.) The basis of the democratic State in all the dominions of the British Commonwealth is liberal and secular, neither clerical nor anti-clerical, generally Christian and Theist.

Because the British people, with their long experience of the machinery of voting, and their preference for the election of officers to the direct responsibility of a more personal decision, achieved an obviously successful form of democracy it by no means followed, as latter-day Liberals assumed, that popularly elected assemblies were a cure for the political troubles throughout the world.

The slow process of political change in England, abiding influence of custom and habit, impatience of all theory except the theory of evolution, stress on precedent, readiness to choose ' the gentleman ' for captain both in politics and in sport—the very insularity of Great Britain gave a confident assurance of stability to its acceptance of democracy in the shape of representation of the people, by the people, for the people. British-speaking people in their self-governing dominions throughout the world do not favour revolutionary action, they cannot appeal to the past to justify change of government by violence. In fact, revolution is not in the rules of the political game as played by the men and women of British descent, and therefore has no terrors for parliamentary democracy.

There is no evidence that our modern European form of democracy, our liberal government by elected representatives, is of universal application, its merits discernible by all nations, its success as the instrument of internal security, of law and order within, and security without, assured. Thousands of intelligent Indians educated in English universities, nourished in the doctrine of philosophic liberalism in the colleges of their native land, are bent on achieving complete self-government, fashioned on the Western model of parliamentary rule. Yet the customs of India are remote from this model. Caste, untouchable class, and the extreme poverty of the people are bound to hinder the free choice of an electorate. The rule of age by youth challenges the whole traditional order of the East. Tyranny and imperial bureaucracy supply no education in democracy, but have made possible an Indian bureaucracy and the rule of an enlightened oligarchy. Our British political system which Indians during residence in England have seen at work, has brought

conviction that the same system could be applied to India. And it is true that in legislative and provincial councils the form of a limited democracy may be observed. But in any case the demand for national independence is not necessarily a demand for democracy. Aristocracy as often as not seeks the overthrow of foreign rule ; tribal chiefs and large landholders irked by the restraints of an alien suzerainty, would free themselves without thought of freedom for the people.

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The XIX century is spoken of now as the century of Freedom, now as that of democracy. As a matter of fact, the struggles, revolts, and wars of the first half of the century were made for constitutional liberties, or for national independence. Thus Belgium became an independent and liberal State, Greece threw off the Turkish yoke, Spain fought her civil wars, the Balkan nationalities became conscious of their individuality, Italy started her Risorgimento, Hungary fought for her traditional rights, Ireland and Poland rose, and Germany moved towards a free federation. 1848 marked the triumph of parliaments and political liberties all over Europe. Democracy there was not, save in France for a short time, but the foundations of democracy had been laid. Quarter of a century later, the bourgeois governments of Europe, England included, accepted a widened or universal suffrage (as the case might be), and we have the first social legislation on behalf of the workers, the recognition to Labour of certain rights, in a word, the entry of the working class into politics. Democracies established themselves nearly everywhere, together with the parliamentary system and Cabinet government.

This did not happen in Germany, or in Austria, or in the Balkan countries, where the power of the sovereign and of his government was independent of parliament, or where the masses were not yet admitted to political activity. In Italy there was an intermediate system, parliamentary and democratic, but without universal suffrage, which came only in 1912.

Not everywhere was this regime adapted to the general conditions of the particular country ; it corresponded to

the European atmosphere of freedom and to the pressure of the middle and working classes, striving for better economic and moral conditions, which should have been obtainable with free institutions and with a stable and peaceable social organization.

Unhappily, on the Continent the movement for political democracy was promoted in an anti-Catholic spirit, so that often the cause of the Church was confused with that of reaction, and the Church was refused those very liberties that were to be given to the people, especially the freedom of the school. Catholics consequently generally sided with the anti-democratic reaction. Pope Leo XIII vainly exhorted the Catholics of France to rally to the republic. The Christian Democratic groups, having a social programme, alone did so. Further, with the rise of the Socialist parties, the middle class, which held control of public power, often opposed the just claims of the labouring people, thus creating class and party divisions disastrous to the internal unity of nations.

Finally, the accumulation of armaments and the accompanying distrust that diverted the policy of the five great Powers: Great Britain, France, the German Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Russia, disturbed the whole development of democracy towards the end of the last century. A period (1900–1914) of European prosperity promised an extension of democracy. And then came war, with profound changes in political constitutions. Modern democracy expressed in the liberal democratic State has fallen in Europe in lands where for the most part its representative institutions, weakened by the War of 1914–1918, rent by internal faction, were disintegrated by the coming of an armed dictatorship. The Russian multitudes, utterly without experience of political responsibility, surrendered to the dictatorship of Lenin and his successor, accepting passively a change of government and being indeed without will or means to resist.

The dictator standing before the world as the saviour of society will always rally to his standard the men and women who despise democracy, who applaud tyranny and acclaim 'strong government.' The petty tyrant finds employment

in the service of the dictator. But dictators leave no heirs and the appeal of democracy, overclouded, overthrown, apparently exterminated in so great a part of Europe, has not been entirely silenced. For 'government of the people, by the people, for the people,' is no mere shibboleth, but recognizably a sound and sensible principle of government, likely to bring the largest measure of life and liberty to its subjects. Always provided that the men and women chosen by their fellows to rule over them pursue neither personal gain nor enlargement of ambition, but the common good and, not content with things as they are, will work for a better future—we should say for a democracy more organic, more social, and with surer Christian inspiration. But democracy to-day in many lands has the names of such men and women on its roll, and there is no reason to suppose the supply will fail.

IV

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

By V. M. Crawford

AFTER the upheaval, felt throughout Europe, of the French Revolution, followed by the Napoleonic wars, a strong reaction set in against democracy and popular rights in practically all countries, threatening to reduce the nations of Europe once more to a political subservience as complete as that of the previous century. Catholics found themselves in a specially difficult situation. Everywhere churches and institutions had suffered, ecclesiastical administration largely disorganized and religious communities scattered. Very much had to be rebuilt, and it was natural that many Catholic minds both ecclesiastical and lay, should turn to the past for inspiration and hanker after the protection of the old State autocracies. The break with the immediate past, however, had been too complete, and the ferment of liberty throughout Europe too vital for any immediate return to political absolutism without a bitter struggle.

Surprisingly enough, the first country to solve on new lines at once its religious and its political difficulties was Ireland. It is to Daniel O'Connell that we owe this unforeseen upspringing of a modern Catholic democracy, by a genuine movement of the people in which the clergy participated, and in which the fight for religious freedom went hand in hand with the struggle for political rights. With some of the worst faults of the demagogue, O'Connell combined the most brilliant gifts of the orator and advocate, a love of liberty that was 'less a principle than a passion,' and a patriotism that was to inspire the whole of his amazing

career. It was said of him that ' he took all Ireland for his client.' A Catholic by birth and education, when to be a Catholic in Ireland was to have neither political rights nor professional prospects, O'Connell refused from the first to allow the cause of religious liberty to be separated from that of political freedom. Throughout the XVIII century there had indeed been spasmodic agitations for Catholic emancipation coming mainly from the Catholic nobility and Anglo-Irish families, who resented being cut off from the political life of England, while caring little or nothing for the disastrous effects of English rule on their poorer neighbours. As his latest biographer, Sean O'Faoilan, has emphasized, O'Connell's aim was an Irish democracy enjoying to the full both religious and political freedom with all that such freedom connotes. He was not a Republican, and in later years he shewed himself suspicious of trade unionism, and was quite untouched by that enthusiasm for social reforms which already in his day was inspiring the best Liberal minds in England—such things, for him, were never of the essence of the task he had set himself. This implied in the first instance, the freeing of his country from the tyranny of Protestant intolerance.

Thus, in popular estimation, O'Connell stands as the man who carried Catholic Emancipation in the teeth of English religious prejudice and of the scruples of a mad old king. In truth, he was much more than this. The Irish peasantry, before O'Connell's day, was sunk in such a state of poverty and ignorance that any unity of action and common policy must have seemed at the time wellnigh hopeless of realization. It needed a man of vision and genius to link up the religion of the common people with the growing national ambitions of an antagonistic class, gathering together all the scattered and undisciplined elements of the population into a great national movement which, bit by bit, compelled concessions from the English House of Commons and, in the end, changed the whole face of the country.

Incidentally, also, O'Connell solved for Ireland the always difficult problem of the right balance between Church and State, establishing a most useful tradition. Thus, in a very true sense, Daniel O'Connell was the Irish Liberator, the

founder of that self-governing, democratic State—which we know to-day as Eire.

Emancipation thus won in the name of religious liberty for a Catholic people was hailed as a great victory throughout Catholic Europe, and not least in Rome where the case was judged on its merits rather than in its wider implications. All through Europe the belief in the rights of nationality and popular government was growing in strength in revolt against the restored Monarchies of 1815, which had been determined to crush once for all the spirit that had provoked the French Revolution. Only too often the ecclesiastical authorities were siding openly with what they regarded as the legitimate forces of law and order, although these, as often before, while professing loyalty to the Church, were mainly intent on making it subservient to their own political interests. Thus the Church in its rightful efforts to regain complete freedom for religious worship and Christian education seldom had a free hand, and was apt to find itself involved in the political unpopularity incurred by reactionary governments.

Among the more educated classes this revived liberal spirit which in effect produced the wide revolutionary movements of 1830 and 1848, was closely related to the romantic movement in literature. In its essence a revolt against the cramping laws of classicism in literary composition, romanticism implied also a certain return to historic and traditional values, while opening the doors in all countries to a flood of eloquent, emotional literature both in prose and verse, which carried people off their feet and inspired them with dreams of freedom often far removed from the prosaic facts of life. It will be remembered how greatly enthusiasm in England was stirred for Greek independence by Lord Byron, and how passionately Shelley denounced the tyrants of his day. In Catholic circles so soul-stirring a movement was bound to influence religious life and thought. Thus in Germany it coincided with, if it did not actually inspire, a wide return in intellectual circles to the Catholic Church in opposition both to the rationalistic tendencies of much Protestant teaching, and to the absolutist theories of the restored monarchies.

In Italy the romantic movement centred mainly round two personalities, Manzoni and Mazzini. The former enchanted his generation with prose and verse that exhaled the purest spirit of Catholic faith together with an intense love and understanding of popular life. The latter, under the motto 'God and the People,' preached a new religion of liberty and patriotism, combined with a high ethical ideal of conduct and a vivid sense of human fraternity, the whole based on a mystical faith in a Supreme Being. The one within, and the other without the Catholic Church, contributed greatly to the new passion for freedom and national unity that produced the Risorgimento. The majority of Italian Catholics at that time were royalists and faithful to the reigning Houses and to authoritarian principles. Nevertheless, a movement was taking shape, to be known as Neo-Guelf, of which the leaders were Gioberti, Cesare Balbo, Rosmini, Manzoni, Cantù, Tosti, E. Amari, and others. They stood for the union of all Italy in a federative, constitutional system, and regarded the problem of liberty and nationality as one, while for most of them the democratic idea remained nebulous, and indeed incomprehensible to not a few. Nevertheless, political liberties were to prove the basis of the future democracy.

In France, in the years after the Restoration, leaders of thought were anxiously at work seeking for a fresh philosophic or Christian basis for a reconstructed civilization. In their different spheres, Chateaubriand and Lamartine both contributed to this task. One aspect of the problem was the disentangling of the rightful claims of democracy from their anti-Christian antecedents inherited from revolutionary days. More quickly than in England, French eyes were opened to the social and economic evils produced by industrialism and to the shocking conditions of poverty and misery with an utter destruction of family life, imposed on the helpless factory hands by the *laissez-faire* school. It was this recognition of the offence against social justice implicit in the principles of the Manchester school, combined with a new conception of political liberty as an essential ingredient of the religious life of a nation, that brought

men like Lamennais and Lacordaire, Montalembert and Ozanam, to a realization of the need for political action based on clear Catholic principles.

The overthrow of the Bourbons in 1830, to be followed by a comparatively liberal regime under Louis-Philippe, afforded an opportunity for action while raising somewhat undue hopes of a new period of freedom and progress on all sides. Under the brilliant leadership of the Abbé Lamennais, an enthusiastic group of young ' Liberal Catholics ' gathered round his paper *L'Avenir*, bearing the motto, borrowed from O'Connell, 'God and Freedom,' and carried on an ardent but brief campaign for religion and liberty in the affairs of the State. Unhappily all the timid and traditionalist elements of the Church in France took alarm, more especially at the advocacy of the separation of Throne and Altar, formulated by Montalembert as ' a free Church in a free State.' Everyone is familiar with the outcome : the imprudent appeal to Rome for an authoritative ruling, the publication by Gregory XVI of the encyclical *Mirari vos*, condemning all the more advanced views advocated in *L'Avenir*, the suppression of the paper and the ultimate secession of Lamennais. The remaining two ' pilgrims of liberty ' loyally submitted, while Catholic enthusiasm was chilled and discouraged. But nothing could stop the ferment for liberty that was rousing the nations of Europe. Montalembert, taught prudence by adversity, devoted his brilliant eloquence in future years mainly to leading the battle for freedom of education and the rights of voluntary association. To him, too, was largely due the passing of the first Act in France to limit the hours of children in factories.

The Abbé Lacordaire, after *Mirari vos*, devoted himself mainly to his great work as a preacher, and then vanished from public life for five years in order to reappear in the Dominican habit and attract vast crowds to his sermons at Notre Dame. His passion for liberty was second only to his passion for religion, hence his bold insistence on the need for free speech and a free press, and also his oft-quoted words : 'J'espère mourir en religieux pénitent et en libéral impénitent.'

1830 was also the date of the revolt of the Flemings and

Walloons against the House of Orange, Catholics taking part in it in the name of liberty. Thus was constituted modern Belgium, which from the first enjoyed a liberal constitution in which Catholics participated. Nevertheless, the birth of the Belgian Catholic Party and the initiation of a social democratic movement only came about later.

On the death of Gregory XVI (1846) the election of Pius IX gave a surprising impetus to liberal hopes all over Europe. Young, easy of access, and adored by the poor of Rome, the new Pope gave every indication of liberal sentiments. One of his first acts was to recall to Rome the Theatine fathers, Padre Ventura, one of the most powerful preachers and advanced thinkers of his day and a personal friend of Lamennais, even after his fall, who had lived in semi-retirement under Gregory XVI. His two sermons on the death of O'Connell, preached at the request of the Pope, gave him the opportunity for glorifying the union of religion and liberty, and created an immense sensation. Thus when the revolutionary year of 1848 dawned, many Italian patriots marched to the cry of ' long live the Pope,' and in Paris Lacordaire did not hesitate to take his seat with other Catholics among the deputies of the extreme Left in the new National Assembly.

Unhappily the exaggerated hopes of future freedom kindled by early revolutionary successes in various capitals, as well as the demand of the workers for a direct participation in the political life of a popular democracy, were not destined of fulfilment. Genuine fears of Communism were roused through the appearance of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, and greatly stiffened Conservative resistance. In Rome itself violent disorders caused the flight of Pius IX to Gaeta, followed by the brief triumph of the Roman Republic and the ultimate return of the Pope under the protection of a French army. It was the end of any possibility of a policy of liberty and democratic conciliation on the part of the Vatican. In France, the *coup d'état* of 1851 proved the death-warrant of popular aspirations, as Lacordaire foresaw, and inaugurated twenty years of imperialistic reaction.

The interest, where Catholic liberalism is concerned,

was transferred to Germany. Already, in earlier years, some progress had been made in Catholic social organization on democratic lines, but it was not till the collapse of State absolutism in 1848 that a great forward movement on political lines became possible. This was largely due to a priest of volcanic energy, Freiherr von Ketteler, later Bishop of Mainz. Inspired at once with a hatred of Prussian bureaucracy and a passion for liberty, not least on behalf of the Church, he flung himself into the political turmoil of 1848 and was elected to the National Assembly at Frankfort. Later he withdrew from direct political action, but, as Bishop of Mainz, by outspoken sermons and by a constant stream of pastorals, pamphlets and press articles, he led and controlled for many years a political movement which had for its main objectives complete freedom for the Church, more especially in educational matters, and progressive legislation for the moral and material welfare of the worker. Ketteler combatted the capitalist absolutism that threatened to enslave the worker as ruthlessly as the State Socialism advocated by Marx. Thus he made bitter enemies in both camps, but he laid the foundations of a powerful Catholic party, encouraged by the hierarchy though controlled by laymen which, after 1870, was to develop into the great Centre Party in the Reichstag.

This Centre Party, so often misunderstood in England, owed its position mainly to two forces, first to the solid political backing it received from workers' organizations of all kinds linked together through great annual Catholic congresses, and secondly, to the many competent, highly-trained laymen to be found in its ranks. Foremost among these was the parliamentary leader, Dr. Windthorst, small in stature but great in political wisdom, to whose guidance it was largely due that the Party remained essentially Catholic while keeping its freedom from clerical control.

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Previous to the publication by Pius IX of the Syllabus (1863), the political tendency of Catholics in most European countries had been towards a liberal rather than a democratic constitutional system. One of the first with the

courage to pronounce the word democracy was Montalembert, at the Catholic International Congress at Malines (1863), when Mgr Manning, as he then was, claimed complete liberty for Catholics as the only basis of life for them in modern society. He added : ' The new society, democracy, to call it by its name, exists. . . . I look before me and everywhere I can only see democracy. . . . In the new order Catholics will have to fight, but they have nothing to fear.'

Montalembert was correct when he envisaged for democratic Catholics a struggle on two fronts : on the one hand, against anti-clericals who regarded them as reactionaries, and on the other against conservative and often reactionary Catholics who advocated either absolutism or an authoritarian constitution, but never liberty, and still less, democracy. When the Syllabus was issued Liberal Catholics became suspect to both parties. Mgr Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, in an effort to direct public opinion, published a statement on the Syllabus, approved by Rome and by six hundred bishops, but in point of fact, political activity died down among Liberal Catholics until the events of 1870–71 gave the movement a far wider field of action.

For it was then Italy invaded Rome, putting an end to the Temporal Power while emphasizing its anti-clerical spirit ; Bismarck constituted the German Empire and embarked on the *Kulturkampf* against Catholics, while France abolished the imperial regime and set up the third democratic republic which soon shewed itself anti-clerical.

In these same years the various Socialist parties were becoming organized and enrolling the workers in large numbers, while anarchist movements filled governments and the bourgeoisie with alarm. In all countries there were groups of intellectual Catholics who could not be satisfied with mere condemnations of Socialism : what they were seeking for was an active social policy. Internationally they had the support of three Cardinals, Gibbons in America. Mermillod in Switzerland, and Manning in England. Broadly speaking, Catholics advocated a return to some form of corporative economy—a conception specially elaborated by La Tour du Pin—and were keen to promote the reconciliation of employers and employed in the

industrial sphere. Moreover, in opposition to the extreme liberal *laissez-faire* school, they began to urge social legislation by the State as the only means to curb the ruthless exploitation of the factory hand.

Clearly the actual developments of so wide a politico-social movement varied considerably in contiguous countries. Austria came quickly under German influences, but even here the movement developed special characteristics, thanks to economic and agrarian conditions within the Empire. Led by Baron Vogelsang it was mainly aristocratic and unfortunately anti-Semitic, and while producing much intellectual discussion of economic theories, especially concerning the nature of usury, had small practical results. Somewhat later a real democratic policy on behalf of the workers of Vienna was initiated by the Catholic but definitely anti-Semitic Mayor, Dr. Karl Lueger.

In Switzerland, on the other hand, a frankly democratic movement in the German-speaking cantons was led in the National Council by Gaspard Decurtins, an enthusiastic disciple of Ketteler and a fervent ultramontane. Thanks to him Catholics took their fair share with others in promoting the labour laws which have helped to place Switzerland in the forefront of well-governed countries. Moreover, to Decurtins was due the earliest realization that Labour legislation, to be really effective, would have to be international, and he outlined a scheme in a weighty pamphlet containing the first germ of a conception which was to lead, some thirty years later, to the foundation of the International Labour Office. Meanwhile, in the French-speaking cantons, Cardinal Mermillod was making Fribourg an active centre at which democratic leaders of all countries met for fruitful discussion of social problems.[1]

In Belgium, so long dominated politically and intellectually by the Liberal Free-Trade school, Catholics were slow in realizing the implications of Catholic democratic principles, and it was from Germany, rather than from France,

[1] About the same time Swiss Catholics began to organize politically, first by cantons and then in the Federal Assemblies. They took the name of Democratic Conservatives, since they wished to combine conservation of traditional institutions and cantonal liberties (against excessive centralization) with the Swiss democratic spirit. One of their most enlightened leaders was G. Cattori. They have given various presidents to the Confederation.

that they ultimately drew their inspiration. The so-called 'school of Liége' with its annual congresses, led by the fiery Abbé Pottier, advocated what was then a very advanced programme of industrial reform to remedy the terrible conditions in Belgian mines and heavy industry. Later, political action was carried into the Belgian Chamber by the *Ligue Démocratique Belge*, a group that maintained a difficult fight against the very Conservative Catholic party, for whom all Labour legislation was pure Socialism. Into the wide field of Catholic social reform which has had such splendid results in Belgium, it is impossible to enter here.

In Holland also, Catholic democratic effort had been for many years frankly political, and nowhere has it been more markedly successful, Catholics as a result (one-third of the population) taking to-day a very full share in the government of the country. Coming late into the political field after a long and arduous fight for their educational rights, Dr. Schaepman was one of the first Catholics to enter the Dutch Chamber on an advanced Labour programme, and by the end of the century he had organized an active group of some twenty-five Catholic Labour Deputies, in the teeth of much Conservative opposition. The backbone of the Party has always been the Catholic trade unions, second numerically only to the Socialist unions and linked together in a strong central confederation. On Dr. Schaepman's death in 1903, his place as leader was filled by Mgr Nolens, a broad-minded ecclesiastic, who became well-known beyond the borders of Holland through his active propaganda on behalf of international Labour organization. (d. 1931.) Holland, in short, is one of the few countries in Europe to-day where Catholic prospects can be regarded with wide satisfaction.

From the fall of the Second Empire a Christian social movement had begun to revive in France, thanks in the first instance to the efforts of La Tour du Pin and Albert de Mun, but unfortunately on a paternal basis—duty of the rich towards the poor—rather than a democratic one. In later years, in the French Chamber, de Mun, realizing at length the need for political action, did noble service in promoting Bills in favour of Labour syndicates, workmen's

insurance, etc., and he was warmly helped by a little band of democratic abbés—Lemire, Gayraud, Naudet, and others. Yet the fact remains that the Catholic social movement in France was far less democratic and attained to far less political unity than either in Belgium or Germany. Even the publication of Leo XIII's important labour encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), which gave such definite encouragement to the Christian social school in all countries and implicitly, at least, condemned the bitter hostility of so many conservative Catholics to any measure of social reform, did little in France to draw Catholics together.

Unhappily at that very time they were torn into antagonistic camps over the policy of *ralliement* to the Republic, urged on them, largely in vain, by Leo XIII. Later the Dreyfus case and the persistent anti-clericalism of successive republican ministries added to the spirit of faction, not a little fomented by the Catholic Press, that has rendered any cohesive Catholic policy on democratic lines impossible of realization. Intellectual and philosophic controversy of a high order has been available in plenty, what has been lacking is practical achievement. A resolute effort was made by Jacques Piou when, out of heterogeneous elements, he built up the *Action Libérale Populaire* which, until the War, served as a useful rallying ground for democratic Catholics. It had some success at the polls and its annual congresses passed admirable resolutions, but for various parliamentary reasons, very few industrial proposals ever reached the statute book, with the result that until quite recently France, as regards social legislation, was among the backward countries of Europe.

Towards the end of the century one wing of the Christian social movement adopted the name of Christian democracy.[1] It made an immediate appeal among working men who had

[1] The name 'Christian Democracy' made its first appearance in Belgium. It was soon after adopted in Italy, and its chief and most authoritative champion in Europe was Giuseppe Toniolo, professor of Economics at the University of Pisa. He was a leader of the Italian Catholic Social movement, and one of those who had done most for the preparation and diffusion of the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. He took a prominent part in the creation of a network of co-operatives, savings' banks, and land banks (of these last the chief apostle was Don Luigi Cerutti of Venice). Professor Toniolo died in October, 1918. The Preparatory Process for his beatification is in course.

refrained from joining the Socialist parties owing to their anti-religious and revolutionary propaganda. The younger groups were keen to work on frankly political lines, but the wisdom of such a policy was questioned by many leaders and was opposed by all Catholic Conservatives. Leo XIII had shewn himself well-disposed to the Christian democratic development, and had used the oft-quoted words: 'If democracy is Christian it should bring peace and well-being to the world.' Nevertheless, Catholic opposition increased, especially in Italy, where, owing to the *non expedit* Catholics were debarred from voting in parliamentary elections and could not offer themselves as candidates. It was then that Leo XIII published his encyclical, *Graves de Communi*, in which he announced that the term Christian democracy could only apply to the social movement in favour of the working classes and *not* to a democratic system of government.

The movement continued to exist for a time in France in the Sillon (condemned later by Pius X),[1] in Belgium in the Democratic League already referred to, and in Italy in the Christian Democratic League, but by degrees the term was quietly shelved among Catholics except in a very restricted sense. The few Italian Catholics who were permitted by Pius X to sit in the Italian Chamber of Deputies called themselves simply Catholics, and devoted themselves exclusively to religious and educational matters and to specific labour legislation.

Such was the position in Europe when the World War came, bringing wholly new conditions.

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In Germany the change was cataclysmic. The Centre Party had an active role in the new Weimar Constitution. In Bavaria a new Catholic Popular Party, more social and decentralizing, joined forces with it for political purposes, and together they carried on successfully for some years the difficult policy of co-operation with the Socialists.

[1] The Sillon was not condemned as being a democratic movement, but because '"*Par un amour mal entendu des faibles*" it sought by the teachings of the Gospel to justify excessive theories on the economic, intellectual and political emancipation of the humble.' (*Ecclesia*, Bloud et Gay, 1927, p. 464.)

In this way they brought about the Concordat with the Holy See and the transfer of the Nuntiature from Munich to Berlin. No less than three Catholics were Chancellors in the post-War period : Wirth, Marx, and Brüning. The latter has been blamed for weakness towards the early manifestations of Nazism, but he was kept in an intolerable position by the intransigent attitude of England and France towards German efforts at economic reconstruction. The German Catholics of the Right were afraid of Bolshevism as had been the Catholics of the Right in Italy. Hitler, in spite of decrees condemning his theories on the part of courageous bishops, was attracting Catholic youth, which was tending to forsake the Centre as too bound up with the Socialists. The ultimate collapse without a fight of the once powerful Centre Party before the triumphant advance of Hitler to autocratic power, remains something of a mystery, and has been followed by the complete destruction of the whole network of Christian trade unions, and of beneficent social and economic organizations with which the Party had helped to cover the country.

In Austria Catholic democratic interests have suffered no less. Mgr Seipel was twice Chancellor, holding office for many years. Roughly speaking the Catholics held the country while the Socialists dominated Vienna. But when the clash came in 1927 between Catholics and Socialists, the tendency of the Catholic leaders was towards a more and more autocratic policy. Thus Dollfuss, by degrees, abandoned the whole democratic system of the Republic, dissolving the Catholic Workers League, while Schuschnigg never attempted to act in concert with the workers until it was too late. It is a melancholy history of failure.

Turning to Italy we find that it was in the difficult, troubled years immediately after the War when parliament shewed itself mute and ineffective, and men had lost faith in the Liberal-democratic conception of the State that had prevailed so long that Catholic democrats began to band themselves together under the leadership of the Sicilian priest, Don Sturzo, in a political party to be known as the *Partito Popolare Italiano*. Its amazingly rapid success founded officially by the issue of its programme in January, 1919,

won it no less than ninety-nine seats, or one-fifth of the whole, in the elections to the Chamber in the following November—shewed conclusively the wide need for a party representing the moderate element, Catholic in spirit though not in name, which had so long been unrepresented in the councils of the nation.

From the first the Popular Party naturally occupied a centre position in the Chamber, opposed both to Socialism and to those violent and autocratic tendencies that were so soon to develop into Fascism. Its programme was fundamentally democratic, neither individualist nor *étatist*, but free, decentralized, and organic. The strongest weapon of the *Popolari* was that they had snatched the political monopoly from the Liberals and the social monopoly from the Socialists. Unhappily the parliamentary position was such that they could do little more than exercise a moderating influence, now supporting, now opposing the successive ministries of Nitti, Giolitti, and Bonomi. Thus the Party opposed the general strikes in 1922, under the Nitti ministry, and again the workers' control of the factories under Giolitti, while making repeated efforts on behalf of Catholic freedom in the schools and to promote measures for the benefit of agriculture. Later the *Popolari* definitely refused to collaborate in a Giolitti cabinet. As Mussolini rose to power with the support of the wealthy classes in their exaggerated panic concerning Bolshevism—already on the wane in Italy—and with the growing subservience of the Government towards him, the Popular Party found itself more and more isolated. Nevertheless, after the March on Rome (October, 1922), certain *Popolari*, not without misgivings, consented to enter the first Mussolini cabinet. But the increasing illegality of the Government soon rendered their co-operation a moral impossibility and at a congress at Turin (April, 1923), the Party reaffirmed its principles of liberty and democracy with an emphasis that brought a rupture with the Fascists. The *Popolari* ministers resigned and the opposition of the Party to Fascism became complete at the general election that followed in April, 1924, and at which the new electoral law reduced the number of Deputies of all parties save the Fascist. The

largest opposition party was that of the *Popolari* with forty-eight members.

Two months later the brutal murder of Matteotti and the events that ensued caused the formal withdrawal from parliament both of the Popular Party and the Socialist and democratic groups to what was to be known as the Aventine. This step implied a revolutionary action that was not followed up. Only the editor of *Il Popolo*, the *Popolare* organ, Dr. G. Donati, denounced General de Bono in the Senate as co-responsible for the Matteotti crime. There followed a trial before the High Court which pronounced a verdict of ' not proven.' In the heated atmosphere of the time the friends of Don Sturzo, deeply anxious for his safety, persuaded him to leave Italy and take refuge in London at the close of 1924. Several of his co-workers were compelled to adopt a similar course.[1]

After two years of secession and four years of opposition and protest, against the Fascist regime, the various parties of the Aventine, including the *Popolari*, were dissolved by royal decree (November, 1926), and this followed shortly after by the dissolution of all the federated labour unions, including the Confederatione dei Lavoratori (Christian Democrats) with a total membership of over one million. Moreover the Fascists forcibly took over many of the agricultural co-operatives, Catholic banks, etc., many of them run by the *Popolari*. Thus the whole of the political and social activities of Italian Catholics was brought to an end, leaving nothing but Catholic Action, of a strictly religious and cultural character.

It is pleasant to turn back to France, which, in spite of invasion, suffered little change in its political life. Thanks to the union achieved during the War, the bitter anti-clericalism of the Combes period was never renewed and Catholics were zealous in building up again all their social organizations. Thus the well-known *Semaines Sociales*, which collect some three thousand to four thousand eager social students every July for a week's strenuous social

[1] The most notable were Dr. Donati, at the time of the verdict of the High Court of Justice (end of 1925), and Francesco Luigi Ferrari, leader of the Left-wing of the Popular Party, after this had been dissolved at the end of 1926. Both died in Paris, at the age of forty-two.

study, started once more with larger attendances than before. Alsace-Lorraine brought a welcome contribution of democratic Catholicism to the nation, and when, in 1924, the Democratic Popular Party was founded, it worked in close contact with the Alsatian Popular Action, which was putting up a strong and successful fight to keep their religious schools outside the French secular education system.[1] A recent sign of the times was that another group of democratic Catholics, the *Jeune République*, contributed a minister, M. Philippe Serre, to the Popular Front, so violently denounced by Catholic Conservatives. A fresh political impulse has undoubtedly been given in the last six years by the daily paper, *l'Aube*, definitely Catholic and strongly republican and democratic which quite recently has been engaged in setting up all over the country the *Nouvelles Equipes Françaises* (N.E.F.) to further the Christian and democratic idea among all sections of the people. A similar aim, on more intellectual lines, underlies various ably edited Catholic reviews such as the *Vie Intellectuelle*, *Esprit*, and *Temps Present*.

Very striking, too, is the steady growth throughout the country of popular organizations on a definitely religious basis. Thus the 'Jocistes,' founded eleven years ago on the Belgian model, number in France alone over 100,000 young men and women pledged to an active Christian life of service in factory and workshop. Many thousands more are organized in similar agricultural and educational groups. Again, the 'Scouts de France,' on lines adapted from our English Boy Scouts, but definitely religious, trains over 75,000 in Catholic doctrine and ideals, passing many on to the adult organizations. The Catholic syndicates, or trade unions, though far inferior in numbers to the Socialist C.G.T., can yet boast over half a million members federated in the Confederation of Christian Workers. All this cannot fail, in due course, to have an effect on the political and social life of the nation. Indeed, one may say that the danger to democracy in France to-day comes far less from

[1] Its leader, M. Champetier de Ribes (now a Senator), has been several times Minister, as he is at the time of writing, in the Daladier Cabinet, while another of its members, M. Pézet, has been for some years Vice-President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber.

Communism than from the growth of Fascist and anti-Semitic tendencies among the middle classes.

Spain, unfortunately, has always been backward in any Catholic democratic activity—it is one reason indeed for its recent troubles. It is true that a Social Popular Party was launched after the Great War, but it had very limited success and was suppressed by Primo de Rivera. There was also a Catholic Democratic Union in Barcelona, which has now been dissolved. Among the Basques alone was a democratic Catholic policy really flourishing, and the Christian trade unions were far more numerous than the Socialist. All these, however, were destroyed when Bilbao fell and the country came under the vengeance of the Nationalists. At the moment there is little hope for Christian democracy in the peninsula.

Much has been written for and against the regime established in Portugal by its Catholic dictator, M. Salazar. He has done a great service by re-establishing the finances of the country on a sound basis and is developing some form of corporative organization of industry, but he is anti-liberal and anti-democratic and his regime may perhaps best be described as an authoritarian paternalism.

Belgium, as we write, has been passing through a difficult political crisis caused partly through the deep fissure that exists between Flemings and Walloons over the language and other matters, partly through the emergence of a Rexist party of a strongly Fascist character. Since the War, Catholics have lost the political supremacy they had enjoyed so long and have been dependent for a parliamentary majority on an alliance, sometimes with Liberals, sometimes with Socialists. Hence much ministerial instability. Two years ago the noted economist, M. Van Zeeland, a Catholic with strong democratic convictions, resigned office as the result of a violent intrigue against him. Meanwhile the Christian democrats have organized themselves as a distinct Catholic group and run two important daily papers, the *Avant-garde* and *La Cité Nouvelle*, while pursuing their valuable social and economic activities. The internal situation of the country has, however, given cause for much anxiety, though happily the last General Election, which

resulted in a defeat of the Rexist and German influences and restored a small majority to the Catholic Party both in the Senate and the Chamber, should inaugurate a more stable era.

A development since the War which has attracted less notice than it deserves, has been the linking up of the Christian Labour organizations through their national federations in a single International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions. Success in this difficult venture, especially amid post-War national antagonisms, was largely due to the strongly organized Christian trade unions of Holland, out of compliment to which Utrecht was selected as the headquarters of a permanent International Confederation, with M. Serrarens, a noted Catholic democrat and a Deputy in the Dutch Chamber, as General Secretary. At the second Congress held at Innsbruck, 1922, the national federations taking part represented no fewer than 3,000,000 organized Christian workers. While condemning violence, these federations have always advocated a strong industrial programme in regard to collective contracts, a minimum wage, hours of labour, technical training, and so forth. Unfortunately the numbers quoted have not been maintained, partly owing to industrial depression, but still more to the enforced defection of both the Italian and German members. The Confederation has had its own delegates on many important occasions, and at the annual I.L.O. conferences at Geneva its importance in the industrial world has always been recognized and in the official Annual Reports of the I.L.O., M. Albert Thomas had always been markedly friendly in his appreciation.

It should come naturally to Catholics to work together on international lines, and so we find most democratic Catholics have been in favour of the League of Nations and of collective peace. They have taken their share in organizations such as the Catholic Union for International Studies and in the Catholic Congresses for Peace, the last of which was held at The Hague in August, 1938. In a similar spirit the Italian *Partito Popolare* took the initiative in uniting in an international centre all the democratic parties of Christian inspiration. Negotiations took a long

time and it was not till December, 1925, that the first meeting was summoned in Paris by the Secretary General, M. Raymond Laurent, now a member of the French Chamber, when the International Secretariat was founded. This still exists in spite of the enforced defection of affiliated bodies from Italy, Germany, Austria, and Czecho-Slovakia.[1]

At the moment the outlook for all democracies in Europe is dark, and the time has come when everyone must make his choice between freedom and autocracy, between the totalitarian and the democratic ideologies. The dangers to religion and civilization from totalitarianism have been made so abundantly clear in Germany that countries which are still free should surely work to promote that Christian democracy which affords the best guarantee of both spiritual and political liberty.

[1] By a decision of the Cologne Congress of this Secretariat, Don Sturzo, as co-founder, continues to be invited to its assemblies, even though the Popular Party no longer exists. The democratic parties of Christian inspiration which are affiliated are those of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Poland, Lithuania. Formerly there were also those of Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Basques. Up till now neither Ireland nor Switzerland has been represented, though the latter sometimes sends an observer. Lately an English Catholic M.P. has been taking part, in a personal capacity.

V

POST-WAR DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESENT CRISIS

By E. Roper Power

OF course every study of democracy in post-War Europe begins by contrasting the triumph in 1918 of the powers that had fought 'to make the world safe for democracy' with the general retreat of those very same powers and democratic ideas little more than a decade later. This statement has become trite, but it remains true. The victorious powers *were*, for the most part, precisely those who had a democratic form of government. Democratic regimes *were* set up in place of regimes of an authoritarian character in many countries. Democrats *were* everywhere happy and optimistic. They were happy, not merely in the promise of democratic government within nations, but at the prospect of the crowning fulfilment of a democratic world-order. And to-day it is equally true that democracy has been repudiated in many countries and is working uneasily in others, that the machinery of the League of Nations has run down and that the blight of pessimism has become almost general. If democracy is not in disordered retreat, it is certainly on the defensive, and the dominant role in European politics has been taken over by the dictatorships. But if this is true, then we must ask why. Why has democracy failed? Let us look at some of the countries of Europe, and especially at those which have turned away from democracy.

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It is the defection of Germany that makes the most profound impression on us in England. The Germans are a

people whom many of us have learnt to look upon as akin to ourselves, our ' natural allies.' Their Weimar Republic was hailed as ' the most democratic Republic in the world.' Its constitution was carefully drawn up, its political parties and trade unions were strong and well organized (incidentally, nowhere else in Europe were Catholics so well-organized as in the German trade unions and the Social Democrat and Centre parties), its citizens were far from being uneducated or politically apathetic. In all, it gave promise of a regime of tolerance and social reform, and encouraged high hopes in Europe. The events of the last five years seem at first sight so out of character and inexplicable. Yet we realize now that they are neither. Germany was a defeated nation as well as a nation undergoing a social revolution. The latter gave birth, premature birth maybe, to a new set of political institutions. But they were born of defeat and grew up in an atmosphere of defeatism. The significance of this atmosphere is considerable. France went through a similar phase after the Franco-Prussian War, but she was able to find compensation in colonial expansion and had only to suffer verbal taunts of degeneracy and weakness.

For Germany the experience has been more bitter. She has come but lately to nationhood, contracted imperialism too late for it to be a relatively harmless experience for herself and others. Her defeat was more spectacular and her losses more severe. Furthermore, her social revolution was only partial. There were changes in the legislative and executive personnel. There were changes in political modes and aims. But certain anti-democratic elements survived with their power and prestige intact. The machinery and personnel of the great Prussian bureaucracy continued to administer the Germany of Weimar as it had done that of Potsdam. The essential skeleton of the Imperial army officer caste remained to build up the new and highly efficient *Reichswehr* and to furnish members for the *Freikorps*. The landed aristocracy, after a first fear of spoliation, regained the ascendancy ; the great leaders of industry could control the economic machine and were able to carry still further the process of cartelizing German industry.

Socialists and Catholics, though united in the Government with a common intent of promoting a wide scheme of social legislation (the Minister of Labour for some time was the democratic Catholic, Mgr Braun), were not strong enough to impose a wholesome discipline on the capitalists and on the organized masses. Their legislation was in consequence vacillating, and its application uncertain.

From the outset the Weimar Republic, weakened within by these structural defects, encountered economic difficulties of the first magnitude. The unresolved question of reparations inhibited economic recovery. For what incentive to economic activity could there be so long as the reparation liability remained enormous but undetermined, and bounded only by vague estimates of the ability of Germany to pay? The very war guilt clause that had been inserted in the Treaty to provide legal justification for the reparation claims, was magnified and interpreted as a moral judgement and bitterly resented as such. The occupation of the Ruhr, far from crushing this nascent spirit of passive resistance, stiffened it and provoked the disastrous inflation that ruined the German middle-classes, the very class upon which depended the stability and development of the Republic.

Two attempts were made to remedy this lamentable situation. The one was political, the Treaty of Locarno of 1925; the other economic, the reparations plan, known as the Dawes Plan, which was followed by the Young Plan. The outcome was the anticipated withdrawal of the army of occupation from the Rhine, in 1930, but this was not enough, and it came too late. In Germany there were reserves neither of spirit nor of wealth with which to meet the world economic depression that began in 1929. Grave internal difficulties for German democracy came from the fact that the two big parties, the Socialists and the Centre, which formed the fulcrum of the Weimar constitution, never succeeded in coming to an understanding; both mutual trust and an agreed plan were lacking, in spite of the necessity for them to collaborate in the Reichstag and in the Government. When the Socialists abandoned Brüning to grapple alone with the financial difficulties (without the help he should have received from London

and Paris), he was obliged to govern by decree, offending both agrarian interests and Socialist aspirations. A too ready recourse to general elections and continual elections of every kind kept the parties and the masses in a state of agitation. Thus Hitler's party was able to gain an ascendancy, stirring up a spirit of *revanche* against Socialists and Centre, Jews and Communists, as responsible, according to him, for the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles and for the unemployment crisis.

Hitler was left free to organize his armed squads and to carry on his propaganda against the Treaty. Thus he won a great following among youth. The elections each time turned more in his favour, till, after the resignation of Brüning and the failure of the Von Papen and Schleicher experiments, Hindenburg appointed him Imperial Chancellor in January, 1933.

Democracy here comes to an end, the parties are dissolved, their leaders scattered.[1]

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The decline and fall of democracy in Germany may not be altogether surprising. But why should it have collapsed in Italy eleven years earlier? Italy had had a Liberal democracy fifty years before the War. Nor was she beaten in the War; she was on the side of the victors. But for all that she experienced many of the psychological moods of defeat. She had entered the War late, attracted at last by Allied promises, but without the backing of a unanimous public opinion. She was a poor country and the War cost her dear. The economic depression that ensued gave the Socialists and Communists (who had always been against the War) the motive for stirring up the masses. On the other hand, the Nationalists were dissatisfied with the Peace Conference, since neither was the Treaty of London being fulfilled in regard to Dalmatia and colonial compensation, nor was the

[1] Certain bishops, among them that of Magonza, forbade Catholics to join the Nazi Party because of the errors of racialism and the theory and practice of violence. On the advent of Hitler to power, and his declarations that he would respect the two Christian churches, the Protestant and the Catholics, the bishops suspended their prohibition (1933). For a while it appeared as if National Socialism, shaped as it had been by the example of Fascism, would follow that example in its ecclesiastical policy also.

question of Fiume being settled in Italy's favour, nor was Italy given a share in the mandates. The public breach between President Wilson and the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, confirmed Italy in the idea that she had been badly treated.[1]

The post-War disillusionment alone could not have been the cause for the decline of democracy. The Liberal democracy of pre-War Italy had always been weak. It had never been firmly rooted in the social structure. The quarrel with the Church had created a social cleavage that was inimical to true democracy. The centralizing tendencies of the Government were out of touch with political fact. The middle classes were both weak and few in numbers, more especially in the south. Taking it all in all, 'Italy, during the nineteenth century in particular, was in the unhappy position of a country which had had forced upon it a bourgeois parliamentary system before it had developed in anything like sufficiency the bourgeois social and economic institutions which were necessary to sustain it.' In such circumstances it is not surprising to find that the parliamentary regime was weak. Its practice was marred by personal jealousies and squabbles untempered by the necessary spirit of compromise.

The economic difficulties with which this regime was faced were grave. Italy had for long been definitely over-populated in relation to her existing economic structure. But her fundamental agrarian problem had not been tackled at all. During the War the land-hungry peasantry had been promised agrarian reform, but this was never effected.[2] There was likewise distress among the industrial population,

[1] There was something to be said on both sides in regard to the Italian questions at Paris, which we cannot go into here. Italian resentment could have been avoided. But Italian statesmen like Count Sforza hold that by the victory of 1918 Italy attained all the aims that concerned her position as a great Power, with the return of Trento and Trieste the strength of her new frontiers, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Italy could have become the centre of economic and political attraction for the Danubian and Balkan countries. All these real advantages have been lost with the fall of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and their absorption in the Third Reich. See L. Sturzo, *Italy and Fascismo*, Chapter XII, 'The Place of Italy.'

[2] The Bill for agrarian reform introduced by the Popular Minister, Signor Micheli, was fiercely opposed, and passed the Chamber of Deputies only in July, 1922, three months before the March on Rome. Before the Senate had time to debate it, it was withdrawn by the Fascist Government.

for Italy, poorly endowed with the sinews of industry, could only compete in world markets by keeping the standard of living low. Socialism was widespread and would have been considerably more so had not Don Sturzo's Partito Popolare claimed the allegiance of the peasantry and a part of the artisans. At the end of the War the economic slump and general war-weariness gave rise to unemployment, strikes, and appropriation of land by peasants. Middle-class opinion took fright. It saw the bogey of imminent Bolshevism. The various governments, in which the Liberals held a majority, were able neither to command the confidence of those who called for reform, nor to allay the fears of the frightened. And fear once more proved itself one of the strongest of political forces. It led to an encouragement of the Fascist movement, which had arisen in 1919 with an extremist republican programme, and which, adopting tactics of violence through its armed squads, had later favoured the reaction of the industrialists and agrarians of Northern and Central Italy against the Socialists and *Popolari*. With this support, the Fascists prepared the revolt and March on Rome of October, 1922.[1]

The story of the collapse of democracy in Czecho-Slovakia is among the bitter pages of recent history. This succession State was certainly set a complex problem after the War. It contained an assortment of races, languages, and religions. It was diverse in geographical and economic character. Yet it was certainly among the most successful of all the new democracies in Europe. It achieved a balanced economy and a stability of government quite remarkable in a succession State, and fulfilled many of those high hopes that elsewhere found disappointment so soon.

Czecho-Slovakia was fortunate in her leaders, and the democratic spirit informed the temper and ideals of her people. She was fortunate, too, in her social structure which embodied no rigid class distinctions and fostered no glaring inequalities of wealth. Her internal mistakes and

[1] The Socialist, Liberal, and Popular Parties resisted the Fascist seizure of power for four years, till at the end of 1926 they were dissolved by royal decree. Thus Italian democracy met its end.

shortcomings were the gaucheries of a newly emancipated people, inexperienced in government and morbidly conscious of its former bourgeois status in an aristocratic empire. Had this nascent republic been allowed (and also encouraged, for it must be confessed that pride in her new-found nationhood made her reluctant to welcome internal federalism) to develop on neutral and federal lines, she would doubtless soon have outgrown these defects. Instead, a sad fate decreed that the world economic depression should have brought widespread unemployment to precisely that portion of the country, the Germans of the Sudetenland, that already had a nationalist grievance, and Czecho-Slovakia was drawn into the vortex of European power politics. So long as the Minorities Treaty of June, 1919, was working as part of the League of Nations system, all disputes that might arise among the Czecho-Slovak minorities found their legitimate outlet. The German Sudetens of the Christian Social Party had even formed part of the Government majority and had their ministers in the Cabinet. But after the seizure of Austria, in spite of Hitler's public assurances that Czecho-Slovakia had nothing to fear from Germany, the question of the German Sudetens became again a burning one. The fall of Prague was not the collapse of a democracy, but the surrender by the great Western democracies to the threats and blackmail of a dictator, at the expense of a small State.

So much has happened in the last twelve months that we are apt to forget Austria. Her post-War history has been violent. She suffered more than any other country at the hands of war and peace. Yet she was largely spared the psychological aberrations of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy owing to the serene character of her people, who valued their culture more than their political destiny. Vienna, a city of aristocratic traditions, was left with an emasculated hinterland containing only twice as many inhabitants as the town itself. It was the absurdly weak economic foundations of her diminished territory that gave rise to the violent swings from the political Right to the political Left. There was a constant struggle between the urban Socialism of Vienna and the rural Catholic peasantry.

The longer it continued the further to the Right or the Left were the protagonists forced to go. A grotesque economic unit, unable to adjust its internal economy, forbidden to seek economic aid other than loans, it was condemned to an artificial independence. A healthy economic structure is a prerequisite of democracy. The wonder is that Austria was able to achieve as much as she did. Austria, indeed, could have restored her economy and regained her activity through a general Danubian *entente*, but this was impeded by the dissensions between the Great Powers and the hostility of the Little Entente.[1] After the advent of Hitler, the Dollfuss Government modified the constitution, violently repressed the Socialist revolt, and Dollfuss himself fell a victim to the Nazis. But only with the connivance of Fascist Italy could Hitler take the final step, occupy Austria and obliterate even the name, calling it the *Ostmark* as a mere province of the German Reich.

It is too early to formulate cool judgements on Spain. All we can do is to emphasize the political and social complexity of that country. Even since the War it has experienced in turn Monarchy, dictatorship, parliamentary government of the Right and of the Left. It is a country that has recently experienced not only a social revolution, but also a successful rebellion against the new democratic regime. It is a country that has experienced different social revolutions in different districts ; in some it has been a peasants' rising, in others a proletarian revolution. It is a country in which regional differentiation is of primary importance. Only in the Basque Provinces and Catalonia and in Madrid and Toledo, were social conditions at all favourable to the introduction of parliamentary democracy. Elsewhere, the absence of a strong middle class, the prevalence of illiteracy, the primitive nature of the economic structure, the disparity of wealth and culture between the classes, the great agrarian problem and the tradition of political violence combined to provide a soil as yet unready

[1] The true solution consisted in making an economic unity of the ' succession ' States of the Danube basin, with favourable understandings with Italy and Germany, hence with the necessary modifications to the economic clauses of the Peace Treaties. See Luigi Sturzo, *Le Problème de l'Europe Centrale*, in *Politique*, Paris, September, 1933.

for a fruitful democratic regime. The process of preparing the ground had begun, but the ploughshares were beaten into swords.

Portugal has several times alternated the democratic system with military dictatorships. Her last experiment has been the civilian and paternal dictatorship of Salazar, a man of great financial ability and a Catholic Conservative, convincedly anti-democratic.

Nationalism in Poland, as in Czecho-Slovakia, survived all attempts by imperial masters to stamp it out. It came into its own after the War, but under international conditions that militated against the successful development of a democratic regime. Poland is a buffer State, her frontiers are exposed and often arbitrary. Recently carved out of the territories of her imperial neighbours, she has naturally been somewhat preoccupied with questions of defence both on the material plane (one half of her budget has been allocated to military expenditure) and the cultural plane. Alliance with either Germany or Russia threatens absorption, alliance with neither becomes more and more difficult in a world of unavoidable political dilemmas. But it must be admitted that the difficulties that democracy had to encounter in Poland did not all come from outside. In the first place, the very fact that her territory was formerly under three different States set a complicated problem in the co-ordination of three different administrative systems. Secondly, there were considerable minorities which have attracted the forces of external politics. In the economic field, too, there was plenty of difficult ground. The agrarian problem is real and unsolved. Poland, like Italy, is definitely over-populated with relation to its existing economic structure, and over-population entails much misery and sullen resentment among the large mass of landless labourers.

The national hero, Pilsudski, came from Socialism, but, as is the way with generals, he had no great love for Parliament. The Poles, through their history and their party divisions abandoned themselves too much to parliamentary discussions. The advent of dictatorship in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia, must have seemed alluring to Pilsudski, who inaugurated the system of the Marshal as

military chief at the side of the civil government, with a 'Cabinet of Colonels.' The democratic constitution no longer functioned.[1]

Lithuania experienced the same problems as Poland (with whom she has been in collision over the question of Wilna), passing several times from democracy to dictatorship.[2]

What after the War became Yugoslavia, was also known as the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom, to mark the federal spirit uniting the three peoples. But the Serbs wanted to dominate the others, and the democratic constitution could not stand against party dissensions. King Alexander sought to establish a royal dictatorship, which ended in regicide. The Regency which followed modified the dictatorship, but proved unable to reconcile the conflicting interests of the three peoples. Recently there has been talk of granting autonomy to the Croats, but so far the negotiations have come to nothing.

The history of Finland and the Baltic succession States offers a somewhat different pattern of experience. They are not the children of Versailles and have thus escaped the strain of bad blood in that family. They came into being through the fall of the Russian Empire, though before achieving independence they were destined to taste for a short while German occupation. This occupation, unpleasant though it was, probably saved them from incorporation in the U.S.S.R. The experience of these countries under democracy has not been uniformly happy. Some have made considerable progress; one, however, has returned to an authoritarian regime. As elsewhere these democratic adolescents have had to grow up in a world of immense complexity, and they have had to solve not merely the problems of democratic mechanics, but also the task of creating a national spirit capable of sustaining the new institutions. These Baltic States were accustomed to

[1] The leaders of the Opposition went into exile, chief among them Vitos of the Peasants' Party and Korfanty of the Christian Democrats. They returned to Poland in April, 1939, at the beginning of the tension between Poland and Germany. Arrested on arrival, Vitos was at once released, but Korfanty remained a prisoner for over three months.

At the same time the Ukrainian leaders (ill-used as they had been by the Colonels' Government), made declarations of loyalty to the national State.

[2] The Christian Democrats have remained true to the democratic spirit, and their leaders are in exile.

Russian rule ; they had had no experience of self-government. Their ruling classes and landowners had departed, or were about to suffer expropriation in order to satisfy the demands of a land-hungry peasantry. They had suffered much from the military campaigns and the breakdown of economic life caused thereby. From being a part of the economic system of Imperial Russia, they had to adapt themselves to a new orientation of economic activity, and at the same time to achieve a certain internal equilibrium that had been unnecessary so long as they were part of a large economic unit. However, the new States were optimistic in their new-found independence, and all adopted constitutions of an advanced, if doctrinaire, democratic form.

Imported ready-made institutions invariably require adjustment. In many instances the constitutions failed to ensure democracy in action. For instance, in Latvia, at one time there were no less than forty-six parties competing for the one hundred seats in parliament. Consequently, each of these States has passed through a phase of dictatorship from which they now appear to be emerging. They are now evolving new constitutions that provide for a considerable measure of corporate representation. Probably the strongest factor which has protected their democratic content through these early stages has been the fact that these countries have done much to solve their basic land problem. They have not made the mistake of trying to run a new political system on the old social and economic framework. They have broken down the age-long quasi-feudal system and substituted one of peasant proprietorship, which has ensured a measure of stability and has given a considerable portion of the community, even through the rigours of the world economic depression, some security. Peasant-proprietorship does not solve all the problems of democracy by any means, but it does extend the area of stability and security, and helps the regime to play for time, that necessary factor.

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Such, in brief, has been the course of democracy in some of the countries of Europe since the War. We have now

to discover, if may be, the common factors that have undermined therein both the faith and the works of democratic statesmen and peoples.

Some of these forces have come from within. They have come from vested interests and the personality of leaders. They arise from the clashes between social classes, religions, cultures and regional interests, the problems of minorities. Such difficulties are, of course, the commonplaces of political practice. They are, in the world as we know it, fair problems. They are problems which, granted good will and wise government, should be capable of solution. Democrats believe that their political forms and ideals are capable of resolving such problems. They must not, therefore, ascribe the failure of their political institutions in so many countries to-day merely to the existence of such problems. These problems are the very problems that democracy claims to be able to solve better than any other political form. But what democracy does not claim, or should not claim, is that it has a formula that can be successfully applied to *any* society at *any* stage of its development and regardless of external conditions. There are, as post-War experience has amply demonstrated, many pre-conditions that must be fulfilled before the democratic experiment can be made.

All through the nineteenth century the political institutions of England, France, and the U.S.A. had served as the patterns from which political reconstruction should be cut, and their diverse and successive experiments were looked upon as able to provide examples for the liberal and constitutional aspirations of other countries, even though these had great traditions in their own history.[1] After the Great War the idea of a wider democracy than the French or British seized upon the defeated countries, where there was considerable pressure from the masses of ex-combatants and from the revolutionaries whose eyes were turned towards Moscow ; at the same time the middle

[1] In Italy the Neo-Guelfs looked towards the Middle Ages, the Democrats towards France of 1789, and enlightened Liberals studied the technical working of the British Parliament, while the Belgium of 1830 sought how best to avoid the errors into which France had fallen in the Revolution of '89 and the Restoration of 1814.

classes sought in imitation of the great democracies a means of bridling the ambitions of the masses. In any case, the imitation (where it came to pass) was not slavish or vulgar. On the contrary, it was carefully reasoned, often indeed too carefully reasoned. For overmuch attention was paid to legal and logical symmetry in the new institutions, and too little to the question of their relationship with the background of local tradition and political experience. On paper, the new constitutions seemed well constructed. In practice their faults soon became glaring. Their turbid origin was disclosed by the lack of harmony between the newly-devised central government and the older and more indigenous local government. The schemes for proportional representation were often too technically unsatisfactory. The many political parties were not subject to sufficient control by the executive. Indeed, distrust of the executive was a common feature of the new constitutions. In an attempt to avoid the evils of oligarchy, greater power was given to the legislature and even the electorate (by means of devices such as the referendum, recall, and initiative). But in perfecting the machinery of democratic control the constitution-makers were apt to forget the primary necessity for democratic action. A democratic form is no guarantee of democracy. The form is valueless without the content. To establish the form is comparatively easy ; maintenance requires some correspondence between the form and the complex of the social, economic, and political content.

That many of the countries of Europe found difficulty in cultivating the democratic spirit necessary to inform the newly-acquired constitutions, has been largely due to the existence of caste divisions and to a low level of education. Caste is inimical to democracy. Some go further and say the same of class, but classes, neither closed nor placed in a rigid hierarchy (as in feudal society) are necessary for a true democracy.[1] Indeed, parliamentary democracy is largely

[1] The Christian-Social school of thought sets at the basis of its conception the principles of private property and that of an organic society—families, classes, municipalities, counties, provinces (or regions, or cantons), State—in order to guarantee the rights and liberties of the human person. A single class and the abolition of private property go together, and lead to social tyranny.

the product of a particular social class, the middle class. And it is precisely those countries with a strong middle class that have been most successful in operating democratic regimes on a large scale. The unbridged gulf between peasant and landlord, worker and owner, involves such a fundamental divergence of economic and social interests and of cultural outlook as to make an equal partnership in self-government impracticable. In Spain, as we have seen, it is for this reason that only among the Basques and Catalans had democracy any deep roots. The collapse of the Weimar Republic was in part due to the weakening of the middle class through the collapse of credit. The more successful countries, such as Czecho-Slovakia and Finland, possessed a strong middle-class nucleus and were free from the growing inequalities of class status and economic prosperity that undermine democracy.

The educational standard is of great importance, especially under constitutions that tend to place greater responsibility upon the electorate. Our own educational standards permit no complacency. Indeed, our Press, which claims to give the public what it wants, provokes speculation as to the health of democracy in this country.

Plato realized full well that one of the central problems of government is that of training leaders. It must be confessed that, of all regimes, democracy has the most difficult task in this respect. Where votes can be counted but not weighed, the temptation to demagogy is great. Where there is no tradition of honour attaching to public service it is idle to expect either efficiency or honesty in political leaders. The whole problem, of course, goes deep into the political attitudes of a people. Politics involve rights and duties. Under democracy, which is self-government, the balance between these rights and duties is assessed by the people themselves. They are judges in their own case. They are thus prone to interpret their cause in terms of their rights rather than of their duties. This tendency is magnified where there is considerable divergence of group interests. It is minimized only where the range of social and political inequalities is small and where there exists a generous spirit of compromise and

mutual toleration.[1] A spirit of compromise is essential in a political system that aims at achieving harmony between millions of individuals all intent on attaining the fulfilment of their personality.

A certain sense of economic and political stability is advantageous for the development of democracy. For whereas other political systems are founded on constraint, democracy leaves freedom of movement both to those who favour it and those who are against it. And since every political system tends to develop beyond its frontiers, just as does the economic system, equilibrium in the international economic system is favourable to democracy. This equilibrium cannot be achieved in the midst of insecurity and friction, and it is then that the anti-democratic nationalist and imperialist forces are aroused. But it is then that the democracies prove whether they are solidly founded or precarious.

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Now it is precisely the economic post-War crises, the vacillations of the international political system, the weaknesses of the great democracies at Geneva, the imperialism and nationalism of the middle-class parties, and the immaturity of the masses that have played such havoc among European democracies. All this has combined to deprive the adolescents of that most necessary factor in the process of growing up, time. Had this all-important factor been granted, doubtless many of the countries we have considered would have been far more successful in fostering their internal democracy. As it is, and as it has been, international forces, both political and economic,[2] have denied

[1] See Chapter VI, p. 95.

[2] 'Seemingly impersonal,' though, like all human happenings, the results of very personal egotism and folly. Just as the League of Nations provided a machinery for the settlement of international differences had there been the will to use it (and had there been that will, the imperfection of the machinery would have provided no obstacle), the International Labour Office set up a machinery which could have done much to avert the economic world-crisis. How much even individuals can do to check the forces of destruction is shown by the fact that long before the League of Nations, or World Court, England and the United States settled their dispute over the Alabama, through the presence in the Prince Consort of a man with resolute vision. And in our own time, the cause of international peace suffered irreparable loss through the deaths of three men—Stresemann, Briand, King Albert of Belgium.

individual nations the benefit of time, and have forced them to turn from the long-range tasks of internal reconstruction to the emergency tasks of defence against external threats.

Foremost among the factors that have wrought havoc among the adolescent democracies is the 'economic blizzard' that began to blow in the early 'thirties. Into its causes we cannot here enquire, but of its intensity there can be no doubt. It forced England to abandon Free Trade and shelter the economic interests of the Commonwealth behind the Ottawa Conference. But in the smaller and less wealthy countries defensive measures had of necessity to be more drastic. There were no colossal capital reserves from which to maintain the standard of living. The old Liberal doctrine of division of labour among nations was jettisoned and each country strove for self-sufficiency. Tariff walls were built up higher than ever before while, paradoxically, countries strove to hold on to their share of foreign markets. Competition became more bitter with every contraction in world markets. As States came to the assistance of their nationals and as State capitalists themselves entered the markets, so political rivalry came to intensify commercial rivalry. Economic warfare broke out, a warfare of tariffs, quotas, currency devaluation, etc. The term warfare is no mere metaphor. Economic dangers and threats are as real as political dangers. They touch individuals as nearly, for they threaten poverty and even starvation. They produce similar reactions on the political and psychological plane. All these reactions are invariably inimical to democracy.

Political nationalism has become yet stronger and blinder through this development of economic nationalism. Once nationalism was the darling of democracy.[1] Nineteenth-century Liberals had welcomed it as a healthy process whereby internal reactionary political elements might be purged, a new political order might be integrated and yet another unit made ready to take its place in an international order, a family of nations. England supported almost all the nationalist movements during the nineteenth century

[1] See Chapter VIII.

(save in the case of Ireland). More recently the national sentiments of the Arabs and Jews have been deliberately encouraged. But we see now that nationalism is a dangerous doctrine. It has its place, its honourable place, in the hierarchy of groups and loyalties. Like the family it has its function of helping the individual to integrate and realize his personality. But, like the family, it has to be prepared to loosen its hold and leave its members free if it is to succeed in its task of securing their happiness. And the nation is a group that is able to entrench itself not only with social institutions and sentiments, but with the more tangible defences of economic and political sanctions. All social groups tend towards totalitarianism. But in the nation this tendency is at its strongest because the nation is the meeting-place of so many aspects of life and has become the pre-eminent repository of tradition. Furthermore, it has appointed itself as the residuary legatee of all the other group loyalties that tend to decay under the strains of the mobility and wide range of modern social life. The dangers for society and individuals in this concentration of loyalties are obvious. We see now that the very democracy that nationalism nurtured is now imperilled by the limitations of its parent. It may well be argued that individualistic democracy doubled with capitalism has been an important factor in this exaggeration of nationalism.[1]

National democracy cannot long survive in a world in which there are frequent contacts between nations and a considerable measure of world trade, unless there is also democracy on the international plane. The relationship between democracy and internationalism is considered elsewhere.[2] It is necessary here only to call attention to the fact that national democracy is undermined by the existence of international anarchy (or power politics) and imperialism. We are drawn to the conclusion that democracy must permeate the whole political structure or else disintegrate. The existing democracies cannot ultimately preserve their *internal* democracy if they persist in a feudal attitude on the international plane. And yet it does not

[1] See Chapter IX.
[2] See Chapter VIII.

rest entirely with them what attitude they adopt on this plane. They are forced to adopt the feudal attitude so long as other countries are not capable of self-government within a world order. We are ultimately faced with the question : how can democracy be achieved on the international plane so long as there is such wide divergence of economic prosperity, cultural attainment, social values, etc. A measure of homogeneity is necessary, above all, moral homogeneity.

Such are the chief factors that have brought democracy into crisis on the national and international planes. The old easy optimism of democrats has gone. The problems before them loom large. Within the national units there is the task of keeping equality in step with liberty, the constant problem of education in its fullest sense, the nurture of wise leaders, the understanding and application of social justice. And all these problems are set in a constantly changing world.

Should then the democrat turn pessimist before these tremendous odds ? Our approach has been largely pathological. We have studied democracy in failure. There is, therefore, a certain risk of morbid pessimism. So long as Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Ireland, Estonia, and Latvia, can still be called democracies, it can hardly be said that democracy in Europe has failed and is out-moded. With the exception of Italy, the countries that have retraced their steps—Germany, Poland, Spain, Hungary, and various Balkan countries—were all ruled by monarchy or oligarchy before the War. So, too, was Russia. Dictatorships have only been set up where democracy had been exceedingly weak and where economic conditions had become intolerable, or where the middle classes have feared the advent of the working-class parties as 'Bolshevism.' But even in what are called the totalitarian countries, at the bottom of the hearts of the masses and of the leaders constrained to silence or exile, there remains the unquenchable spark of a new democracy, for no historical experience is ever lost.

Who, indeed, in Europe looked for a resurrection of

French democracy under Napoleon, or during the Restoration? And who thought of a return of French democracy under Napoleon III? And who, in 1868, during the debates over Disraeli's Reform Bill would have believed that the United Kingdom could give the vote to 20,000,000 women without falling into chaos? Or have a Labour Party (instead of the Liberal Party) as alternative of government? The democrat may retain his faith, for after all democracy is an attitude of mind, a quality of spirit. As such it can survive persecution, even if the institutions that embody it are crushed. As an attitude of mind it is always ready to re-create its social and political institutions.

PART II

IN THE SOCIAL ORDER

VI

DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY, AND LIBERTY

By Luigi Sturzo

WHENEVER we study the origin of power and seek to find an adequate solution, we come to something that is at the very root of democracy.

Is it really important, it may be asked, to have a close acquaintance with the origin of power? Is it not enough for Christians to learn from St. Paul that there is no power but from God? Whether absolute monarchy or even dictatorship, whether tempered republic or even social democracy, should it not matter little to the Christian, since he would find in all a *power* coming from God, which therefore deserves the name of *Authority?*

This kind of ascetic indifference to the concrete form of political power may be considered either as an escape from worldly reality, lest it become oppressive and absorbing, or else as an attitude of the mind of those who would live exclusively in a world of their own. The famous Sanskrit scholar who, during the French Revolution, was so absorbed in his studies as not to realize that Louis XVI had been beheaded, (to the point of proposing to dedicate his work to him), had found a total escape from political life in concentration on his scientific studies.

If, however, this may be the privilege of a small number of persons, living in the world yet outside the world, it cannot be so for the immense majority of men, who live in society and for society, bringing to it a continuous, indeed a daily contribution of activity. For them the problem of power has an insistent value, for it affects them, as individuals and as social groups, in their relations to one another, and in the social whole which we call now Community,

or Commonwealth, now Nation or State, and which extends to the Community of Peoples and Society of States.

To find the origin of power means to discover its nature through its genesis and to seize the historical line of its evolution. What is here of import to us is to find how far and by what affinities the origin of power and the origin of democracy have, or may have, points of real coincidence.

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The Schoolmen and Canonists of the Middle Ages saw relations between the people and authority in contractual terms. In a monarchic regime the people bound itself to give loyalty and obedience, while the king bound himself to respect and guarantee the laws, traditions, and liberties of the people. In a republican regime the people appointed its rectors, or heads, for a predetermined period, and at the end of their tenure of office had the right to hold them to account for their acts. In both cases—and the former was far more widespread than the latter—it was presupposed that the practical source of power, the secondary cause as the Schoolmen had it, lay in the people. The people, either by renewing its ' contract ' with the sovereign (whether chosen by election or recognized by hereditary right), or appointing the rectors of the republic, accepted an authority that was neither self-imposed nor imposed by others.

The idea that power came from the people is to be found even in the Justinian Code, which declares : ' That by what was known as the *Lex Regia* every right and power of the Roman people was transferred to the imperial authority.' There was, however, a difference between the principle of Roman law and the medieval idea. In the first the transfer of power was total (or, as sociologists say, without residua) ; the emperor did not represent the people nor had he a contract with the people, nor was he, so to say, its titular heir. The Roman people continued to hold the symbols of power through the Senate and other historic institutions, but all power had passed into the emperor's hands. In the Middle Ages this was not the case. The people always remained a contracting party in respect of the king ; it could exact respect for its rights even by force, and if the

king failed to keep his pledge it could withdraw its oath of loyalty without felony, depose him without sedition. In the republics the relationship between electors and elected was obvious. In all the theories of the time it was never questioned that the root of public power lay in the people.

Side by side with this theory, which we may call the political theory, there was the religious theory, which from the beginnings of Christianity found its way into the teachings of the Fathers. For them power (like private property and slavery) came from Original Sin. It called, therefore, for a sanctification, that is the recognition that as fount of authority it came from God. Hence the sacred rites to bring out this derivation, the religious respect for those invested with authority, the insistence on the duty of monarch or emperor to uphold authority as a sacred ministry, co-operating with the priesthood for the good of the people.

The two conceptions, the popular and the religious, were not opposed to each other or mutually exclusive; under a certain aspect they might be considered complementary. Whether the Roman conception prevailed, as in the Byzantine Empire, or the feudal idea of contract, as in Western Christendom, the two conceptions, political and religious, were realized as concomitant.

During the Investiture Conflict between Papacy and Emperor, the religious theory gave the motives for that of the 'Divine Right of Kings' and that of the 'mediation' of the Popes.[1] At the same time the political theory of an original contract between the people and its heads remained the basis of the social edifice, and was utilized by both conflicting camps, now by the Canonists in favour of the Pope, now by the legists in favour of the Emperor.

[1] The theory of the Divine Right is too well known to need explanation. That known as 'sacerdotal mediation' is the opposed theory—that the power given by God to *Christian* kings over the people, is communicated through the Church and with her intervention. This theory was particularly applied by the medieval popes to the Holy Roman Emperors. It was explicitly formulated by Innocent IV, in his famous letter to Frederick II of Swabia, in 1245, and developed the right claimed by the popes to depose kings and release their subjects from their oath of allegiance. See Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State* (Geoffrey Bles), pp. 109–10.

With the Renaissance and the Reformation there is a change of course. The idea of the State and the idea of Sovereignty crystallize, and on the one hand, in the name of the Divine Right of Kings, which becomes absolutism, there is a denial of all original and effective participation of the people in power, while on the other the Pope (or the reformed Churches) are denied any right of intervention over the sovereign power. In reaction, the defenders of the papacy—especially the Jesuits Bellarmine, Suarez, Mariana —become the last defenders of the popular origin of power, reduced, however, to a symbolic principle,[1] while in England the aristocratic parliament fights its great fight to maintain the right of limitation of the monarchic power in the name of the people.

It was then that the Natural Right school revived the thesis of the popular origin of power, though dropping its relationship to the religious theory, laicizing it, as we should say to-day. The new conception was not juridical (contractual) nor historical, but metaphysical: society is constituted by nature, man naturally creates society. The will of the people is implicit in it inasmuch as it demands order, prosperity, the possibility of life in common. This will is at the root and is one with nature.

According to Hobbes, such will can never express itself save in an already constituted society, outside of which there is nothing but the horde (disorder, anarchy). When this horde becomes subject to the power of a stronger man or men, the popular will expresses itself by conferring on the leaders, once for all (without residua), the authority that implicitly resided in the individuals. Locke goes further. He vindicates the individual as such and sets him at the root of authority in the form of a collective will expressed by majorities. Modern individualist democracy was born. It took Rousseau to bring the idea of a social contract, not after the fashion of the medieval Schoolmen, between people and sovereign, but as the permanent and reciprocal

[1] Suarez allowed that the rights of guilds, communes, and other moral bodies were concessions from the Monarchy; thus the principle of an original contract between people and head was confined to the political power of the States.

will of individuals to live in society and to govern it collectively, that is as a unique, immanent will, which becomes authority of itself.

Following the process of ideas, we shall find that the popular will is conceived by Kant as liberty (and liberalism is born from it), by Fichte as the Nation (and nationalism is born), by Hegel as the manifestation of the Spirit in the State (and pantheistic Statalism is born), by Marx as the class war over the economic system (and Socialism is born).

Modern totalitarianism utilises the basic idea of the popular will, together with the ideas of State, Nation, Class, Race, creating a mysticism of force and of power as the incarnation in a head of the will of the people, which moves collectively, by an absorption of the individual personality in the whole.

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In two thousand years of Christian civilization we may say that the idea of the popular origin of power has never ceased to exist. And before Christianity, though distorted by the phenomenon of slavery or coloured by polytheistic myths, this theory had right of city in Greece and Rome. Doctrinal formulations have varied, practice has denied what theory affirmed, but at bottom, the idea of a collective will at the origin of every society, has always persisted, albeit subconsciously or ineffectively.

But since the historical origin of each nation or human family loses itself in myth, we can never seize the critical moment in which, through this will, for the first time *force* becomes *power*, and *power* for the first time is recognized as *authority*.

This research, fruitless on the historical plane, must be transferred to that of metaphysics. Every concrete case is unique and cannot be repeated, but in every concrete case of the formation of a group or social nucleus we shall always find the three moments of *force*, *power*, and *authority*. These are so connected and interdependent that many thinkers make one derive from the other, and conclude that in the process of formation of organized society the popular will is an intruder.

There is an interesting means of checking that it is not an intruder in the case of the legitimization of power. This brings us to the root of the origin of power, almost without our being aware of it. In the case of legitimization of power, either the people has its say (whether explicitly or implicitly), or power will never be legitimized, that is, it will never constitute authority.

If a usurper attacks a kingdom, the king, his armies, his people, resist by arms ; there arises in them the will to resist. (We have the modern instances of the aggression against Abyssinia, or the invasion of China, Czecho-Slovakia, Albania.) If the attacked people is overcome by force, it surrenders and a *de facto* government is installed, which is not legitimate but usurped. It is then that force becomes power. For the new power to become legitimate it is not enough for the king or vanquished leaders to leave the kingdom, yielding to force, but the population must accept the new order. If this acceptance is forced, it will never constitute legitimization. Only with time can it become so, when, with the fading of all ideas of a *revanche*, there comes about a spontaneous adaptation which turns into a new order. But then the collective will for legitimization will be implicit in the will to co-operate in this actual order for the good or lesser evil of the population itself.

It may happen that popular acceptance is rendered explicit, by means of plebiscites, after the modern fashion. Such plebiscites are often simply a mystification, and the power of the usurper will be legitimized formally, but not substantially, till a true collective consciousness of acceptance of the new order has been formed. If this consciousness is never formed, then instead there will be a constant dualism between the population and the usurper (the historic cases of Ireland under English rule, Poland partitioned between Russia, Germany, and Austria) ; then power remains substantially illegitimate though constituting a *de facto* government. It is *power*, but it is not *authority*.

Nor can what is known as the *de jure* recognition interchanged between States ever take the place of the popular will in legitimizing a *de facto* power. *De jure* recognition, as *res inter alios acta*, can never have other significance than that

of defining the relationships between the States concerned. It may, up to a point, influence the will of the people to accept the *fait accompli*, but it may also have no such influence, for always the will of a people may be re-quickened and become its own master. The usurper's power, in such case, remains for the people simply *de facto* power, even though recognized by other States as *de jure*.

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Those who oppose the origin of power from the people to the origin of power from God (whether affirming or denying St. Paul's dictum), bring an immense confusion which it will be well to clear up. The question has arisen in two phases. The first phase : the kings against the popes. The kings claimed a divine origin for their power in order to withdraw it from the moral and political control of the Church ; hence the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which the Catholic Church refused to accept. Second phase : the Catholic Church against the Sovereignty of the People as proclaimed by Rousseau, for this presupposed a human nature good in itself (denying Original Sin) and had no limits, not even moral and religious ones.

Both theses, that of the Divine Right of Kings and that of the Sovereign Right of the People, in antithetical form make power an absolute principle, so that it cannot become, what it must become in final resolution, a true authority.

We have noted the three ' moments ' in the process of society, that of *force*, that of *power*, and that of *authority*. Not all force is power, but only that which succeeds in dominating over others. Not every power is authority, but that which is legitimate, that is, bound up with lawful right. Finally, there can never be a right that is not accompanied by a correlative duty, that is to say, there can be no absolute, unlimited right ; if it is to be a right, it must always be relative and limited. Thus, in the dynamism of society, authority alone has the just exercise of power and the use of force, for the right of power and of force is limited by the moral obligation of legality, justice, equity.

The meaning of St. Paul's saying, that there is no authority (for *potestas* means authority and not power in the sense in

which we have used the word) save from God, brings out its ethical character. God and God alone in giving to man authority over other men, and in obliging man to be subject to man (that is, in making man a sociable being), assigned the moral limits that come from the very nature of authority, which is a ministry, a service of the collectivity. Christ wished to perfect this ministry in the Church, taking from it all that savours of dominion, stripping it of the worldliness of power and unveiling its essential principle of service. '*You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them and they that are the greater exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be the greater among you, let him be your minister. And he that will be first among you shall be your servant*' (Matt. xx, 25–27).

The insuperable limit which the ethical nature of authority sets to the exercise of power can be called now *right*, now *duty*, now *responsibility*. This limit has a twofold origin, from those invested with authority (king, parliament, government, etc.), and from the subjects. Both categories are composed of human persons, both therefore have rights and duties, and are responsible for their actions. In a word, they are endowed with *freedom*. Just as authority comes from God, so does liberty. There is nothing good but comes from God, and His imprint is in us always in all His gifts. Liberty, like authority, cannot be absolute, or it would be inhuman, not social but anti-social. It would mean the denial of that right, that duty and that responsibility which we have seen to be the limitation of authority. Here, too, are the limits of liberty. Authority and liberty are often presented as antithetical; this is not the case, they are two social factors which form a synthesis, for they both have the same limit which makes them operative and moral, that is, right as correlative of duty, and personal responsibility in the exercise of right and the fulfilment of duty. The divine origin of authority and liberty is nothing else than the recognition that God is the author of human society, that is, that He has created man social and has imposed moral limits on the relations between individuals in the effective unity of the body social. The man who will not recognize the moral limit of authority or the moral

limit of liberty rebels against God, for he denies the very nature of society and seeks to raise himself above other men, ignoring their rights and violating their personality.

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If enquiry into the human origin of authority leads us to the collective will of the people, the human origin of liberty leads us to the person as individual. Those who deny the free will of the individual can hardly sing the praises of the civil and political liberties of a people. Those who deny the moral responsibility of human actions can hardly claim the right of all citizens to share in the power of the State.

We, by philosophical conviction and Christian profession, are persuaded of the freedom of man's will and of his moral responsibility for his actions. Therefore we can speak of the nobility of the human person, of equality and spiritual fraternity between men, and we can see in civil and political liberties the leaves, flowers, and fruit of a plant of which the sap is rising and the life maturing.

That is why we do not make an absolute of liberty. Liberty is limited. Licence is unlimited, but where there is licence there is no more liberty. If the brigand, the gangster, can rob, defraud, intimidate and kill with impunity, it is the end of the citizen's quiet life in his family, his profession, his business. The magistracy is overpowered, the police disarmed or corrupt, the whole civil order suffers, business shrinks, life is insecure, poverty increases. . . . Where then is liberty? True liberty is in order, not in disorder.

But what is order? That everything should be in its proper place. Order is never perfect. Order is always in process, a *dynamic* order, never a *static* order. A river must be banked up lest it overflow, but it is always moving and beating against the embankments, which must continually be renewed or strengthened. Thus liberty has its limits, which create order. Liberty is in movement, order must be renewed.

What are the limits of liberty? Two, the law that defines the rights and duties of all, and the personal responsibility which creates the self-discipline of the good (those who

observe the law) and the punishment of evil-doers (the law-breakers).

In an autocracy, in a class or caste oligarchy, in a totalitarian dictatorship, there is little or no trust in the individual person, his capacity for education, his self-discipline, his sense of responsibility. It is thought that only the leaders, their cliques, the ruling castes, are able to govern and to enjoy the privileges of power. They subject others to the law, denying them all freedom. Thus they come to deny the human personality of the subjects, for were they to recognize it, to however a small a degree, they would have to concede the corresponding liberty.

In the concrete of history, every form of civilization, however rudimentary, recognizes a minimum of human personality, and it is this minimum that becomes freedom and responsibility. From this minimum of freedom come the golden threads of civilization, its inalienable conquests. Religious freedom to preach the Gospel was won by centuries of struggle and martyrdom ; in the same way it will be re-won to-day if it is wholly denied. The personal freedom of the slaves made its slow progress through domestic, monastic, municipal enfranchisement, reaching at last social and political enfranchisement. The freedom of woman began with the rigid monogamy of Christianity, to arrive at conjugal, economic, and political parity.

So it is in every field, through long and never-ending historical experiences, for these experiences under various aspects are continually reproduced and renewed. Every now and then an oligarchic system gains the ascendancy, the freedom of the human person narrows till it becomes restricted to a closed social circle, sealed by a pseudo-religious conception which denies free will and individual responsibility. The dynamic process is suspended. What is then needed is a truly religious, fundamentally Christian reawakening, to revive the dynamism of civilization in the vindication of the freedom and responsibility of the human person.

If one dyke of liberty is individual responsibility, the other is the law. This is in the consciousness of the people as the expression of justice and morality. The social authority

does not create the law, but recognizes it ; it does not invent it but formulates it, adapts it, actuates it. The law is born, like responsibility, from man's social and moral nature. It can be formulated in two ways. The one is ethical and negative : 'Do not to others as you would not that they should do to you.' The other is juridical and positive : 'The coexistence of rights in the recognition of mutual duties.'

Laws in the concrete must translate into general norms and particular precepts these two aspects of law in the abstract. It is for authority to formulate and enforce it—the legislative, administrative, and judicial power. Thus human society is the resultant of authority and liberty. Where there is a balance between these two permanent factors, there is *order*. Where one prevails at the expense of the other, there is a lack of balance, order is perturbed, the law is distorted for the benefit of the few, human activity suffers, society is in a state of upheaval, for liberty without authority is licence, and authority without liberty is tyranny.

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In democracy there is the endeavour to realize the combination of *Authority* and *Liberty* in an *Order*, in which, in different degrees and with different responsibilities, all adult citizens, men and women, participate, with the exclusion only of the insane, criminals and those suffering special disabilities.

If we look at history from this standpoint, we shall find that the lines of advance of civilization lead to this outcome. Yet, since this is simply an historical tendency, never a necessary evolution by ineluctable law—or rather, since it is a moral acceptance, a fact of consciousness, it can never be fully realized unless the collective consciousness feels the need for it, accepts its postulates, overcomes egotistical reluctance to renunciation of a class dominion (a renunciation implicit in the democratic order), and finally, unless it overcomes adventitious prejudices of a religious character.

That is why to-day we have reached only partial experiments in democracy, which imply recurrent crises and what may be prolonged periods of eclipse. The basic problem is

that of the coexistence, correlation, and extension of the binomial 'Authority-Liberty'; it is at the foundation of every sound democracy. There is true democracy where all participate, according to their particular possibilities, in the dynamic balance 'authority-liberty.' On the one hand, we have the *individual Personality* with its rights (*liberty*), on the other the social *Community* — kingdom, State, Commonwealth, League of Nations—with its rights (*authority*).

In practice, conflict may and does continually arise between the two. Which must prevail? Certainly, that which has right on its side. But, in a democracy, who will judge of this right? And in the case of conflict between two coexistent rights, that of the *Person* and that of the *Community*, which must be given precedence? The manner in which these questions are answered shows whether there is a clear idea or not of a true democracy. For the essence of democracy consists in making the people and its organs (which are its direct or indirect emanation) conscious of the value of individual and collective rights and of the corresponding duties, and of their co-ordination or subordination as the case may be. In a democracy, choice and political decision appertain to the technical and responsible organs, but the judgement of value is of the people.

The organs of authority (Parliament, Government, Magistracy, President, or Crown) must be established by the will of the people. The Crown may be hereditary, but in this case there is a constant presumption of the will of the people, which merges in the feeling of attachment to the reigning House and faith in it as representing the guarantor of the democratic regime and the symbol of the nation. If the king does not arouse this confidence, the democratic system itself is compromised. In every other case true democracy is founded on popular election. Election is an act of authority based on liberty; it is the first and most elementary synthesis of the two terms, a synthesis which we shall encounter at every stage of democratic organization.

Modern democracy has been parliamentary, for direct government by the people is inconceivable and unfeasible in the case of nations. Even the smaller ones, like Belgium

and Holland, have such a complex population that they cannot be compared with Athens, where the slaves and helots did not count as citizens, or with the early Italian republics, which did not include the rural population and serfs.

To-day there is widespread dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system ; in France, in certain sections of opinion, it reaches the point of a contempt, even a hatred, such as falls to the lot of someone passionately loved, and then, in disillusionment, abandoned so that even his name becomes odious. And this not only in the ranks of the authoritarians and totalitarians (as would be natural), but among the democrats themselves.

In England this feeling is less widespread, above all because Parliament has a glorious tradition and traditions have here an inestimable and constant value ; secondly, because the English Parliament never remains the same, but evolves with the times, in an historical continuity stretching through seven centuries, and with an admirable inner capacity for adaptation. Even to-day, with the advent of democracy, the British Parliament will be able to adapt itself to the facts of the democracy that is coming to maturity.

Why should the parliaments of America, France, and the other countries of democratic conviction be deemed incapable of further adaptation to the needs of the day ? The truly democratic parliament has yet to be created. What has existed up till now has been the liberal Parliament of the bourgeoisie of the past century, combined with certain aristocratic survivals (as in England), and recently diluted by the political forerunners of the working classes, who appeared barely thirty or forty years ago.

The working classes, having come late to parliamentary life (and the same may be said of women in certain countries), have not had sufficient political experience to be ripe for co-responsibility in power with the middle classes which have had so long a start of them. Moreover, the Labour, Socialist, or Trade Union parties, often carry with them a rigidly economic class mentality and a certain lack of intuitive understanding of the complex whole of national and international life. Here is one of the gravest difficulties for

a democratic parliament of 1940, impeding and delaying the evolution of an institution which in a democracy is irreplacable.

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Here we must find room for a problem that may seem remote from the subject we are considering (the dynamics of liberty-authority in democracy), but which, on the contrary, touches one of its most delicate points. It is the problem of the so-called governing classes, or political *élites*, or ruling groups. (In sociology there is not yet an established and universally accepted term indicating those who, at a given moment, assume the direction and responsibility of government and derive immediate advantages from it.)

In an equalitarian conception of society, such as an individualistic democracy after the fashion of Rousseau, there would be no ruling groups or classes ; just as all are equal before the law, so all would be equal in politics. The Communists (and also the orthodox Socialists) add : so all should be equal in economic life. The principle of equality, thus interpreted, as a kind of levelling, would lead to a static form of society, transposing all liberty into authority in order to prevent any differentiation of classes, groups, or individuals. This would be the negation of any true society ; society is what it is because men are diverse, from their family life to the highest speculations of thought and the highest peaks of morality and genius ; individuals and groups, each insufficient alone, complete each other. On the political plane, an equalitarian democracy would be a tyranny leaving no room for liberty ; the whole effort of the leading and governing organs would be directed to suppressing any attempt at differentiation, which would mean a rebirth of individual liberty.

We, on the contrary, wanting liberty for all, with the dynamism it creates in society, admit in consequence the formation of ruling *élites*. We start from the principle that a freedom outside the democratic system would be freedom only for the governing class, and a democracy not founded on freedom would mean the dominion of a group, that

which was in command. The others, in both cases, would suffer the effects of such dominion, which can reach the pitch of tyranny. True democracy is free. But because it is free it does not deny the existence of governing classes (or ruling *élites*). The advantage of democracy is that these are not determined by birth, as in aristocratic systems, nor bound up with property as is middle-class mercantilism, nor with physical courage as in military communities, and so on, but are open to all classes, categories, and groups of citizens, indeed to all individuals who rise above the collective mean and who take a more active part than the others in the debates of public life. This selection might be deemed an automatic process of society ; it is not automatic, but has been freed from any external artificial limit and left to the selective virtue of human activity.

It is often said that in democracy mediocrities and intriguers prevail, and demagogues and windbags are encouraged. History shows us demagogues and intriguers, mediocrities and windbags in every regime, including the totalitarian ones (if the experience of the past few years has any value for sensible and studious men). Where is the political society that has been free from demagogues, courtiers, and hypocrites ? Were there none in the courts of Louis XIV, of Elizabeth, of Frederick the Great ?

The anti-democratic spirit to-day has accentuated a psychology antagonistic to the participation of the working classes in politics as ruling *élites*. The upper and lower middle classes, which have held the political power for over a century, are mistrustful, even afraid, of the political advent of the working classes. Russian Bolshevism has given the example of the violent suppression of every other class in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, the Socialist and Communist parties of Europe have come forward in political life as representing an economic class, labour, in opposition to other classes, styled capitalist, with the intent, avowed or latent, of making use of parliamentary democracy in order to overthrow it and to arrive at the dictatorship of the proletariat. This, in both cases, arrests the dynamism of the formation of *élites*, setting both groups on a platform of antagonism.

And here we come to our starting-point : the formation of the political *élites*, however much impeded by conflicting interests, is at the basis of any true democracy, for the organs of command, the administrative and governmental machinery, must be entrusted to capable and trained men, ready to assume responsibilities and to answer for them before parliament and the country. Just as in a factory a man cannot become a mechanician or an engineer or manager without special capacities, so in the political society men should not become rulers without the necessary qualities and an adequate preparation.

What is more, the political rulership of a country should be enabled to alternate between the various currents, according to the trend of public opinion and the ways of considering the practical problems of the hour. The *élites* must be various, all well-prepared and open to sound currents of ideas and to new movements. If power remains too long in a few hands or in closed circles, it becomes too personal, and grows remote from contact with public opinion.

It should be noted that wide political *élites* cannot gain their experience solely at the centre of government. Experience goes from the smaller to the greater, from the circumference to the centre, from the local councils and free popular assemblies to those of the nation. Journalism, public discussions, party congresses, the universities, serve to make problems known, to educate men in the use of freedom, to bring out the more gifted personalities, to give a training for the battles of civil life. Without the exercise of political liberties, the political *élites* would have no adequate means of formation, and without such *élites* it is impossible to bring about a true democracy.

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The whole people is potentially an *élite*. In democracy the first essential is the existence in the people of a collective political consciousness. But the people, as an amorphous mass, cannot act on the political plane. It must be organized. From this primary need springs the political party.

Till yesterday, the party was the expression of the political groups among the wealthy bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia,

and the middle classes, which formed an electorate on a property basis. Here was a first sifting out of *élites*, which could be only transitory, when the masses were knocking at the doors of political life. Universal suffrage, extended to women, has multiplied the electorate tenfold ; the old parties are no longer capable of canalizing such a multitude and making it organic. Through a kind of defensive instinct, the leaders of the parties have become authoritarian. The rank and file of members form a certain opinion, which tends to correct the authoritarianism of the leaders, but only when it is not to their interests to uphold the latter. Thus the mass of the electorate is moved only by elementary and immediate feelings.

All this is rudimentary democracy, which too easily slips into the domination of a group of leaders (as once the Spanish *caciques*, the Italian *ras*, and the French *cliques*). The Socialist and Communist parties, by remaining class organs, have not succeeded in becoming true parties. In England there is on the one hand the trade union bureaucracy and, on the other, the central committees of the Conservatives and Liberals. In each case, this means a centralization of all political enterprise, which through the enormous expense of election campaigns, has become restricted to closed coteries. If this tendency is not corrected by an electoral system more adherent to reality, the formation of a true democracy will be arrested.

As correctives of party monopoly, the various free associations for the orientation and expression of opinion can do much. Such in England are the League of Nations Union, or, potentially, 'Freedom and Peace,' while in France, besides innumerable cultural groups, there are the recently formed *Nouvelles Equipes Françaises* (N.E.F.) and the *Energie Française*. But above all, the Churches will fulfil a function of orientation, if once they realize their specific role in this regard in a regime of free democracy. The ethico-religious orientation brings out the bearings and moral limits of authority and liberty, in all the degrees of the social organism, from the popular electorate up to the head of the State. The ethico-religious orientation facilitates what we have set at the root of democracy, the judgement of value. This

appertains to the people, it is the judgement of the popular conscience, which must exert its influence on those who, in the various social organs, are invested with authority. When a decision, a political choice is demanded of them, even if it presents itself under a purely technical and practical guise, it must not only not contradict the orientation of popular consciousness, but must be in harmony with its judgement of value.

To reach this result, there must be an organization at once free and responsible, spontaneous and disciplined. In sociological terms, we speak of four kinds of freedom, which taken as a whole go to make true liberty. The first, as we have seen, is *original* liberty. This is not a philosophic abstraction, nor an historical moment of the past, but is a reality ever present, actually or potentially. Its lack brings the realization of its existence. Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Albanians, Jews, have understood that they were free formerly, now that they are free no longer. But it is experienced as something in actual existence when it becomes embodied in organisms allowing free action ; that is, when it becomes *organic* liberty.

There are always social organs, but there is not always organic liberty. This exists only when society has preserved its original liberty, that is, the spirit of liberty. The Austria summoned to plebiscite on 10th April, 1938, under Hitler's military occupation, and when her fate was already sealed, had an electoral organism but not organic liberty. The German Reichstag of 30th January, 1939, which approved the prolongation of the Four-Year Plan, without preliminary consideration, nor discussion, nor personal votes, nor reservations, nor parliamentary opposition, but only by the unanimous gesture when the six hundred representatives simultaneously rose to their feet, could not be said to be free. The Four-Year Plan embraces the most thorny problems of the present day—economic self-sufficiency, exchange control, a sixty-hour working week, increased armaments. Were the deputies of the Reichstag free to vote against Marshal Goering's proposal ?

It may be asked why they were not free. Each of the six hundred could have broken his fetters and assumed his

own responsibility. If he did not do so, it was either because he was convinced that the new system corresponded to the elementary needs of his country, or else he acted on the principle of the lesser evil. If this can be an excuse for the single individual, it cannot apply to the organic whole formed by the individuals. Where liberty is lacking, the organ's functioning is arrested, and every individual effort is destined to failure, unless there is the will to vindicate afresh his original liberty.

This, which philosophers would call the dialectic moment of liberty, may be indicated as *finalistic* liberty. It is maintained by the theologians and by philosophers that freedom is a means and not an end ; it is a quality of action, not the end of the action. This is exact. But the vindication of social liberty, in the concrete this or that liberty, or its spirit as embodied in a social system, or its methods as put into practice in political life, can become an end for action. Then liberty is conceived of as a good, a good for individuals and for society, for the sake of which it is, or may be, a duty to sacrifice oneself.

Liberty is not an end but a means. But is there any means that does not become an immediate end when it is lacking or insufficient for our purpose ? Money is a means for acquiring a home. Those who lack it must seek it ; the money (means), the home (end), in the dialectical moment of action become identified. The example of money must not mislead us. Liberty is a spiritual good, a good in itself, which enables us to seek a higher good and to enjoy good as a spiritual conquest ; it is therefore worthy of all sacrifices, even if considered as a means. And not only liberty as a spiritual value in itself, but all those guarantees which at a given moment of history render social liberty effectual. To-day these guarantees are what are known as the political (or *formal*) liberties, such as freedom of vote, speech, meeting and the Press. In the Middle Ages they were the liberties or privileges of the guilds, municipalities, universities, free bodies. In ancient Rome there was the *tribunato* of the plebs, in Athens the right of *ostracism*, and so on. If these guarantees are lacking, then the vindication of liberty comes about through revolutionary methods, by

armed revolt and civil wars. That is, with means that appear to lead to freedom, but which contain implicitly the moral and legal negation of freedom.

The only, the truly spiritual means for preserving freedom when it is once possessed, consists in an ever-renewed experience of it, a reliving of it in its fundamental originality. A Swiss general said in January, 1938 : ' It is better to die than to be reduced to servitude.' Thus he reset the problem of liberty to his fellow-citizens. Maybe the Czechs to-day think the same, without being able to say so aloud, in view of the fact that Hitler's police force and army occupy their land, under the ' protectorate ' of Berlin.

But freedom must be rewon daily. In democracy uniformity, centralization, the majority law, stereotyped *élites*, bureaucratic parties, hamper the exercise of liberties ; there must therefore be that awakening, that conviction, that passage of liberty from means to end, which refashions the spirit of the public and brings new life to the ageing organisms of the political body.

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This brings us to the decisive point of our study. Freedom, thus conceived, is in its essence participation in power. Organized liberty is authority ; authority is organized liberty.

The individualist conception (which is usually styled *liberal* through a sum of historical half-truths and philosophical misconceptions) is inadequate, inexact, and ends in egotism. It is utilitarianism raised to a system. Each individual is free to seek his own advantage ; the sum of individual advantages forms the collective advantage. Hence the vogue of the economic theory of *laissez-faire* and *laissez-passer*, and in politics that of non-intervention.

The democratic conception sprang not from freedom but from equality, and led to State intervention in economic and social matters. It brought the social laws, which seemed at the beginning wholly revolutionary and anti-liberal. But they contained a necessary guarantee of individual liberty, that of a normal standard of life as the foundation of a free democracy. What freedom has the worker who is forced to work from twelve to sixteen hours a day, as a century ago,

or a wretched unemployed man without insurance, or an emigrant placed outside any social protection? The democracy of Athens was the democracy of perhaps forty thousand citizens, not of the hundred thousand slaves or helots. In modern society there is still an unspecified and unassimilated mass (workers without protection, unemployed, emigrants, political refugees, Stateless persons), who have no part in collective life save as an ever-growing and preoccupying encumbrance. They are the slaves of a system incapable of embracing them and of making them citizens of a true, complete, and organized democracy.

We must reach the widest expression of the participation of all in collective life, in its twofold aspect of liberty and authority. We are still at an uncertain phase of social organization, for not only in the political, but still more in the economic sphere, liberty and authority are not yet harmonized, conceived as they have been up till now as antithetical one to the other, and deemed, as it were, outside and never immanent in a democratic regime. Of this the materialistic conception of life has been the true cause. How many of the old democrats have said that they had nothing to do with liberty (taken as Liberalism)? And how many, Christians even, heard with complacence a dictator's boast that he had trampled on the decaying corpse of liberty? The fact is that they did not think that political liberty is 'conscious and organized participation in social power for a common end.'

Is this abstract philosophy? No, it is effective reality. In democracy, liberty and authority coincide in ends and in extension, and are differentiated only by method and technical means. Just as the electorate is free to choose its representatives and at the same time this choice is an act of authority, so Parliament is free to pass a law, and, when it passes it, it performs an act of authority, and so, too, the Government is free to propose a treaty and, when it signs it, performs an act of authority. Each organ influences the other in so far as it is free, and this freedom does not hinder the exercise of an authority that is correlative and intrinsic to it. To extend this principle to economic life will be the task of a true *Social Democracy*.

In order that the exercise of liberty-authority for each individual in his respective organic frame shall be an effectual source of good, worthy of a sound democracy, each must be conscious of it, filled with a sense of the responsibility it implies, with a sense of the moral value of our actions, and the will for a quest of the common good in the co-operation of all. What an immense force could be developed from a similar conception of public life ! It will be said that this is a dream. And so it will be, till there is the education that generates conviction, the mystical urge that gives the sense of a higher duty.

VII

DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION

By S. J. Gosling

WHAT will be the future relationship between democracy and Religion? The answer to this question must be a matter of the deepest interest and concern to the adherents of both these forces. There are democrats who regard the complete divorce of democracy from religion as inevitable and not to be regretted, and not a few are actively working to this end. On the other side, the side of religion, are men who have apparently reconciled themselves to the view that the masses are, at any rate for the time being, lost to religion, who envisage the future of religion as a return to the catacombs where it will be the possession of a spiritual aristocracy. And there are men whose religion is no less fervid and uncompromising who refuse to entertain these defeatist notions, who hold their faith on the understanding that it is to be preached to all and sundry without distinction of race or class, and who profess to see in the spread of democratic ideas a Heaven-sent opportunity to appeal to the reason of mankind unhampered by dynasties and tyrannies, jealous of any loyalty that is not concentrated upon themselves. These latter are not without friends among the followers of democracy, for there are democrats who view the estrangement between religion and democracy with the greatest alarm as foredooming their ideal to ultimate extinction.

The presence of all these conflicting opinions is an accurate reflection of the chaos in men's minds concerning the meaning and function alike of religion and of politics. The most popular—and the most superficial—view is that in their own interests religion and politics must be kept apart; that when

politics dominates religion, religion is destroyed, and when religion invades the sphere of politics it becomes a tyranny. Both these results have happened in the modern world, but the irony of it is that they have been brought about as the direct result of the policy of those who would separate religion and politics.

'Only a superficial mind can make an absolute distinction between religion and politics; both belong in the last resort to the intellectual sphere; politics uninfluenced by religious motives are mere power politics, and a religion which has no effect on the actions of politicians is rapidly reduced to sentiment.'[1] This is not only an acute diagnosis of the present position, it also is a prophecy which we see in the act of being fulfilled before our eyes every day. In the history of the world politicians have frequently been in revolt against religion, or against some aspect of religion, or against some particular form of religion. We have had to wait to our own day to hear the claim made that religion and politics must be divorced. Divorce is the right word to use. In the past there have been plenty of quarrels between religion and politics, but they have been domestic quarrels, the constant connubial battle for ascendancy, for spheres of influence; more often than not they actually arose from a recognition of the fact by both parties that they were matrimonially one, for better, for worse. A new concept, however, has taken possession of the modern mind, on all fours, with the modern idea of the so-called marriage contract, so that we can use the very phrases of twentieth-century morality without appearing to strain the meaning. Religion and politics must 'be free to live their own lives.'

The temptation so to regard the relationship between religion and politics is peculiarly attractive to the English mind, because the average Englishman instinctively avoids principles in the search for a *modus vivendi*. The spirit of compromise has served him well in his political experience, and in the mutual give-and-take of compromise principles are apt to become a nuisance; they are indeed, by definition, *un*compromising. If, therefore, some sort of formula can be devised that will delimit the respective spheres of politics

[1] Edward Quinn, *The Dublin Review*, Oct., 1938, p. 259.

and religion, and so avoid any possibility of a clash between them, the Englishman is prepared to herald such a discovery as a triumph of political sagacity. Two factors encourage him in the belief that this desirable end is also attainable. In his country the official Church is established, and though it may not be in the full sense of the word Erastian, it does tend to be 'patriotic' and complacent in its judgements of the actions of the State. The only other religion likely to be critical of the Government is the Catholic religion, which has not long emerged from the penal times, and its English adherents, remembering those not far-distant days, are only too thankful that they are allowed to practise their religion in peace and quietness. Peace, though it may not be guaranteed by obscurity, is, they feel, more likely to be undisturbed in that condition than if they challenged the actions of the ruling powers. So they, too, are inclined to favour a separation between the authority of religion, where faith and morality are private and personal, and the authority of the State which they are prepared to acknowledge as supreme in political and civil life.

This adjustment of rival claims, so obvious a solution to the Englishman, finds no favour among Continental nations, Latin or Nordic. They have, for the most part, a truer conception of the inter-relation of religion and politics, with the result that their actions, whether for or against religion, are much more violent. They seem, therefore, to the average Englishman either fanatically anti-clerical (for that is how he views religion—in its *public* profession a matter exclusively for the clergy), or hopelessly priest-ridden ; in both cases intolerant. Some of the bloodiest wars in history have been the wars of religion. This historical fact seems to be perfectly natural to the Continental, for it is to be expected that men will fight most fiercely for that which they hold most dearly. But to the Englishman this has always been a source of scandal, even when he has been one of the fighters.

Writing for Englishmen, therefore—and the same applies to the English-speaking nations—one has to establish an additional premise. History is our witness that in actual fact religion and politics never have been separated. We

have to go on to show that it is undesirable that they should be so separated. Religion, it is true, begins with the personal appeal to the individual conscience, and its ultimate aim is the salvation of the individual soul, but that does not mean that it takes no account of the individual's corporate actions. There are not two standards of morality, one for private and one for public life. The attempt to operate two codes of morality, one for the family circle and one for business, has had the result that ' business morality ' has become another name for immoral practices that are contrary to justice and fair-dealing. It is just as true, though perhaps not so obvious, that a like result will follow the attempt to separate individual morality from political morality. Such a separation is ethically unsound, since in the last analysis political actions are human actions which come under the moral law.

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To separate religion and politics is morally indefensible. It remains to consider what would be the result of such an attempt on the philosophy of democracy.

When the relationship between religion and democracy is treated from the historical angle one needs to beware of two misconceptions which, if they are entertained, are capable of invalidating any conclusions drawn from history. The first misconception is prevalent among students, philosophers, and historians, whose life is in the study rather than in the market-place, who take words at their face-value without always examining the reality for which they stand. They begin their study of popular government with the so-called democracies of ancient Greece. As a basis for academic discussion, or as a framework on which can be moulded the policies of governments, the activities of States, and the duties and responsibilities of individual citizens, the political writings of the Greek philosophers are invaluable. They can state and resolve their problems with the lucidity and detachment of Euclid, because, like Euclid, their straight lines are always straight and their right-angles are rectangular. They are working in a medium in which human error and human perversity have been

eliminated, or rather in which they were never present, for the democracies of ancient Greece and ancient Rome were not democracies at all. They were oligarchies in which the oligarchs functioned as democrats, but strictly among themselves. The State was managed according to the democratic model by a little band of philosophers, and by definition the philosophers were wise men. The rest is easy, and one can write the Q.E.D. or the Q.E.F. with a flourish.[1]

But these were not democracies according to the modern, still less according to the religious, meaning of the word. They were slave-owning States, and though it took nearly two thousand years for the Christian Church to convert the slave-owner, it was clear from the very first that Christianity and slavery were incompatible. Because there was no dramatic striking of the manacles from the hands and feet of slaves, following the political triumph of Christianity, historians have overlooked this fact. Emancipation did not come in that way; the Christian conscience did not act like a hammer, but, *more suo*, like a corroding agent which gradually ate away the iron that kept men and women in bondage to the will of their masters.

There are reasons, profound, essential, and dogmatic, why slavery could never ultimately survive in a religious atmosphere, and we shall treat of them presently; but if anyone doubts the truth of the contention that the sole emancipatory force was the religious conscience, let him examine the conditions in which slavery has returned to the modern world. He will find them precisely in those States where, for the time at least, religion has been defeated, in the moral triumph of industrial Capitalism and the political triumph of atheistic Communism. It is worth noting that the bribe in both cases is the same—material well-being. In Communism the masses are induced to accept a

[1] Father Gosling's judgment may here seem in contradiction to that of Dr. Crespi (Chapter II). But if we consider not only the disproportion between the free citizens and the slaves and helots, but also the conditions of human labour, and the lack of value attributed to personality, we cannot fail to note the spiritual abyss that separates the pre-Christian from the Christian world. Father Gosling seeks to explode the literary preconception by which the Greek democracies are presented as the true and unsurpassable type, while Dr. Crespi, after analysing them from the historical standpoint, shows the gulf that separated the pagan ideal from the Christian.

political slavery under the promise of a higher general standard of living ; in the Capitalistic State each individual is cozened into agreement with the system of wage-slavery by the gambler's hope that he may be lucky, and, by winning a fat prize, escape into the upper circle of free men. So much for the jibe at religion that used to be so popular on Labour platforms forty or fifty years ago—that it would be better for the downtrodden masses if religion talked less about the hell of the next world and more about the hell in this. The demagogues have been proved wrong ; slavery has been re-introduced precisely in those places and among those people where the doctrine of eternal punishment has been suppressed or ignored.

The first mistake, then, consists in accepting as a democracy something which is not a democracy at all ; the second mistake is due to attributing to religion an aim which it never professed to have, and then blaming it for its failure to attain it. The primary end of religion is the salvation of man's soul and not the betterment of his physical condition. We shall, of course, scandalize the weaker brethren by stating the case so bluntly, for they will see in it nothing but an admission of the charge that religion is merely 'dope for the masses.' But that can't be helped ! This book is not written for surface thinkers, but for those who can penetrate deeper into the motives of human actions.

The usual apologists for religion, the Christians who are 'comfortably-off,' are fond of cataloguing an imposing list of good works that owe their existence to the spirit of Christian charity, alms-houses, and orphanages, schools, and hospitals. These, however, are not the works of mercy that placate the revolutionary since he considers that they should be his by right and not of grace, and in any case he looks upon them, very often with justice, as the price that the rich pay to salve their consciences. So bitterness is engendered ; the poor see their rights doled out to them in the name of Christian charity, and the rich see their gifts thrown back at them, or taken grudgingly without thanks. In this atmosphere of mutual resentment and distrust, there grows up the belief that religion favours the 'haves' against the 'have-nots,' and that in politics it will

always be found supporting the party of privilege and those who are concerned with maintaining the political *status quo*.

Both sides are missing the true meaning of the Christian dynamic. There is nothing to be found in Christian doctrine that favours one kind of political government more than another. If we examine the words of Christ Himself, we shall find only one reference to actual political conditions obtaining at the time. Even so it was forced upon Him by His enemies and dismissed by Him with almost contemptuous indifference.

The interest that the believer in democratic freedom must have in religious dogma does not lie in any supposed fact that Christianity requires any particular political system. Christianity is prepared to abide by, and to work under, any form of government that is conducive to the welfare of its citizens and respects their right to practise their religion. Following her Divine Master the Christian Church is indifferent to political systems so long as they allow her liberty to deliver the message entrusted to her. The affinity between the democratic ideal and the Christian pattern of life is much more subtle and much more profound than any alliance based on identity of aims. There is, in fact, no such identity. The aims of political government, which are the welfare and happiness of the community, overlap and interlock with the aims of religion, which concern the salvation of souls through the service of God. Both are subject to law, divine and natural, but they operate on different planes. There is not one law for the politician and another law for the saint, as the heresy of separatism would try to insinuate. There is 'One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all.'[1]

Though it may sound like a paradox it is in this very indifference of the Christian thinker towards any particular form of government that the first contract between democracy and religion is made, since the indifference does not arise from any lack of interest in man's physical well-being, but is due to the recognition of the fact that men are at liberty to choose the form of government that best suits them.

[1] Eph. iv. 6.

Here we begin to get at the very core and centre of the matter. It can be put very simply from the point of view of the democrat and of the Christian man. Democracy depends upon the premise that men are capable of governing themselves ; religion is based on the truth that men are called upon to save their souls. St. Augustine warned his hearers that God who made them without their consent would not save them without their consent. From all the confusion caused by man's ignorance and sin, by his selfish and foolish thoughts, there stand out clearly for all to see these ideas—liberty, reason, and free-will. God has called man to know Him and to serve Him by the exercise of his free-will. The appeal of religion is made to man's reason. It follows then that man must have that liberty of action necessary to form and carry out that pattern of life that his reason tells him is the answer to the command to love and serve God.

Every Christian philosopher knows very well that ignorance, malice, and the limitations of varying intellectual capabilities, will not permit a unanimous answer to the problems of the religious life. But he knows, too, that these are the factors in the situation that have to be dealt with without destroying man's free-will and his consequent free acceptance of the Divine Will. That is the central problem of all religion—to conform the unstable, the uninstructed, and the sin-prone will of man to the Will of God. But the conditions of that problem have been laid down by the Creator. Governments cannot presume to arrogate to themselves the power to control that which the Creator has left us free to enjoy. The only excuse that governments have for the limitation of freedom is the safeguarding of the liberty of others.

In this endless fight between good and evil, between Christ and anti-Christ, the weapons of the Christian are many and various. They are, precept and example, instruction and persuasion, and above all, the grace of God acting through His appointed instruments. But in this campaign the integrity of man's free-will must be ever respected. That is sacrosanct in principle and inviolable in fact, for no physical force, prisons, tortures, nor death

itself, can destroy the freedom of man's choice between good and evil ; they can only limit the possibilities of making that choice effective.

Such then are the conditions that surround the work of religion in the world, determine its procedure and dictate its lines of action. It is not dependent on any political form though obviously it can function more freely and smoothly inside a political regime that accepts its premises than in one that denies them. Those premises include the responsibility of each individual to exercise his free-will, *to choose.* A pattern of life that is dictated by another, no matter how intrinsically good it may be in itself, does not satisfy the religious demand for the voluntary obedience to the Divine Will.

It is necessary to dwell on the essential part that reason and free-will play in religion because so many people fall into the common error of supposing that an hierarchical order and a code of laws are not consonant with a democratic regime. They confuse the age-old distinction between liberty and licence ; they imagine that liberty means also equality, and they have not grasped the truth that Montesquieu, among others, elaborated when he defined liberty as the power to do that which the laws do not forbid. Law is seen to be an essential prerequisite of liberty, since to allow to one individual liberty unrestricted by law would be to destroy it for others. When we speak of liberty, therefore, in the domain of religion, it does not mean that we are free to do as we like ; it does not mean that we can make or change the moral law to suit our convenience. It *does* mean that Almighty God has left us free to accept or reject the appeal that religion makes to our reason ; it means, in the words of Leo XIII, that we are ' in the hands of our counsel and have power over our actions.' In the last analysis therefore, man is free. He is free, not on any theoretical grounds, nor because human freedom is a desirable hypothesis, but for the plain and simple fact that God has made him free. Is there any other ground as firm and as stable on which the democrat can establish his claim to political and economic freedom ?

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For what, after all, is democracy ? It is the principle that free and intelligent beings should freely guide themselves by the light of their intelligence to their chosen ends. Free-will and reason keep ringing through that sentence like strophe and anti-strophe. Whence do they come except from the hand of God, the Creator ? And if we reject the evidence of religion on this score, by what means shall we establish man's right to be considered and treated as a free and intelligent being ? Because (let us confess it) if we judge him by his actions it is not always patent that man, either individually or in the mass, is a free and intelligent being. Sin can undermine free-will, and ignorance and selfishness can obscure intelligence. The political philosopher as well as the Christian moralist is often tempted to aver that such people cannot govern themselves, and to preach liberty to them is to lead them back into the jungle. How often have we heard that verdict supported by a wealth of evidence to illustrate its truth. What answer can we give ? To most of us there has come at some time or another the sickening reflection that there is no answer—and there is none, except the one given by religion, that by denying man's freedom and ignoring his intelligence you are degrading the handiwork of his Creator.

Freedom, indeed, may have to be restricted and intelligence disciplined ; so long as these measures are temporary, and look forward to the time when freedom may be used intelligently, they may be justified. But when they are employed as a permanent act of government they are contrary to the end of man, and no amount of good promised by the dictators, the politicians, the moralists, or the economists, can ever excuse this defacement of the image of God in man's soul.

We have said that the relationship between democracy and religion is subtle and deep. It is here, at this stage of the argument, that we uncover it by disclosing their dependence on each other. Religion means the reaching down of the grace of God to the individual soul and the lifting up of the individual will to the Will of God. The law, the Church, and the sacraments are the means by which that connexion is made. There is no substitute known to religion for the

voluntary submission of the individual to the law of God. For its part democracy demands the recognition of the right of free and intelligent beings to guide themselves towards their appointed end. There is no substitute known to democracy for the free choice of the means to this end. It is the same principle, regarded in the first instance from the point of view of religion, in the second, from the political standpoint. Anything, therefore, that impairs the individual's political liberty is a potential menace to his religious liberty. For as long as the individual is free to criticize the actions of the government, to debate their efficacy, and to organize opposition to their decrees in the realm of reason, so long will the evangelist be free to preach his gospel and to endeavour to persuade others to his way of thinking. Once that permission has been withdrawn religious liberty is at an end. Religion, however, can surmount that difficulty and still survive; history proves it. Not so, democracy; history is proving that as we write. The reason for this difference is not difficult to see. Political liberty is desirable but not essential to the survival of religion. Religious liberty is essential to democracy, for to deny man the liberty to follow his conscience is to attack liberty at its source, to maim the integrity of human personality and to refuse to it the expression of its highest function.

It may come as a surprise to modern minds to be told that the only certain foundation for the democratic ideal rests on Christian dogma. Their incredulity can be excused since the events of the last three or four hundred years have again and again forced the Christian Church into alliance with anti-democratic forces. This has been brought about by the exaggerations and excesses of the revolutionaries which compelled the Church to stress the claims of authority and law in order to maintain that equilibrium between law and liberty on which all human society depends. To preserve this balance is the supreme concern of the sociologist because once it is lost society topples over, and either sinks into a state of licence that knows no law, or, if the pressure has been in the opposite direction, it becomes the victim of a tyranny that denies to man the exercise of his God-given attribute of liberty.

It is clear, when we have removed all the confusing and distracting unessentials, that the problem alike for the theologian and the political philosopher, resolves itself into the proper adjustment of the rival claims of liberty and law. Without law there can be no liberty, and without liberty reason cannot act. The mistake that Liberalism made was in imagining that man, solely by the exercise of unrestricted liberty would, ultimately and necessarily, attain the highest good. The mistake of the benevolent dictator (to put the case at its highest) consists in his thinking that he can procure the highest good by forcing men to accept it against their will. He will fail, and is bound to fail, because the indispensable note of the highest good, so far as man is concerned, is his voluntary adhesion to it and his voluntary acceptance of the means to attain it.

For the Christian the ' highest good ' is synonymous with the Will of God, and the phrase throws a flood of light on this baffling problem. No purely ethical or psychological theory is capable of explaining the paradox and resolving its divergencies into agreement. The man of religion, however, and he alone, can see that the facts of life bear out the teachings of his dogma, and his dogma can give a reasoned explanation of the facts of life. For man is wayward, ignorant, and selfish, and his natural inclinations if they are not curbed and guided will lead him dangerously. Those are the facts ; the doctrine of the Fall explains them. But man has been redeemed, called back to his duty of knowing and loving God, of giving Him his ' reasonable service ' ; this is the dogma that guarantees to man his intellectual independence.

The real danger to democracy, therefore, does not come from tyrants and dictators ; it comes from democrats themselves, and arises either from their failure to realize what is the true end of man, or from their unwillingness to adopt those measures of self-discipline by which that can be attained. They have appetites, desires, ambitions ; why should they not be gratified ? Wherefore the need of self-denial ? The answer has been given once for all ; ' Not in bread alone doth man live, but in every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God.' In like manner if

the people will not realize their spiritual destiny they will become the prey of those who can bribe them with material things and induce them to barter their heritage for the good things of this world : ' All these will I give you if falling down you will adore me.' Again the answer has been given : ' It is written, the Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve.'

Without democracy religion will be cribbed and confined, at the mercy of every power that can bribe or bludgeon the populace into servitude. But without religion democracy will betray itself, for it will either riot in lawlessness or it will sell itself into the slavery of the highest bidder. Religion—that is, the force that lifts men's thoughts above the base gauds of this world, that testifies to us that God is our Father and we are His children, that upholds and defends our personal integrity, and directs us how we may order our lives towards our appointed end—religion alone can save and safeguard democracy. The people demand the right to govern themselves ; the right is theirs. Democracy will be judged, as every other system has been judged, by the manner in which the people exercise that right. When the old aristocracies were the ruling class they invented a phrase, *noblesse oblige !* It was a confession that power by itself was not enough, it needed to be justified by the use that was made of it. So the aristocrats sought by this phrase to impose upon themselves a stricter sense of duty and a higher code of conduct than lesser men professed. When they forgot it, they failed. If democracy is to succeed, the people, too, must realize that power brings with it the obligations of knowledge, self-discipline, and service. *Démocratie oblige !*

VIII

DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION

By Maurice Vaussard

DEMOCRACY is passing through an undeniable crisis. This crisis may perhaps indicate its final decline, but it may also be nothing more than growing pains, from which democracy will come out strengthened.

The reason why we are inclined to consider the latter hypothesis as the more likely, is that democratic countries have not the slightest wish to become subject to a dictatorial regime. Whilst the aspiration towards liberty—the ' original liberty ' of the sociologists and the formal liberties—endures, real although strongly compressed, in all countries deprived of it. How many, if freely consulted, would confirm in power the men and institutions which now rule them? An aspiration so widespread must always triumph sooner or later over adverse circumstances.

Another reason for hopefulness is to be found in the historical evolution of democracy, which has been examined in the preceding chapters and also briefly alluded to by Luigi Sturzo, in his clear and moving study of the present conflicts between morality and politics, where he analyses the ' crisis of democracy.'[1] Whilst tyrannies are as old as humanity, one can barely speak of ' democracy ' in an ancient world based on slavery, where only a small number of free men represented the city. Even in the Middle Ages, when the municipal democracies of the Italian towns, for instance, showed astonishing spiritual as well as economic vitality, and developed a form of government which has had no equivalent ever since, the struggles between factions always

[1] *Politics and Morality*. Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1938, Chapter III.

prevented the development in these collectivities—small though they were—of a truly unitary consciousness, and this made them fall an easy prey to the princes of the Renaissance who, for all their patronage of the arts, were authentic tyrants.

In fact, the democratic regimes are 'young, in some cases in their infancy. Their experiences are recent and incomplete. They have had to face notable difficulties, grave crises, and the solutions adopted have not always been well chosen or always responding to the social structure, being based for the most part on an exaggerated and disorganized individualism. In spite of this, the progress made by mankind in every field during what may be called the *first phases of* modern democracy has been remarkable and incontestable. There has been a continuous striving towards a better future.'[1]

The great internal enemy of democracy is the particularism of groups, castes, parties, and provinces when it overshadows the vital exigencies of the wider community to which these groups, classes, provinces belong—the fatherland and the community of mankind. That is to say that the national sentiment, which towards the end of the eighteenth century took the place of the monarchical loyalty—until then the essential link between the citizens of the principal European States, but which had become a link more and more loose and questioned, and serving selfish interests—offered an eminently favourable basis for the establishment of true democracies, since these could prosper only where there was a very clear collective consciousness of a common ideal and common interests. By abolishing as *contrary to the laws of reason*, and because 'all men are born free and equal in rights,' the privilege of class as well as of fossilized organisms which no longer represented in the Old Regime anything more than the survival of old abuses, the French Revolution brought into being the elementary conditions of the consciousness of a national solidarity, which is more valuable and stronger than the sum total of particular interests. But this collective consciousness may itself easily degenerate into nationalism or imperialism. The object of the present study is to show historically how the two terms 'nation'

[1] *Politics and Morality*, p. 59.

and 'democracy' are meant to complete each other, and how the necessary conjunction is at present deviated—let us hope only temporarily.

From the beginning, the founders of the first democracies —the American and the French—came across the obstacle of the various particularisms which we have just enumerated.

As regards the United States, it is through an optical illusion due to historical and geographical distance that we usually imagine to-day that the thirteen colonies that belonged to England until 1776, were lands which everything predisposed to form a federation, once they had acquired their independence. The exact opposite is the truth, and the best minds of the times made no mistake. Frederick the Great said on the subject in 1782 : 'It would be no more absurd to suggest the establishment of a democracy to govern all territories from Brest to Riga.' We find similar opinions in the descriptions of travellers contemporary to the American Revolution. One of them wrote, in 1760 : 'Fire and water are no more heterogeneous than the various American colonies.' And another asserts that the idea of uniting them into one state is 'one of the vainest and most visionary ideas that has even been thought of, even by novelists.' As a matter of fact, the distance (1000 miles) separating the North from the South, the differences of climate, of economic activity, of origin, of population, of religious, political, and social ideals, made the dream of Washington and Hamilton seem absolutely Utopian. During the struggle for independence, the only link between the thirteen States had been the united command under one leader, and, once peace had been secured, that of a 'league of friendship, fragile and despised.'

As M. Jacques Lambert, Professor of the Faculty of Law of Lyons, has written in his valuable little book, *Les Nations contre la Paix*[1] :

> 'Each State complained that its neighbours had left it to bear all the brunt of the war and had taken from it all the profit of victory. . . . Being all the more jealous of their sovereignty because it was of recent origin and had

[1] Paris, Alcan, 1933.

been bought at the cost of a fierce war, each colony surrounded itself with customs' barriers, so as to affirm through isolation the fullness of its sovereignty; each one was ready to secure respect for its independence by force of arms.'

It is surprising to find in America, at the end of the eighteenth century, a situation so similar, for instance, to that of the successor States of the Austro-Hungarian Empire immediately after the World War, and in a more general way, to those European States which some daring minds dreamed—and still dream—of linking together in our times in a Federation which would be no greater or more incongruous than the present Federation of the United States.

The small minority of great landlords, traders, and industrialists, whose interests extend far beyond the frontiers of each colony, and who wanted to free the American market from the economic imperialism of England, therefore appeared—under the leadership of Washington—to be 'internationalist patriots' in a way, as much as democrats. And until the end of the Civil War, which finally secured the federal victory, the rulers of the Union, who besides were nearly all members of the well-to-do middle classes, were more concerned with strengthening the young American State politically than with establishing the collaboration of classes, which is also an essential element of true democracy.

The same thing happened in France. An undeniably democratic spirit, at least, in administrative and political matters, is evident in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Constitution of 1791 and the work of the Constituant Assembly. The task of organizing the new regime was entirely assumed by a new privileged class: the bourgeoisie, and the people had hardly any share. If on the one hand the peasants saw their condition improved through the abolition of feudal dues and the increase in the number of small owners thanks to the sharing out of *biens nationaux*, the townspeople soon discovered that the suppression of the Craft Guilds changed only, as far as they were concerned, the form but not the substance of economic bondage. Furthermore, after 1792, and the declaration of war with

Prussia and Austria, the defence of the 'nation one and indivisible' took precedence over the establishment of social democracy. The attempts made by Robespierre and St. Just in the midst of the Terror, to modify the status of property in a collectivist sense—and which were besides much too daring for the times—could not succeed and had no sequel. And the annexation of territories, determined by idealogical as well as strategic considerations and soon extended far beyond the needs of national defence, show already, at that period, how easily national sentiment, once it has reached a certain pitch of fervour, can degenerate into imperialism.

French unity, which was emphasized by the establishment of conscription to face the hostility of Europe, came out of the Napoleonic wars unshakably strengthened, and the favours granted by the Restoration to the *émigrés* who had fought against their country was one of the mistakes public opinion never forgave.

At about the same time and after the debacle of 1804, the national idea assumed in Germany with Fichte the form of a *mystique* which rallied round it the moral *élite* of the nobility and the bourgeoisie as well as of the intellectuals and popular classes. In Italy, the fight against absolutism and the aspiration towards national unity also found their support and their martyrs in all circles, and even a greater proportion amongst the enlightened classes (including the clergy, contrary to a fairly widespread belief) than amongst the common people. In these two countries it is not yet a question of 'democracy,' but rather of 'constitutionalism,' and, above all, of 'liberty,' which is the basis of both; *political* liberty, still very incomplete, and which even when it is theoretically very great, is now being found to be little more than a sham if it is not coupled with a minimum of *economic* independence for the worker in the fields and in the factory, who is otherwise urged by wretchedness to revolt against the social order.

That is one of the dangers which throughout the course of the nineteenth century, the triumphant patriotic bourgeoisie could not or would not see, and which widened between this class and the proletariat a gulf which did not exist in

1789 and hardly at all in 1815. In France, this tragic misunderstanding, fostered by a whole series of internal troubles during the reign of Louis-Philippe and the Second Empire, culminated in the Commune of 1871 when, under the eyes and with the complicity of the conquering enemy, the regular army of the bourgeoisie drowned in blood the attempt to organize a power at once *national* and *proletarian*, but open also, at least in the beginning, to the other social classes. The territorial unity of the nation emerged intact from this crisis (since the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was in no sense a consequence), but its moral unity and the possibilities of establishing a real democracy in the country received a blow from the consequences of which we still suffer.

It may seem incredible that a century after the beginning of the French Revolution, the idea of integrating the working classes into democracy should appear—in spite of the substitution of the limited suffrage of the Monarchy of 1830 by universal suffrage and the recognition of the rights of trade unionism—to be on the decline in the very country which sketched out the outline of modern democracy. And yet such was the case; during the first decades of the Third Republic, the republicans of the Government parties spent their energies in Parliament in favour of secularized schools, the struggle against the Church, diplomatic and military recovery, and also, to a certain extent, in favour of a better regulation of working conditions, but in an *étatique* and socializing rather than a sanely corporative and truly democratic spirit. Besides, demagogy only too often played into the hands of the open or hidden enemies of the working classes.

However, so long as the masses remained openly patriotic —in France one may even say chauvinistic—the ruling classes had no justification for denying them that place in the French State to which their numerical importance, and in many cases already their technical qualifications, entitled them. It was by indirect methods that endeavours were made to impede their access to the counsels of government, if not to government itself. But with the development of international Marxism which coincided more or less with the deplorable

Dreyfus case, France appeared to be morally divided into two camps ; one almost exclusively bourgeois, which gave an anti-democratic tone to the defence of the national idea (if necessary *against* the working classes, in so far as these adhered to internationalist Socialism), the other proletarian —although its leaders were also bourgeois intellectuals— which asserted its democratic faith and conceptions on anti-militaristic and (apparently) anti-national bases. The names of Jaurès and Maurras synthetize these two tendencies which the claims of national security succeeded in reconciling for a time during the World War.

But the clash of doctrines revived after the War, and as the Socialist parties, which were considered the vanguard of the democratic movement, suffered defeat after defeat in many countries where they held power or shared it, the criticism which nationalism levelled at democrats of all shades (even and in some cases *especially* at Christian democrats) became more and more harsh and radical.

It is remarkable that although Maurras and the *Action Française* have carried on for the last thirty-five years a merciless war against the Republican regime, and have only used the liberty which it gave them in order to attack its men and its principles, the attraction of this doctrine far surpasses the still limited circle of its declared adherents, and even the limits of the country. In intellectual circles hardly a single known writer from 1903 to 1938 has dared to make a stand against Maurras and his school, apart from a few Catholics and a few Marxists, *even among Left-wing Republicans.* His recent election to the French Academy, thanks to the votes of those of its members whom he had most insulted, supplies a further proof that intimidation and audacity succeed in this world in other realms besides foreign policy.

Abroad, the doctrines of *Action Française* have had great influence on the origins of Italian nationalism, to-day absorbed by the Fascist Party ; in Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain they have inspired other small currents of nationalism, more literary than efficient, in countries where the means were then lacking to translate it into political reality, but in some of which attempts have since been made.

In any case, they prepared the ground where later there would develop a boundless and unbridled admiration for the anti-democratic action of Mussolini, presented in all these circles as the renovator of Europe.

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From this brief historical survey it therefore appears that in France and in several neighbouring States, the normal development of the idea and fact of the Nation conscious of itself as a living unity, which should logically lead to the realization of the *social nation*, integrating all classes in a hierarchized whole, subject to the voluntary discipline of democracy, *was arrested* at the end of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth *by the advent and rapid predominance of two ideologies antagonistic to each other, but both equally opposed to the democratic ideal : Marxist Internationalism* founded on the idea of class warfare (and which has led in Russia to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the suppression or enslavement of the former ruling classes), and *Nationalism*, it matters little whether it is of defence or aggression since wherever it triumphs it leads to the same result—the domination of a political caste (occasionally surrounded by a pretorian guard) over the whole of the nation.

Naturally, this historical epitome contains an intentional simplification.

In the first place, in a country with the historical traditions of France, there can be no question of an abrupt or final arrest of the democratic process. The latter follows a broken line, and it is rather of *slowing down* that one should speak after the Commune, for instance—or even, strange as it seems, after the Great War—when the representative Assemblies were packed with rigid Conservatives of the diehard type ; of *acceleration* with the accession to power of a Briand or a Léon Blum, whose social reforms, to the large extent in which they are founded in justice, had long ago been advocated by social-minded Catholics, who had neither the means nor the energy to translate them into law.

Shrewd observers have noticed that the social legislation

imposed in June, 1936, on French employers—holidays with pay, collective contracts, reduction of working hours—and the essential of which remains in spite of the failure of the General Strike of the 30th November, 1938, has changed the state of mind of the proletariat, notably with regard to National Defence. Certainly it did its duty in 1914 as it would have done it again, if necessary, during the crisis imposed on Europe by the German-Czech dispute ; but before June, 1936, with the feeling that it was defending *the country of the others*, the bourgeois rulers, *rather than its own*, whereas to-day it feels that it is defending not only *its* home, *its* children, but also *its* factories, *its* instruments of work, etc. . . . And there is perhaps no need to look elsewhere—though progress still remains to be accomplished to complete the integration of the worker into the French State—for the reason which makes him accept to-day so deliberately, on the whole, the risk of war against the anti-democratic Powers of the Berlin-Rome Axis, just as the conscripts of the First Republic accepted it against the absolute Monarchies at the end of the eighteenth century, whereas to-day resistance to war comes from a large section of the bourgeoisie, which is concerned above all with preventing a new possible success of Bolshevism as a result of a general conflict.

There are certainly shades of difference, on the other hand, between a nationalism like that of Maurras, which claims to renew the royal tradition of the union of all the live forces of the nation, including the humblest, around the hereditary defender of the national community—a formula very attractive in itself, but never put to the test of events in our times—and the fierce racial expansionism of Hitler, forging the apparent unity of will of a master-people through the coercion of dissenters and the legal suppression of non-Aryans. But in the opposition of the *Action Française* theorists on principle to those elements which they consider disruptive for the national community, Jews, aliens, Freemasons, in the violence always advocated and often employed by them and their troops to silence their opponents—free fights at public meetings, riots at the universities, threats of death or defamation through the Press, ' corporal

punishments' even at church doors, in their open revolt against the condemnation by Rome of their doctrine and methods, accompanied by a campaign of abuse against certain ecclesiastics whom they knew to be hostile to them, do we not find *all the elements* of what the totalitarian dictatorships practise in order to establish their domination? Between the two there is only a *difference of degree*. And as a matter of fact, we find that the abominable German persecutions against the Jews draw from Maurras and his direct disciples neither pity nor formal censure, no more than the extermination of countless Abyssinians by gas, or the bombardment of open towns by Franco's aeroplanes.

In Italy, where until the advent of Fascism, the development of democracy had been much slower (universal male suffrage was granted only in 1912), but more evenly spread than in France thanks to the concomitant progress of trade unions, co-operative societies, thrift and benefit societies, popular banks, etc., and where from the moment of its formation, a political party of Christian democratic inspiration swept into parliament one hundred *Popolari* deputies, it is the Marxist virus rather than the Nationalist virus which was the *first in time* to compromise the success of democracy, although at the time of the *Risorgimento* this country had given a most admirable example of union in the service of a national ideal. Perhaps the same is also true of Germany if we judge only by appearances and do not agree with F. W. Foerster (but I for one certainly do), that *from the time of Bismarck and William II* imperialist nationalism had completely distorted the most noble German traditions.

On the contrary, in Poland, Yugoslavia and, before the debacle of 1918, in the old Austro-Hungarian empire, it has been Polish, Serbian, or Magyar 'nationalitarianism' that has essentially prevented the organization of these States on really democratic bases. This is due to the reluctance of the dominant ethnical groups to give their rightful place to those who form imposing minorities. The prolonged and persistent acuteness of the Croat question has no other origin.

On the contrary, in Catalonia and the Basque country it was believed that when, after the fall of King Alphonso XIII,

these provinces—socially and economically the most advanced of the Iberian peninsula—momentarily obtained linguistic, cultural, and administrative autonomy, this was to be the prelude for a general evolution of the policy of the Madrid government towards wiser formulas than had prevailed during the latter period of the Monarchy. The Christian spirit, so powerfully manifest in the customs and social organizations of the Basque country in particular, permitted the hope that if an exaggerated and imprudent separatism were avoided these autonomies would have been rather profitable than perilous to Spain. In any case, did not the political advantages England has derived from the independence granted to Southern Ireland within the frame of the Empire—an independence going well beyond the Basque and Catalan claims—show by contemporary example that to oppose just aspirations indefinitely and by force is never profitable to excessively centralized States? The new nationalist Spain, which has brutally suppressed all the liberties granted under the Republic to the northern provinces, will maybe prove this some day by painful experience.

Switzerland, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and especially England, form a happy exception to the crisis of 'anti-Democracy' that Europe is now experiencing. If the belief in democracy is not in danger in England—although some of her statesmen are entitled to wish that it were more dynamic, especially among the young—it is not only because Great Britain retains the most solid traditions of parliamentary dignity and professional organization, but because the trade unions have always remained patriotic and opposed to sterile class-warfare, so that a reaction of those elements which elsewhere style themselves 'Nationalists' would have no justification here. It would not be possible to conceive in England an attitude like that of the Italian Socialists, who remained 'neutralists' after 1915, without grounding their abstentionism on a defined religious or moral ideal; still less like that of the Bolshevist signatories of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, who accepted the carving up of their country's territory, so as to be free to carry on the civil war.

Finally, the case of Belgium offers the particularity of a State with tried democratic institutions, which had long possessed one of the best electoral systems in Europe (the plural vote, abolished after the War, which conciliated the principle of universal suffrage with the consideration due to the responsibilities incurred by heads of families and social authorities), but which has experienced for many years now a great feeling of uneasiness owing to a division of languages which has undermined the national consciousness, and has ended by endangering Belgian democracy itself. Being cut off, *in spite of itself*, from its ruling class, which is French-speaking, Flemish democracy organized itself with the assistance of the local clergy which had remained nearer to the people, on confessional and anti-unitary bases, which in some ways are reminiscent of those given by the late Mgr. Hlinka to the Slovak Popular Party in face of the former Czech Government. We perceive here, by a phenomenon which is in a way contrary to what has happened in some other countries of Europe, where the spread of a nationalism of a reactionary type has retarded or arrested the development of democracy, *the absolute necessity of keeping democracy on a basis which is largely national, and not particularist or provincial, if it is to be preserved from the danger of dictatorial degeneration.* At least, in a Europe where this danger is only too real, for in the absolute, it would perhaps be permissible to reason otherwise. Slovakia is having to-day that sad experience—she who for so long created gratuitous difficulties for the rulers in Prague—and Flanders might perhaps have it to-morrow.

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We thus come back to what we wrote at the beginning of this study about the United States of America and the service which Washington and his friends rendered them in the beginning, when they urged them to federate. But if the excessive cutting up of a territory into independent States, which is the consequence of a shortsighted nationalism, is at once a menace to their liberties and a cause of weakness to their economy, the idea of organizing the whole world into one League of Nations, which appears however to be

the logical conclusion of democratic evolution, was no doubt too ambitious or, at least, too premature a dream in 1918. The failure of this attempt is even more disastrous than the retrogression experienced within many States, which, in full possession of their national consciousness, have seen it diverted towards the excesses of an imperialist or particularist nationalism, as the case may be, before having reached the normalizing stage of the 'social nation.'

If we define the latter as '*a nation wherein all social groups develop their own activities freely and harmoniously under the control of the State*,' but not under its constraint, we see that more than one example has existed for a long time even in Europe, notably the Swiss Confederation. It has become a commonplace to point out how three cultures, three languages, two religious confessions, have become so closely welded into the same national body and an almost unanimous acceptance of its democratic institutions, that it would seem a real crime against civilization to attempt to separate them on racial or nationalist grounds. Alsace-Lorraine, peaceful meeting-place of the Latins and Germans, the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religions, each being enriched in contact with the other instead of losing its own characteristics (it is common knowledge that the Alsatian Catholics, like the Swiss Catholics, are as fervent as any in the world) is another instance ; France allows the continuance there of a special regime, which could without disadvantage be extended further in the direction of cultural autonomy, and the attachment of the German-speaking Alsatians to the Republic is strengthened thereby.

It would seem that it is in this direction—which is both democratic and federal—that we should seek the salvation of Europe, once the nationalist fever which now undermines her has disappeared, perhaps after many tragedies and trials.

Lucien Romier, who perceives the first manifestations of nationalism in the Christendom of the sixteenth century, and predicts that after its uninterrupted growth in extent and intensity until the World War its curves will extend perhaps for another century or two, defines it as 'one of the most formidable passions recorded by history.' We cannot

be surprised if our civilization appears to reel under this blow ; and if it is also true that ' nationalism, in competition with materialism, gains all that is lost by religion ' we have here, in a few profound words, the diagnosis of the evil and of the possible remedy. The Church and her faithful had to fight for more than two centuries against other heresies which appeared to be as formidable, and in the end she triumphed. It is because we believe in the invincible power of the Spirit and of Charity that we believe that a time will come when the effort towards peace and social justice which is postulated by democracy, understood and realized in a Christian spirit, will triumph at last over the tyranny of man on man.

IX

DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

By Alfredo Mendizábal

We might start by considering here two aspects of the theme suggested by the above title; by analysing modern attempts to organize the international community in relation to democratic principles or by examining the opposition existing between democratic countries and those totalitarian countries whose formidable thrust is disturbing the whole world and especially Europe. But we have to admit that neither way of considering the question is really satisfactory. Both aspects, however, do really concern the study of the problem, which we would prefer to entitle: *anti-democracy* and *international disorder*.

We want to avoid presenting Democracy and International Order as if they had a correlative existence. The truth is that just now it is not a question of their correlative existence, but simply of their existence. We can find only partial attempts at democracy and timid outlines of any international order worthy of the name. But since things are defined rather by what they claim to be than by what they are (and people have acquired the lazy habit of attributing effective reality to mere tendencies or partial and incomplete realizations) everyone is agreed in terming 'democracies' certain forms and methods of government based on the principle of universal participation, in spite of the fact that they may be vitiated by demagogic corruption or counterfeited by an oligarchic hoax, in the same way as it has been generally agreed for the last twenty years that an international order has been achieved in the

scaffolding of the League of Nations, as that institution was shaped by the Covenant. Since in spite of this widespread agreement, there is still some difficulty in securing acceptance by all of the notion that the name makes the thing, I am disposed to incline towards the negative but much clearer notion of anti-democracy and of disorder, because when we deal with the first, we immediately see that we are dealing with the very principle of despotism, and when we denounce the second, we oppose the anarchical consequences of that tyrannical principle. International morality, even more so than politics, is involved, and it is precisely when it is attacked or ignored that its necessity is greatest, and the task of upholding it most urgent.

Although it is unnecessary, we should like at the outset to stress the following point so as to avoid possible criticisms if it had not been made clear: If we have to criticize the Fascist States as being anti-democratic States, it is because, in the times we live in, it is they who disturb international life by their opposition, as much in interests as in theory, to the States that are called democratic or invoke democratic principles. If we do not refer at the same time to the Soviet Union, it is certainly not because we consider that State to be democratic (it has been on the contrary, the first, in our century, to adopt a tyrannical regime, which is a negation of democracy and of human liberty). It is because at the present moment it is not the Left-wing Fascism of the Soviet Union but the Right-wing Fascism of Italy and Germany that threatens the peace of Europe and the territorial integrity and independence of so many States. This does not mean that the world must ignore the danger of Bolshevism, but that it must also preserve itself from international disorder leading logically to a most fearful war which, even though it were declared by the Fascist countries, would eventually benefit Bolshevism and the growing anarchy in the modern world.

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The programme of the German Workers' National Socialist Party, proclaimed by Hitler in Munich on the 24th

February, 1920, already included the whole of the foreign policy of the Third Reich in its three first points :

(1) *We demand that all Germans should unite in a 'Greater Germany' in accordance with the principle of national self-determination.* The official commentator of the programme, Gottfried Feder, added : 'We shall not give up a single German of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Southern Tyrol (for the sake of Mussolini, this last claim was suppressed in the second edition of the programme), of that colony of the League of Nations, Austria, and of those States that have succeeded the old Austrian empire.

(2) *We demand that the German people should have the same rights as other nations and that the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain be abolished.*

(3) *We demand land (colonies) for the feeding of our people and for our surplus population.*

Not only are these objectives being reached, but a great many of them have already been passed. It is necessary to distinguish in German nationalism between the genuine reaction of a nation which wishes neither to perish nor to live at the mercy of others, and actions determined, not by the vital needs of the German people, but by the spirit of loot and of immoral force which inclines to take justice into its own hands ; a unilateral justice which makes no effort to arrive at an agreement with other Powers and prefers to break international bonds in a violent fashion.

To-day, 'Greater Germany' has expanded to such a degree that it has burst the racial frame in order to annex, under a vexatious form of protectorate, independent countries which are thus suddenly reduced to slavery. Colonies in Europe ! People were scandalized to see Italy conquer Abyssinia, a member of the League of Nations, by means of a war of aggression. Still more revolting was the pure and simple incorporation of Austria by another act of force, without a single protest by the signatory States of the Peace Treaties or by the League of Nations. But the carving up of Czecho-Slovakia (with the connivance of England and France) followed by the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, passes all measure. The voracity of the Third Reich will

not stop at this, neither will Fascist Italy (a model for, and afterwards a copy of, German Fascism) which has just added to the double crown, royal and imperial, of Victor Emmanuel III, that of the kingdom of Albania, snatched on a Good Friday by an act of violence against a defenceless people.

It is a fact that threats to peace are to a great extent the outcome of an absence of scruples in the choice of methods, as well as of megalomania and the spirit of domination and conquest which contains within itself the spirit of war.

There is an aggressive meaning in all these mobilizations of uniformed and militarized masses which dramatize collective life in dictator countries. Until war comes, an *ersatz* drill takes its place. Everything is a preparation for war, which is first of all considered inevitable, and then desirable. Hymns, flags, parades, are constant demonstrations of forces at the point of explosion, which are being held back, but which will soon be irrepressible. There is too great a tendency to create inextricable situations in which guns will go off of themselves.

Landon[1] remarks that in our materialistic and materialized world, the word *mystique* has become degraded and has lost its meaning of love. Etienne de Greef, in a valuable study,[2] has recently presented the *mystiques* of to-day as attempts to reinstate force, together with a cult of force which is the only form of conquest accessible to the formless multitude, since conquest by love, of which Christianity remains the guardian, is a progressive form abandoned by the totalitarian regimes.

Working on the myth of the racial theory, National-Socialism has elaborated, developed and upheld a *mystique* arousing subconscious forces, which are now ready to enter into action and put the world to fire and sword. Racialism has therefore become the *mystique* of a myth. But even without the Aryan myth, the *mystique* of force is common to all regimes of totalitarian dictatorship.

Anyone who has seen the parades of little ' Balillas ' with daggers in their belts and the look of men on the watch for

[1] *Les formes inférieures de conviction.*

[2] Professor E. de Greef, ' Le drame humain et la psychologie des " mystiques " humaines,' pp. 111–113 of the *Etudes Carmélitaines*, Paris, April, 1937.

the enemy, knows exactly what is meant by the education in violence of the new militaristic pedagogy. The heroic sentiment of existence, imposed by force and against its will on a nation which is not naturally warlike, will lead afterwards to the living of that ' lion's hour ' which Mussolini offers to his compulsory heroes when he sends them to their death in adventurous expeditions for the glory of the empire. The present imperialistic tone of Italian policy is an important factor in world unrest.

The doctrines of force now permeate the whole of popular education in National-Socialist Germany. The German of to-day is the victim of propaganda which is organized ministerially as an official instrument of the State. Youth especially seems to be completely mobilized, and apparently likes it, since it is experiencing that very German pleasure of the *zusammenmarschiren*, which dissolves the individual in the mass and gathers up all energies into an irresistible avalanche.

All this is dangerous to the highest degree when it is impregnated with a conquering and dominating messianism, when it is possessed by a self-worshipping pride, which as an immediate consequence, provokes contempt for other nations, judged incapable of effecting their own salvation.

' A century of great battles is about to begin,' says Gottfried Benn, in the last chapter of his book, *Die Intellektuellen und der Neue Staat*. '. . . A century of destructions awaits us. We have only one solution left, to educate brains, great and terrible brains, consecrated to the task of defending Germany. Brains provided with canine teeth. . . . Brains provided with tusks as powerful as those of the rhinoceros. . . .'

The feeling of ' being attacked ' is constantly besetting the mind of the collectivized German. And this perpetual state of alarm creates a suitable atmosphere for the outbreak of a ' preventive ' war. The climate of militaristic racialism greatly predisposes to this. *Die deutsche Wehr*, the well-known military review, published in December, 1935, these significant words : ' War is the only passion of the new man, his only joy, his only pleasure, his vice and his sport, a real possession.'

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The international community is something that exists, and, like all human communities, it possesses an organization which, although rudimentary, is based on *Law*. If the efficacy of this juridical order, which oversteps the sphere of each State, is still very imperfect, the principle of Law itself is never wanting. For there exists in the world a universal juridical conscience which is always alert, and which condemns, at least in the moral sphere, all infractions against the body of rules, written or unwritten, constituting International Law as accepted by the States, and governing those of their relationships that are capable of a juridical regulation. Hence international morality based on traditions or on principles, the gradual incorporation of which into the whole of the law of nations is the task of those who want to lead the community of nations from a state of semi-anarchy to that of a juridical community.

The prestige of law is so great that, as Father Delos says: 'Even when a State does something on the border-line of law or contrary to it, it cannot rest until it has integrated the practical consequences of this accomplished fact in the framework of the law recognized by the other States. When a State violently absorbs another, the trouble which it promptly takes to secure *de jure* recognition of its sovereignty over the conquered territory, and the importance which it attaches to this, are a tribute to the juridical character of the international community; the fruits of illegality do not seem to be reaped until one can return with them into the fold of legality.'[1]

The whole history of relations between the peoples is based on the dynamic process of a common and higher law. The moral idea of community becomes in the concrete a juridical law of relationships; from the elementary private relationships (enshrined in the *jus connubium* and the *jus commercium*) to the most complex and public relationships expressed in *pacts* and *treaties*. The *jus gentium* is nothing else but the realization of an elementary community of peoples. Canon Law had already stated the idea of a Christian community

[1] *The political causes of international disorder.* Report presented to the Catholic Congress for Peace held at The Hague, 1938. Cf. *Foundations of International Order* (Catholic Social Guild, Oxford, 1938), pp. 49–50.

with a universal tendency and spirit. The Spanish precursors of modern International Law, the theologians and jurists of the XVI century, conceived the idea of Christendom as a universalist unity. According to Vitoria[1] : *The human race constitutes* aliquo modo *a universal Republic ;* according to Suarez[2] : *It presents a certain unity not only specific but quasi political and moral.* The great ideas of the universality of the community of nations, were put forward by the founders and by the thinkers of the modern European and American democracies. And one of the most necessary things to-day is the recognition of this universality by those who have to go beyond the national stage in the organization of human groups, in order to arrive at the rational organization of a world conceived as a whole.

National Socialism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of universal humanity and of the essential duty of the human race. So as to avoid an opposition which might base itself on universally valid principles, it restricts the province of Law. According to Government Councillor Schraut[3] : 'Law, in the National Socialist sense, is not a concept embracing the whole of humanity ; the representation of what is properly juridical is conditioned by race, it depends on the quality of the blood of each individual.'

All universality, all human juridical community, is radically denied in this raving obsession of a privileged race.

Italian Fascism has recently affirmed the principle of race, thus contradicting the previous ideas of Mussolini who, in 1932, told Emil Ludwig : 'There are no longer any races in the pure state. . . . I will never believe in the possibility of biological proof that a race is more or less pure.' Speaking of German racialism, he added : 'Nothing like that will ever happen here.' Nevertheless, racialism has already been introduced officially into Italy and its exponents are trying to distinguish this *biological* racialism of the present Italian thesis, from the German *philosophic* racialism. Though Italy does not theorize the Latin race,

[1] *Relectio de potestati civili*, n. 21.
[2] *De Legibus*, II, XIX, 9.
[3] 'Volk, Staat und Recht,' speech made on the 2nd October, 1933, *Deutscher Juristentag*, 1933, p. 148.

she accepts the Aryan thesis and banns the so-called Semites and Hamites ; this enables her to exclude the Jew from the community and to determine the racial inferiority of natives in the colonies. Thus the breakdown of human universality is achieved, and new empires are founded on the basis of a racial exclusiveness. These empires are not exactly a revival of the Holy Roman Empire, incorrectly called Romano-German. They are empires which add to the racial cleavage of the world, the moral cleavage which is caused by the violation of pacts, the breaking of the plighted word, and the constant threat of the use of force to settle disputes with other nations. Thus society crumbles as the bases on which a universal community should be built are suppressed.

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When, if ever, will it be possible to emerge from the present stage of relations between peoples, which are settled in the last resort by the rule or threat of force ?

What is the use of International Law, which has been so laboriously established ? What is the use of those occasionally naïve, but often generous attempts, which seem powerless to substitute justice for force, to establish a real juridical organization of the world of nations, which, in the case of relations between persons, have for a very long time secured a constitution which forbids the private use of force ? Has evolution stopped short at internal Law, and could it not be extended to the Law of Nations ?

We are certainly experiencing a standstill, which is explained by the slowness of the juridical evolution of humanity. There was the stage of private vengeance, a stage which was passed as soon as a decisive power arose in the political society, with the task not only of proclaiming the Law, but enforcing it, and settling concrete cases in the law courts. Now this stage was followed in the case of the internal Law of each people by another in which moral ideas imposed the settlement and solution of differences by means of compromises, arbitrations, etc.—means which legal institutions have not yet sufficiently developed or guaranteed. It is only when a moral consciousness is socially

established through legal institutions, that the State becomes the arbitrator between the members of the community. This last juridical stage has not yet been reached in the international sphere. It has already been outlined and, as it were, prefigured in the rudimentary organization of the League of Nations, but so long as the latter is lacking in adequate executive organs, that is to say, without the possibility of imposing its decisions efficaciously, the moral value of International Law will not receive a truly juridical consecration and guarantee. We are still at the stage of co-ordinatory contractual Law, and a long evolution is still necessary before we reach the era of subordinatory and supra-national law which is capable of directing the life of nations.

It was thought that this advance had been definitely made with the foundation of the League of Nations, and a great hope swept the world. But the founders of the League of Nations were too timorous. The concept of national sovereignty was so deeply rooted, that they did not dare to supersede it by granting to the League of Nations a kind of participation of sovereignty on the inter-State plane. They succeeded in affirming interdependence in fact (economical and political) with a minimum of juridical and political guarantees (High Court of International Justice at The Hague and sanctions).

It must be admitted that the fact of having established (although it was by means of a multiple pact) proceedings to prevent the exercise of the right of war and of having instituted the system of Colonial Mandates and the protection of minorities, was no small achievement. The declarations of Benedict XV and Wilson had supplied the League of Nations with a moral basis. The political basis was to be sought in a juridical constitution which would develop in its own way.

Unfortunately, the Peace Treaties, to which the existence of the League of Nations appeared to be bound, contained a number of fundamental errors. Peace was imposed on the vanquished without their collaboration, and the League of Nations became, in the hands of the victors, an instrument which they used to impose their own conditions.

There have been two periods in the working of the League of Nations, an ascending and a descending one. During the first period, the description of 'international crime' applied in 1923 to all war of aggression, marks a decisive progress for the guarantee of peace. In 1925, the League of Nations decided to constitute a *Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*. On the 1st December, 1925, a great event took place—the signing in London of the Locarno Treaties and Agreements between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, who gave mutual guarantees of security. In 1926, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations, a decision correcting the initial error which, by excluding the losers of 1918, took away from the Genevan organization its universality. By the Locarno agreements, the signatory Powers 'undertake to settle by peaceful means . . . all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which they may not be able to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy. Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, and the parties agree to comply with such decision.' In 1927, the League of Nations decided to establish a *Committee on Arbitration and Security* to prepare the peaceful settlement of international conflicts. On the 27th August, 1928, a decisive step of a high moral value was the signature in Paris of the *Briand-Kellogg Pact*, which 'outlawed' war. Lastly, in 1932, the General Disarmament Conference met in Geneva, and in 1934 Russia was admitted into the League of Nations.

Disarmament—the first condition of lasting Peace, as Benedict XV proclaimed—was fundamental to the organization of a League of Nations. Disarmament was to have begun by a gradual reduction of armaments. If this path presented technical difficulties, the political difficulties which arose were greater still, and they brought about delays in the application of Article 8 of the Covenant, and disturbed the atmosphere of the Conference, which opened at long last in February, 1932. The chief error was to insist on the retention of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty at the expense of Germany in the new

draft convention for the reduction of armaments. When the declaration of parity of armaments in collective security came in December, 1932, it was already rather late. France and England were hard and illogical in dealing with the democratic governments of Germany (Socialists, Centre, and Liberals). After the mistake of the occupation of the Ruhr, the Locarno Pact (1925), and the withdrawal of troops from the Rhineland (1930) had been reached. But the question of Reparations dragged on with the Dawes and Young Plans until the Lausanne declaration of 1932. And when Hitler came into power in 1933, it was already too late to alter the policy of the Great Powers with regard to Germany, and the latter started to burn her boats by withdrawing from the League of Nations.

After the failure of the Disarmament Conference, the persistent craving for power of the Fascist dictatorships became worse and exasperated the problems liable to disturb peace. The Abyssinian War in 1935 brought Italy into violent conflict with the system of the League of Nations, and the disastrous policy of hesitation and truckling practised by the ' democratic ' States, showed the impossibility of applying either the spirit or the letter of Article 10 and the other articles of the Covenant, in a League in which the members no longer felt any solidarity with the whole. The solemn declaration of Article 10, by which ' The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against all external aggressions, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League,' served no purpose whatever. Neither did Article 12, by which ' all members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council.' And in no case, according to the terms of this article, shall they resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators, or the judicial decision, or the report of the Council. Italy made war on Abyssinia in spite of the firm, but later weak, declarations of the League of Nations, chiefly because of the failure of the system of Sanctions provided for by Article 16 in the event of a member's having recourse to

war in spite of its undertakings. This evidenced the anarchical spirit of those powers which preferred the failure of the League of Nations to the temporary sacrifice of certain interests. One may therefore say that rather than a defeat of the League, it was a defeat of the nations composing the League.

Powerless in the face of the occupation of Manchuria and of the Abyssinian War, the community of nations, for which Law should not have been a vain word, fell back before the daring acts of the aggressors. It did not even retreat, it simply abdicated. The consequences were soon evident. The sad and lamentable story of the so-called 'non-intervention' in the Spanish War has revealed the strange meaning which the aggressor nations give to the undertakings that they have freely and solemnly contracted. And the complacency of the other signatories of the non-intervention agreement has revealed the inability of the bureaucratic democracies to stop the unscrupulous dynamism of the totalitarian regimes. It is obvious that on this occasion the democratic States failed in their most elementary duty. Otherwise how did they pass from the proposal of the non-intervention pact (made by France and England) to a state of deafness and blindness at the warlike participations (cynically denied in the first place and afterwards cynically admitted) of the Powers which nevertheless still continued to sit on the non-intervention committee? And especially, how were they able to agree later that non-intervention should consist, according to the Italian thesis, in maintaining men and arms in Spain as long as the war lasted, and that these should only be withdrawn when the Fascist victory was assured?

Japan's war against China and Germany's domination over Central Europe have ratified the abdication of the leading Governments of Europe. Faced with events as serious as the annexation of Austria in March, 1938 and, a little later, with the subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia and with the annexation of Albania, the democratic Governments of Europe were taken unawares and have failed on several occasions to do their duty as guardians of international legality. A few years ago, it was especially the

ideological imperialism of Russian Bolshevism, and above all, its aim of world revolution which was to be feared. To-day, the danger is to be found in an opposite direction, but it is greater still. For Fascist and Nazi imperialism does not simply aim at undermining the democratic regime by spreading totalitarian doctrines throughout the world; it directly threatens every free country in Europe and the whole international community.

The belated stiffening of Anglo-French policy due to Hitler's threat to Poland and Roumania and Mussolini's threat to France, as well as Roosevelt's warnings to the totalitarian Powers, gave a certain sense of security to the States which are more directly endangered, specially the smaller and weaker ones; and international policy is once more beginning to be considered in terms of law, justice, and liberty. The consideration of world problems has taken precedence over problems of particular interest. Since for seven years any serious League of Nations' policy has been abandoned, all that is possible to-day is to re-establish a certain international solidarity on the basis of the *balance of power*. The burden of armaments is crushing the European Powers and every one of them, small or large, is on a war footing; the economic conditions of civilian life are becoming more and more difficult, and tension is so great that a single spark would be sufficient to set alight the conflagration which would destroy Europe. That is the stage that we have reached in that international crisis of conscience which opposes States holding opposite concepts of the nature of man and of society. The ideological struggle would turn an armed conflict between nations into a sort of universal civil war, which would multiply the horrors of international war and of civil war, which we have already experienced in one country.

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Having outlined, in the light of the principles of morality and justice, the diptych of the present situation under the title of 'anti-democracy and international disorder,' it is advisable to return to the question of democracy, and,

leaving criticism behind us, to gather together a few ideas which may serve as a basis for a more rational and just organization of the world of nations.

At first sight it would seem that from the time of pre-Christian civilizations until the present day, democracy has contributed little towards the elaboration of an international order. The democratic experiments in the ancient world, the Middle Ages, and in modern times, have been limited in time and place, uncertain in character and intermittent in their historical evolution.

But if we pass from the accidental facts to a thorough examination of values, and if through the external form we seek for the spirit which gives it being, we will find coincidences which are neither occasional nor superficial, but which are real bases on which democracy and International Order rest.

A first point is the idea of the ' Legal State ' (*Etat de droit*). It is impossible to have a democracy which is not based on a State organization in which a regime of Law replaces arbitrary Power ; not a privileged law in favour of the ruling classes of superior groups, but a law for all. We shall not here discuss the workings of this democratic principle in the internal organization of the State[1] ; but one condition is necessary for the creation of a real international order : it is that the relations between States should be relations of lawful right and not purely arbitrary ones, and also that the international community should tend (like the national community) towards the idea of embracing all peoples and the whole system of their public and private relations.

Another coincidence between democracy and international order is the thesis that the source of authority resides in the people, a thesis which is not opposed to, but on the contrary is allied to the Christian principle that all power is derived from God.[2] There is no democracy which does not make the people participate (either individually or organically) in the exercise of political power. In other words, there cannot be, either in the civil or political order, any exclusion of classes or categories of citizens from common rights, or from the expression of political opinions, or from the social

[1] Cf. Chapter VI. [2] Cf. Chapters VI and VIII.

and moral guarantees which ensure effective participation in the task of securing the common good.

International order postulates a conception similar to that of the state-community. And although differences of size and power, culture and civilization, geographical position and historical development, and even of influence and responsibility must be taken into consideration when assessing the relative moral, juridical and political rights and duties of every State, each one must be guaranteed its personality, its voice and its participation in the construction of the League of States.

From this we deduce a third aspect, which places us on the democratic plane, namely participation in social sovereignty. In the case of internal democracy, this participation develops (according to period, attitude, and local traditions) into direct or representative power with a limited or fiduciary mandate, by means of parliaments, popular assemblies, or referendums. On the international plane, other methods are possible, but the principle always remains that of co-sovereignty.

Under democracy, it is no longer possible to consider States as absolute, either at home or in their external relations ; at home, on account of the interdependence of classes and groups (which should be of an organic nature) ; externally, on account of the interdependence of States. Absolute sovereignty must give way to international co-sovereignty.

This process is neither new nor contrary to the nature of things. Its name has changed because the positions have changed. But historical experience is never wasted.

Under the Romans, the Empire was an absolute master, but it felt bound, however, to the *jus gentium*, and more still to a widening of Roman citizenship (a sort of evolution from a closed *élite* to an open *élite* : therefore a trend towards democracy), as well as the concession of a certain degree of autonomy to the various nations, with a guarantee granted to certain local laws.

Christianity brought with it a new conception of life which embraced the lowest categories in the social scale; the slaves and the barbarians. It tends towards a spiritual

equality, which after twenty centuries of struggle has given civilization its foundations in the civil, political, and economic spheres.

Under the Papacy and the Empire, the tendency was towards a feudal and ecclesiastical community of nations, superior to any sentiment of national or racial hostility or jealousy. Since the Reformation, which brought with it the absolute rule of sovereigns *by divine right*, and the break away of a number of States from Catholicism, the sense of an international order has been lost in practice, but it has been compensated by the birth of the *jusnaturalism* which then became the basis of modern International Law.

Although it was afterwards secularized, democratic doctrine revived under the sign of Humanism (or humanitarianism) the idea of a universal society of peoples. But that is still not enough. Anthropocentric Humanism, to quote Jacques Maritain, will become, through its integration into the Christian ethic, an integral Humanism on which it will be possible to rebuild one day a new democracy and a new international order.

Democracy excludes the domination of a few privileged classes over others ; in the international order it must also exclude the domination of privileged (hegemonic) States over others. If national democracy bases itself for this purpose on human personality, as the reason and measure of all rights and duties between men, international democracy must respect the personality of each people, the existence of which renders it capable of communion with other peoples.

International Law can no longer be considered as in earlier times, as a purely positive construction which registers existing institutions and the pacts and conventions underlying them. It is a construction founded on the personality of each of the nations forming a State, and these, in their turn, are based on the human personality of the citizens that constitute them. There is here a fundamental correlation of principles and spirit which cannot be cast aside if we wish to get to the root of national and international democracy.

The latter cannot be considered as a fixed form, for it is

continually changing and always in the process of elaboration. It must be considered as a tendency in the course of realization ; one which seeks to overcome all forms of predominance of a few categories over others, of a few nations over others.

This end can be attained only through the spirit of true liberty, resisting the tendencies towards anti-democracy and international disorder, which to-day, as in the past, express the fundamental egoism of man once he has fallen a victim to his instincts and has lost sight of moral and social laws common to all.

PART III

PRESENT-DAY MOVEMENTS

X

FASCISM, NATIONAL SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

By J. F. Neurohr

THE two dictators of the totalitarian States never cease in their speeches to condemn, to ridicule, to vilify the democratic system of government, nay, the principles and the very idea of democracy itself, and in the same breath—as if to pay homage to the innate democracy of Christian Europe—to pride themselves on being the only real democrats. They proclaim their own systems to be a modern, a twentieth-century edition of democracy, incarnating more profoundly, more directly, the popular will and the spirit of the people than our old-fashioned, superannuated States with their liberty, their parliament, their parties, and their independent judiciary.

Indeed when Fascists begin to expound the theory of their government and its origin, they do not appeal to the Divine Right of kings or governments, but claim the people, or rather the nation to be sovereign. The dictators and their party represent the popular will, the popular spirit. They incarnate the conscience of the people more directly than Liberal parliaments, because the machinery of the parties, themselves allied to money interests or social interests, falsifies the direct expression of the popular will. 'The will of the people can express itself by acclamation, or by tacit consent, by not contesting existing conditions. This is no less democratic and may even be more so than that statistical apparatus which has been elaborated at so much trouble for half a century. Beside Direct

Democracy, parliamentary government seems a very artificial machine.'[1]

Thus the Cæsar becomes the incarnation of the popular genius, not of its fleeting fancies and whims, which find their expression through selfish parties and politicians in parliament, but of the essential permanent will of the people, of its highest aspirations.

The leader in return forms and enlightens the popular will, guides it, makes it really conscious of itself, for the people do not really know what they want, they have only a vague instinct of what they want and the leader wills what the people hope for and expect. 'Without hero no people,' says Rousseau; 'Without leader no nation,' asserts Schmitt.

This is more or less the old Cæsarism on a plebiscitarian basis, of which Napoleon III in the nineteenth century was the famous example. But there is a difference. To give the new Cæsarism more stability and a better grip on the people as a whole, the dictators have created around them a well organized party, not a party in the old meaning of the term, but a kind of 'open conspiracy,' first meant to undermine the democratic regime, thanks to the liberty which they enjoy within its framework, and then, once in power, to eliminate all the other parties and to make the will of the dictator effective throughout the nation.

In Fascist and Nazi theory the Party is nothing else but that part of the nation that is politically interested, active, conscious of the deep aspirations and desires of the nation, exactly as in Bolshevik theory the Communist Party is simply the proletariat become conscious and organized. In other words, thanks to its beliefs and its consciousness, the Party is the new political *élite*, kept together by an iron discipline, an absolute orthodoxy, exclusive, recruited by co-option, a kind of religious order. Its members may not be directly chosen by the people, but they really are the people. The Nuremberg Rally is the real Reichstag.

Thus far the Fascist and National Socialist theory, which seems a modern version of Hobbes and even of Rousseau. Even in the way by which they attempt to obtain the

[1] C. Schmitt, *Hochland*, 23rd year, Vol. II, p. 257.

popular consent, the dictators use not only the methods of the authoritarian Monarchy of Divine Right but, up to a point, democratic methods. They may reject democratic institutions, the whole framework of formal democracy, but they appeal constantly to democratic emotions and democratic instincts, as a matter of fact to those popular feelings which have been at the origin of our own democratic institutions. The 'community of the people,' the common good, the 'commonwealth,' the nation, the destruction of class-privileges, the subordination of selfish interests to the general good, have a very familiar sound to the ears of a democrat, and indeed a part of the Puritan spirit of Cromwell's Army or of the spartan 'Spirit of 1793,' seems to have passed to the Black- or Brown-Shirts. For, indeed, Fascism and National Socialism have not only adopted a part of the theory of the democratic State, but also something of its emotional basis stirred up by a century of struggles and conquests. They seem to have taken over the democratic mysticism of the 'people' and the 'nation,' without, of course, liberalism and individualism, or without those organic institutions and safeguards which prevent a democracy from becoming a monist State and the tyranny of a fanatical and transitory majority.

In a very similar way Fascism has also taken over the emotional residue, the mysticism—I nearly said the moral enthusiasm—of the various forms of nineteenth-century Socialism, rejecting naturally its class-basis, but also those liberal or individualist tendencies which are present in all of them, even in pre-Lenin Marxism. It is not surprising, therefore, that more and more they resemble Bolshevism, and that Fascism, Nazism, and Bolshevism have Georges Sorel for common ancestor. Up to a point Fascism and Nazism are indeed justified in calling themselves more Socialist than the democracies. Capital as well as Labour is subordinate to the State, 'to the common good,' in a degree unknown as yet in democratic States, even in war-time, or under Socialist government; economic planning and State-control of credit and finance, the nationalization of the Central Bank, and so on, must make some of our Socialists green with envy. The labour camps with their

equalitarian aims, the hostility to any social consciousness, and all the levelling tendencies in the new regime ought, in a way, to appeal to democrats and Socialists.

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The totalitarian States should be grateful to the much despised democracies. They have inherited from them the whole fabric of the modern centralized State, the State which has destroyed nearly all those organic institutions between the State and the individual, local parliaments and provincial assemblies, professional guilds, communal privileges, and the Church as a social power, which made the theoretical absolutism of kings of old so ineffective, and imposed some checks and limitations on it in practice. The totalitarian State is in this respect the logical conclusion of the liberal and democratic State of the nineteenth century, assuming more and more power, more and more functions, exercised previously by other constituted bodies, with, of course, the whole civil service and police and its modern efficiency, and even the modern army.

It is this that makes the modern authoritarian State so frightful. It is the old authoritarian State of the Ancien Régime, without its moral, religious, institutional checks ; it is the modern centralized omnipotent State, appealing occasionally still to democratic emotions, but without any of the modern forms of liberty and control. Thus it inherits both from the absolute State and, still more, from the modern democratic State, but uses the machinery of the latter for ends entirely foreign to fundamental democracy.

This is obvious, for instance, in its systems of education. Modern State education has indeed its origin in the Lutheran States of Germany and in the ideas of the French Revolution. The first was fundamentally still a Christian conception of education where the Prince took over the duties of the Church, but its aim remained more or less unchanged. The fundamental idea of Danton's decrees is to create an education on a national scale, since a democracy can survive and prosper only if its individuals have reached a certain level of intelligence and understanding in order to fulfil

their civic duties with discrimination. Fascism and National Socialism do not pretend to educate individuals, but rather conscious members of a community, with a keen sense of their duties towards this community. On this point they have something to teach. The education for enthusiastic sacrifice for the community is certainly in conformity with the best democratic traditions, and a lesson for us who live still in the ethics of individual democracy. Our generation knows all the rights and liberties conferred upon us by the democratic systems, yet have forgotten, or so it may seem, the corresponding duties.

But Fascist and National Socialist education goes far further. In their will to create the absolute moral unity of the nation, the two systems destroy even the basis of moral responsibility and of human personality, and undermine Christian morals, the uniqueness and value of the individual soul. 'Each man exists only by the State and for the State,' or the 'blind obedience' of the Fascist oath, can never be accepted without reservations either by a Christian or by a democrat. The position of education in the totalitarian States is typical of the so-called 'real' democracy within these countries. State-education, originally established in order to guarantee a Christian upbringing or the emergence of free men and citizens able to defend themselves against tyranny, has become an instrument of propaganda in the service of anti-Christian ideologies and of tyrannical absolutism, and is now a school for militarism and imperialist expansion.

In these countries 'economic democracy' or Socialism is exactly in the same predicament. There is control of finance, there is planning by the State, abolition of unemployment, besides the emotional appeal to Socialism in *Winterhilfswerk*, etc. And by themselves these things are perhaps not anti-democratic, but to the contrary. But this 'Socialism' certainly does not aim at raising the standard of living, at a better distribution of property or of the goods of this world, it does not seek to give a father the means of feeding and clothing his family decently, so that they be able to lead honest Christian lives, as the Encyclicals have it, or the emancipation of human personality from the economic

machine. On the contrary, the new system, if it goes so far as to ' free ' the human being from private capitalism at all, or protects him against it, does so simply to hand him over to the all-embracing State, where political power and economic power are more and more in the same hands, in other words, to State Capitalism.

Those who had expected a real social reform from Fascism or from National Socialism have been bitterly disappointed. The bigger role played by the small manufacturer or trader, the revival of the artisan, the return to the land, protection of the peasant, and splitting up of the big estates, in other words, a healthier social equilibrium—all this was promised, but has gone overboard, in order to increase the stranglehold of the State on the whole of the economic life and therefore on the individual, to make the power of the State and the Party over the people more frightful at home and, on the other hand, to strengthen its economic and military striking power abroad.

So the features of the totalitarian States, which might claim to be democratic in character, are really only incidental, means to an end, which have nothing to do with democracy, for these, as well as the methods of their governments and, above all, their spirit are fundamentally anti-democratic.

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Democracy may in the course of history take on different forms. The institutions and the legal machinery which incarnate the democratic spirit may vary from age to age. But there seem to be two features which all democracies have had in common whether in antiquity, in the Middle Ages or in modern times. Namely : (1) That government was not arbitrary, but that it took into account the feeling and the opinion of the politically interested part, if not of the majority or the whole, of the people, that it was therefore a government by consent, tacit or vocal, and that it was possible for a public opinion to be formed ; (2) Secondly, that the relation between government and governed was a mutually binding contract, written or unwritten, and that laws were considered binding for all.

Now the first of these two criteria or minimum requirements is definitely absent in Fascism as well as in National Socialism. They may perhaps still call themselves 'government by consent,' they pride themselves on being the expression of the popular will, and indeed they try—and with what results we know only too well—to mobilize public opinion, to enlist popular approval, or to have their acts endorsed by plebiscites. But at the same time this cannot even by the most ardent admirers of the system be called a 'free' consent. The terrific efficiency of the modern Police-State makes it impossible to register anything but consent. Violence, spying, moral and economic pressure are all used to make any appeal to the people a foregone conclusion. A State where any opposition to the will of the government is *ipso facto* a crime, can certainly not be called a democracy.

We must add to this the power of the Modern State to create, to fabricate so-called public opinion. The police-force and the Party make any active opposition impossible, the propaganda machine and State-controlled Press and news-agencies, the wireless, make it morally very difficult to have any other opinion but that of the government. The very facts on which to base an opinion are withheld, falsified right from the source. Not calm judgement, not even reasoned consent are wanted, but emotional, hysterical approval. The method is not that of persuasion, but mass-suggestion, an appeal to all the irrational forces in the human soul: heroism, sacrifice in the service of hate and of the not quite human. Demagogy, however magnificently organized, is not democracy.

Thus not only active opposition is ruled out, but even the possibility of expressing, nay of forming, a public opinion which might be hostile to the men or the Party in power. (They do not 'speak' in the Reichstag, they only sing.) The abolition of parties and of parliament meant the end of organized opposition, and the disappearance of freedom of speech and of the Press, the end of public opinion. If these facts were simply incidental or transitory features of the regime, made necessary by a state of emergency, they could perhaps be justified, but they represent, on the

admission of the Fascists themselves, an essential and permanent character of the new system. Yet Fascist States do not content themselves with suppressing the political rights of the citizens, they even attack his personal rights, his moral rights. This leads us to the second criterium of democracy : The Rule by Law. When a citizen of a Greek City-State gave to a Persian patriot the famous answer : ' We have no King, but we have the Law,' he not only gave a definition of democracy, but proclaimed also a fundamental principle of government which was to become the common legacy to the West. We may have had Kings in the meanwhile, but even they were bound by Law, Divine Law, Common Law, the rights and privileges of groups or persons, and only for a time some of them grew absolute and half-Asiatic when standing armies, civil service, and the centralized executive power made or tried to make the old checks inoperative.

At the same time this Law is mutually binding, stands above government as well as above the governed, and if authority or the State make the Law, ' the Law is greater than the power that made the Law.' Thus the Law is not only a means of government, but it protects the citizen against any arbitrary infringement of his personality by the State. The citizen has had certain fundamental rights, written, or unwritten, as an individual, or as a member of a guild, a commune or a province, or an ' estate.' These rights are not conferred upon him as a kind of concession, but are originally, fundamentally his.

The totalitarian State goes in this respect much further than any western despotism ever dared to go. The State is considered the source, the maker of the Law, and at the same time is *lege absolutus*, above the Law. What it does becomes *ipso facto* the Law. The State can do no wrong. In order to achieve this the executive power makes the laws itself which it also applies and if the judiciary partly inherited from more ' legalistic ' times has some scruples, and judges have some conscience left, special tribunals are established, unhampered by such old-fashioned ' legalistic ' or moral checks. Robespierre and the Jacobins used already this method. And furthermore, the police will even dispense

with any kind of trial. Not only has the citizen lost his political right to share in the life of his nation, but even his personal legal rights as a man. He has nothing left but duties, all the duties of a democratic State, conscription included, and many more, and the State has none towards him.

Thus, whatever the two dictators may call their own systems, they are certainly not democracies. What there is democratic in character is purely incidental, an emotional residue of previous regimes, or their machinery, but even these are falsified, put into the service of a new kind of despotism more thorough and more efficient than any the West has ever known. *Ne habeas corpus, ne habeas animam*, seems their Magna Charta.

We are even justified in refusing them the epithet of authoritarian. We must refrain from using too lightly the expression Authority in speaking of neo-despotism. That will not make them respectable, but will be to the detriment of the very word of Authority. Let us remember that there is no authority against God and His Law, and no government can justly claim to be an authority if it invades the sacred precincts of the Christian soul, which has the responsibility for, and the right to its own salvation. Arbitrary rule, backed only by fear and physical force, cannot be called Authority. Conformity with the Divine Law which is able to command moral respect, free consent, or even religious awe is the basis of any authority.

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The totalitarian experience teaches us a few important lessons : (1) Democracy in order to survive must become more conscious of the reality of the collectivity and its rights, which are not in opposition to the individual, but the individuals must be integrated, since their terrestrial destiny cannot be separated from the community into which they are born and in which they must live. (2) Freedom must never degenerate into licence, but must be based on the responsibilities towards the community which freedom implies, responsibility of each individual, responsibility of each civic or political group. (3) Totalitarianism shows that

any retrogression of civilized standards is the end of democracy. Introducing the system of force into civic life, the whole life of the city is based on and held together by repression and fear. The real formation of a public conscience, real political responsibility become impossible. (4) Only the reign of Law, which is the reign of Liberty, is capable of achieving the reintegration of all social elements, classes, groups, individuals in a real community.

XI

SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, AND DEMOCRACY

By Anthony Moore

THE subject of the present chapter implies a series of problems which deserve our full attention, for they concern a large section of the working classes who, though calling themselves Socialists or Communists, are at bottom really democratic. Is there an incompatibility between democracy and Socialism, or between democracy and Communism? Are these systems that can be classed as at all democratic? Do they offer a path towards a true and better democracy? Or do they stand in its way? These are the questions we have to answer.

There was a time when democracy was considered as government by the people in the sense that all classes would be absolutely equal; with the addition of the adjective 'social,' Social Democracy in Germany and elsewhere was synonymous with Socialism. The idea of liberty was confused with liberalism, which was bourgeois and commercial, and thus the implications of liberty, which is the very foundation of a true democracy, were not only passed over, but by many were abjured as a source of economic and social inequalities. Two different ideas of democracy thus took shape, liberal democracy which stressed liberty, and social democracy, which stressed equality. The Socialists chose the second as against the first. This was the position before the War.

The Russian Revolution brought about the biggest experiment in Communistic Socialism, and proclaimed the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. All other classes were abolished by force, the State assumed the monopoly of economic life, economic and political centres were formed

among the workers and peasants, and the whole was absorbed into the State bureaucracy and subjected to dictatorial discipline. Thus the first Communist experiment was anti-democratic and totalitarian.

The word ' totalitarianism ' did not come to birth in 1917 in Russia, but nearly ten years later in Italy, invented by Mussolini to characterize the Fascist regime in which all the interests of the country and of its citizens, individual and collective, particular and general, combined as a single whole. But the phrase ' dictatorship of the proletariat ' came from Russia, and echoed among the workers of Europe and America, as the advent of the working classes to a monopoly of power. The ideal of social, or Socialist democracy, gave place to that of a social revolution for the political dictatorship of the masses, the Communist proletariat. Moscow was looked upon as the living symbol of the future of the workers. Even in England our calm, level-headed Labour men were so infatuated with Moscow as to support the admission of the Russian unions to the International Federation of Trade Unions, as though they could be considered as free associations independent of the Moscow Government.

It is vital never to lose sight of the fact that democracy allows for the existence of all social classes and even for their fruitful co-operation, as opposed to the forcible levelling of all classes into one that is the ideal of the totalitarian adherent. This differentiation between the various classes takes into account not only the personal qualities of the individual and existing social conditions and groups, but also the various forms of labour and the right to the private ownership of property. Any attempt to level all classes must necessarily lead from an economic system based upon private initiative to a communal system that in the last instance puts all power into the hands of the State, which is the only real owner and will hamper, if not suppress, any action by individuals or autonomous bodies that may wish to retain a measure of freedom.

This has been the case in Russia, which has subordinated everything to the creation of a pure working-class State and the elimination of the bourgeois. But the Soviet

experiment has not been able successfully to resist pressure from the enormous peasant class which must always be the backbone of Russia. Russia's peasant class, whatever its political sympathies, plainly tends towards the principle of the private ownership of land, and this has gravely hampered the progress of Communism in Russia and forced Moscow to retreat on more than one occasion.

It is worth recalling that Russian Communism is largely the product of the thirst for liberty of the old-time Nihilists or Anarchists. Apart perhaps from Spain, the world has long forgotten the Kropotkins and Bakunins and others who fought the Tsarist tyranny, but most of those who were in the forefront of the struggle to overthrow that tyranny had, unlike the Communists, a high conception of the dignity of the individual. These people did not fight and die for Stalin's slave-State—they fought and died for their ideal of liberty and, however mistaken their particular conception thereof, it is only right that this should be acknowledged. Undoubtedly their ideal of liberty was one with which no Christian democrat could agree. It was a liberty and a total lack of centralized control, Utopian, failing to take into account the most obvious aspects and weaknesses of human nature. A liberty moreover that must of necessity all too often mean unbridled licence because of its refusal to recognize a higher spiritual plane that transcends the material. But still liberty, not the Soviet negation of liberty.

Communists base their claim that the Soviet Union is a democracy on the assertion that full right of criticism is granted within the framework of the Constitution, that is, criticism on points of Communist detail without the possibility of any criticism of the essential principle of the Communist State. This actually is a denial of any real right of political criticism.

Although in recent years Stalin has modified the practical application of Marxist principles considerably, the same high-minded confiscation and elimination of 'untrustworthy' elements would take place in any attempt to found a Marxist State. The least fundamental criticism, or suspicion that the principles of orthodox Marxism were not

being applied, would without doubt create a distrust in the minds of the public which, so it would be argued, would have to be avoided if so delicate and vital an operation as the creation of the Marxist State were to be carried to fruition. So a *temporary* suspension of free political discussion and criticism would be claimed . . . 'temporary,' but it is very rare to find a dictator or group of dictators desirous of turning back.

We cannot identify Russian Bolshevism with Marxist Socialism, of which up till now we have had no example. But all those who speak of the advent of Marxism, to be brought about in an industrialized country (unlike Russia, which is mainly agricultural, with a primitive and pastoral system), cannot conceive of it otherwise than as the result of a revolution leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat. If all other classes are to be abolished, if all individual freedom is to be not only restricted, but suppressed, for the sake of a collectivized economy, then plainly a totalitarian dictatorship will have to be installed in full strength. The example of Lenin in Russia would have to be repeated in France, or Germany, or England, were these to become Marxist, in spite of the immense economic and political differences between the Western countries and Russia.

To-day the revolutionary visions of Marxism are no longer the fashion. They have been put in the shade by the Fascist and Nazi revolutions (and other second-hand imitations) which, using the same violence that the demagogues of the proletarian masses preached to the 'Red' mobs, have installed totalitarian systems of the Right, financed by industrial and agrarian capitalism. On the other hand, there is no longer a belief in the materialism which, according to Marx, by a deterministic process, was to lead to a Communist society. The political factors of society have proved themselves more powerful than economics and able to dominate them, indeed, to bend them to their own service. Moral values emerge from economic and political crises in a surprising manner ; the personalities of outstanding men dominate material factors. Scientific Marxism has collapsed to give place to the working-class parties (Socialist, or Communist, or Labour), which form a class organization

and which, inserting themselves in the democratic regime, at one and the same time make use of the democratic and liberal parliamentary system and continue to display more or less revolutionary theories, like worn-out banners.

Hence the impossibility of seizing hold of the real nature of either Marxist Socialism or Communism, or of what they would wish to become in a future organization of society when such parties gain a majority and hold the power of modern, industrial, and democratic States in their hands.

That is why it is difficult to realize that Communism and Marxist Socialism, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, are in reality so far apart from one another and indeed are mutually exclusive. The main difficulty lies in the fact that for some time Communists and Socialists of all brands have been profuse in apologias for democracy and the defence of democracy, reiterating that they stand for this defence. Some would claim that this attitude is dictated by purely tactical reasons, and that it is at best but temporary. But the problem is in reality more complex. There is, for instance, a very large section of the British Labour Party that is loyal to the conception of a Socialist State, yet believes that this Socialist State can and must be reached through the ballot-box. Such men have never faced the issue of the continuation of democracy during the so-called transition period of the construction of the Socialist State—and who is to define the length of this period? They sincerely believe that parliamentary government, complete with a Conservative Opposition and periodical recourse to the ballot-box, will continue as before, and fail to see that it is most unlikely that the application of their programme will allow of the continued use of democratic methods.

There is another Socialist school of thought in this country, rather to the Left of the main school we have mentioned, that renounces the revolutionary method with perhaps a tinge of regret, recognizing that it could not fail to be disastrous in Great Britain, but which has no illusions about the meaning of the creation of a Socialist State. These doctrinaires would like to exclude all possibility of looking back and are the only true non-Communist Marxian

Socialists in Great Britain. It is a school of thought that has a bigger following abroad than here.

But probably the most numerous body of Socialist opinion, both here and in the Scandinavian citadels of Socialism, stands for a type of Socialism that is widely different from the Marxist conception and unequivocally reformist in character. The advocates of this type of Socialism are in control of the Labour Party machine at the present time. This school of thought has already been at work for some years in Scandinavia. Great benefits have been secured for the people by the application of its Socialist programme, and recent elections have confirmed the people's wish to create a People's State. Few to-day contest the salutary nature of the widespread reforms secured, such as the co-operative marketing schemes of Denmark, or the large-scale pension and housing schemes of Sweden. The practical applications of such Socialism have indeed saved Scandinavia from a revolutionary danger that at one time definitely existed. In fact, this form of Socialism is based upon the defence of the right of the little man to his own stake in his own country, and an ever improving one at that.

This reformist type of Socialism is in reality hardly Socialism at all. The full democratic structure of the State is left intact, anti-Socialist parties are in a position to attain power and reverse any legislation of a Socialist character, and the right to possess private property is fully safeguarded in so far as it does not conflict with the just claims of the community.

'State Socialism,' on the other hand, is closely akin to Marxist Socialism, as, although it is not necessarily based upon the principle of revolution and the class struggle, its ultimate aim is the elimination of private initiative and enterprise, as well as the very stringent limitation of the right to possess any private property. The new tendency in Russia, for instance, would appear to be in the direction of State Socialism rather than Communism, as witness Article 12 of the Soviet Constitution : 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.' As opposed to Communism, this entails considerable grading of individuals (and thus comes very near to officially reintroducing some-

thing resembling privileged classes), but the State becomes the beginning and end of everything—the individual and the family no longer count. This is already the case in Germany and Italy, as well as Russia. It is thus important, when viewing the relation of Socialism to democracy, not to forget the sharp distinction between what may loosely be termed Reformist Socialists on the one hand and Marxist or State Socialists on the other.[1] (The fact that most Marxist Socialists call themselves Social Democrats is confusing.) While many Socialists are, and will presumably remain loyal to the democratic principle of respect of the expressed will of the majority, others wish to make use of democracy only in order ultimately to remove it, while a small minority is openly revolutionary and, although claiming to lead and represent the workers, has discarded the idea of democracy, even working-class democracy.

But, on the other hand, it would surely be a mistake to imagine that Marxist Socialism and Communism are incapable of evolution in the direction of reformist Socialism and democracy. The experience of recent years goes to show that, as international Fascism has made ever-increasing inroads in Europe and elsewhere, it has brought home to Communist and Socialist leaders one fact—namely, that there is, despite previous denials, a very distinct difference between the democracies and Fascist States. (The Communist Party of Great Britain appears in this, as in most respects, to be behind the Communist Parties of the Continent.) They have at last realized that it is useless to pretend that the Marxist gospel necessitates a refusal to differentiate between Fascist and democratic States and to reject both as equally obnoxious spawn of the capitalist system.

Previously this refusal lost the Communists many possible adherents. The stupidity of Communist tactics at the time of the Ramzin trial, when it was alleged that such British Labour leaders as the late Arthur Henderson were engaged in sabotage of the Soviet State with a view to its overthrow, must have perturbed the more intelligent Communist leaders. I remember a leading member of the Communist

[1] A further confusion is sometimes caused by the fact that Reformist Socialism in England is often described as State Socialism.

Party of Great Britain, since killed fighting in Spain, assuring me some three or four years ago without a smile that there was an anti-Bolshevist White terror in Prague against all Czech Communists !

It would be foolish to pretend that all Communists and Marxist Socialists have experienced a sudden complete change of heart and abandoned all ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To some extent Popular Front sympathies and occasional willingness to form an alliance with liberal and other bourgeois elements, is dictated as much by the tactical manœuvre of the Trojan horse as by the very genuine desire to rally all anti-Fascist elements. (The obvious reluctance of many of these desirable allies to participate is irrelevant to the argument, and in any case, the past record of revolutionary Socialists and Communists is now reaping its own reward—it is quite impossible to obliterate past memories of bitter Communist attacks and malice in a day.)

But these revolutionary elements are coming into contact with democracy. They are in many cases beginning to see that there is something to be said for the formerly despised idea of democracy and something to learn from their new colleagues. Permeation can work both ways. That the change of heart has in very large measure been due to tactical reasons it would be idle to deny ; but is it not to some extent genuine ? It is impossible to advocate liberalism and democracy constantly without being in some measure affected by the workings of these two panaceas, however little the belief in them at the outset.

To sum up, it would appear that in principle there are bound to be, and to remain, irreconcilable divergences between Communists and Socialists on the one hand, and democracy on the other. The former can hardly avoid the suppression and denial of those elementary rights of liberty that are the lifeblood of the latter.

What we have been saying must not prevent us from recognizing the contribution made by Socialists and even Communists to the study of economic problems and the development of social reforms in democratic States. (And

the same must be added of certain pre-War States such as the Austro-Hungarian or German Empires that cannot be classed among the democracies.) To-day the working-class question, the problem of social justice, may be said to be fundamental, even if, in certain countries like Germany, an attempt is being made to sidetrack the issue by a virulent form of nationalism. If, therefore, the consciences of large sections of the bourgeoisie have to some (admittedly still inadequate) extent been stirred, it is in no small measure due to the work of such pioneers of Socialism as Tom Mann and Ben Tillett in this country (although it is open to doubt whether the latter would describe himself as a Marxist !), Jaurès in France, Vandervelde in Belgium, and other Socialist leaders elsewhere.

At the same time, it cannot be denied that systems such as those advocated by the Marxist Socialists and Communists are based upon the principle of class war. This principle, accompanied by the sharpening of the class struggle, has helped to create and foster a class antagonism that has resolved itself into a social struggle, and finally a political struggle between these classes. In many countries this unnecessary antagonism has merely succeeded in hampering the evolution of a *bourgeois* democracy into a *social* democracy and has thus hindered the cause of social justice.

This does not mean that the class war does not exist. It does, and is often a grim and evident reality. But the efforts of the democrat, particularly the Christian democrat, should be directed toward the minimizing and, if possible, the elimination of the class war rather than its unnecessary, useless, and anti-Christian accentuation as a method of social struggle or for purposes of hatred.

The evolution of bourgeois democracy into social democracy is to-day the ideal of democrats the world over. They will be found in widely differing groups and parties, but they have a common aim, namely, to prevent their countries from falling victims to totalitarianism, whether of the Right or Left, and at the same time also to prevent the domination of society by Capitalism.

The ideal of Christian democracy, too, must be almost

precisely on these same lines—to do away with the principle of the class war and to underline the necessity of all classes living in harmony, while fighting constantly the evils of a capitalism that seeks to dominate and evade its clear responsibilities ; in short, to seek to compel private property in its many forms to assume its share of responsibility to the community.

This, then, is the ideal of Christian democracy, an ideal that has crystallized in the light of the teaching of the Holy See, of the Christian Social school, and of recent experiments in Europe and elsewhere, social, economic, and political. Such experiments, it is true, are far from having achieved any notable measure of success save in rare instances, but have nevertheless afforded practical lessons from which we can learn much. Unfortunately trade unionism outside Great Britain has often neglected its primary mission of pressing the workers' just claims, and devoted much time to attacking the Church on the ridiculous ground that the latter is simply a tool in the hands of reactionary forces and an anti-working-class organization. In this way Catholic workers were antagonized and viewed Socialists and Socialist trade unions with justifiable suspicion. Socialists of this type therefore must bear the blame for unnecessarily dividing and weakening the workers. (The anti-clerical resolution passed by the National Congress of the French Socialist Party in June, 1939, is sufficient evidence of this, although happily this mentality is that of a small minority.)

There have, however, been frequent occasions when Christian Democrats and Socialists have combined to defend their common interests, first in the economic and social, and finally in the political field. In Germany there was the Weimar coalition, and in Belgium the Poullet, Van Zeeland and Spaak coalitions. In Czecho-Slovakia the Czech Popular Party and its leader, Mgr Sramek, co-operated with the Socialists for years and achieved results of high value. In Italy, while it was the refusal of the Socialists (July, 1922) to enter the government in coalition with the Popular Party and liberal democracy that opened the door for the advent of Fascism, we may note that the Aventine

Union after the murder of Matteotti comprised Populars, Socialists, and Liberal Democrats.

Christian democracy is the new spirit of the age and far more representative of the twentieth century than is, for instance, the already antiquated materialist teaching of Marx. A world that is sick to death of materialism is turning in ever-increasing numbers to Christian democracy.

The rise of Christian democracy as a working-class movement in the middle of the last century is a phenomenon parallel to the growth of Socialism. Socialism took root among the masses, and Socialist propagandists were successful in exposing countless injustices. At the same time Catholic workers, repelled by the anti-clerical tendencies of the Socialists and feeling unable to co-operate with them, began to organize in mutual benefit societies and craft leagues. From these beginnings, led by a number of social priests and laymen and vigorously encouraged, in 1891, by Leo XIII with his great Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, sprang the great movement of Christian democracy, that endeavours to permeate the social system with the teachings of the Church, and to reform the structure of society from within through Christian industrial and political machinery created for that purpose.

Christian democrats should not forget that they have a message for the masses of the Left that is just as urgent as it is for the slumbering masses both working-class and bourgeois who are content to let things be. A message that is vital and fundamental and revolutionary. A message that proclaims that it is not merely individual acts of charity that are required, but the realization that the abolition of injustice is the first essential for Christians. Until first things are allowed to come first, until we agitate for and obtain governments that are going to make decent housing and feeding and medical services and working conditions for all, not as a new charity for a privileged few, but as a primary right for all, we cannot say that we have succeeded in our object. If Communists and Socialists wish to help in this they can. There may be something to be said for parallel action, provided that it is made clear that there is no unity and no political *arrière pensée*. But these things

should always remain our own objective, and no amount of offers of support from elsewhere should deflect our gaze from this goal.

Christian democracy has a tremendous task before it. The more tremendous as Christian democrats, alone perhaps of those who battle for social justice, realize that side by side with the struggle for social justice must go the struggle for liberty, for the freedom of thought and action of the individual to the greatest extent compatible with the welfare of the community. A struggle, in fact, to restore the spiritual to its rightful place in the community—a real *Primauté du Spirituel*.

XII

CORPORATISM AND DEMOCRACY

By Louis Terrenoire

THE authors who have preceded me in this volume have had the task of comparing democracy with other political regimes, with political regimes which seem to have triumphed over it in public favour, in this year of grace 1939: Fascism, Nazism, Communism, Socialism.

It has been left for me, on the other hand, to establish the relations between Democracy and Corporatism. The task is not easy, for while the one belongs to the political plane, with the other we find ourselves in the domain of economics.

But politics cannot ignore economics. In every State, hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions, of men and women are victims of unemployment. Industrialists and traders are closing down for lack of orders, old men and children are dying of hunger and cold . . . yet the world produces a superabundance of wheat, coffee, clothes, boots. . . . It is equipped to produce far more goods of every kind than human beings have need of . . . yet for want of money, an incalculable number of people cannot procure the bare necessaries of life.

Every political regime—but democracy more than any other—must have as its first concern, as its essential end, the good of the people. But the evils that I have just touched on can be relieved only by remedies of an economic order, to which the State cannot remain indifferent.

Is it Corporatism that will enable the democracies to surmount the crisis and to ameliorate the lot of peoples?

And if so, how is it reconcilable with the political regime founded on liberty? This is the object of our study.

First of all, we must ask ourselves *what precisely is Corporatism?*

Like many analogous terms that end in 'ism,' this word covers a number of quite different notions. There are several kinds of corporations, several kinds of corporatisms. And all are not reconcilable with a democratic regime.

The French word *corporation* (in English, guild), applied in the first instance to the old European organization of economic and social life that existed in each State from the XII or XIII century (according to country) down to the XVIII. The corporations or guilds united craftsmen of the same trade; originally their members were in turn apprentices, journeymen, and finally masters when they had achieved a masterpiece. These corporations considered themselves as having obligations towards the community, as well as towards their own members. They enjoyed considerable autonomy under the control of the legislative power.

The possession of a legal *monopoly* (or exclusive privilege of production and sale) made of them closed and prohibitory bodies, which resisted the free introduction of new producers and new products. It aimed at removing outside competition and competition among the masters themselves.

But from the XVI century onwards, and above all in the XVIII, the conditions of economic life underwent such pronounced modification that little by little the corporative regime fell into decay. Trade expansion resulted in the corruption of the monopoly and the rapid decline of the corporations in every country in Europe, including England, the leading industrial country. In England, though their privileges were not formally abolished till 1835, they had long ceased to serve any useful purpose by the end of the XVIII century. In France, Turgot's edict of 1776 ratified the disappearance of the old economic order by simply suppressing: (1) monopoly, as contrary to the interests of consumers and to the freedom of labour; and (2) the workers' right of association as having been usurped to the

detriment of the King. Under the Revolution, the famous Le Chapelier Law confirmed this destruction of the corporations. In their place was installed a regime of total liberty, of unbridled individualism, which coincided with the advent of large-scale capitalism and the Industrial Revolution—both favourable to the growth of an insensate competition.

There can be no question of introducing the Corporatism above described into present-day democracy, for it would in no wise fit in with our modern life. At the most it might have a lesson to teach where the artisan is concerned.

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To-day, as we know, Corporatism, after a long eclipse, has returned to fashion. Since the War it has been practised in a certain number of countries which boast of authoritarian ideologies and conceive the corporation under the sign of dictatorship. Such is the Italy of Mussolini, and such, too, in a lesser degree, the Portugal of Salazar and the ill-fated Austria of Dollfuss.

We will speak only of the first, as it presents a perfect example of the type.

Fascist Italy, after having broken the old Socialistic and Christian democratic trade unionism, powerfully organized though it was, created compulsory syndicates[1] on a compulsorily Fascist basis, as also a complete corporative system regulated according to different laws, principally those of 3rd April, 1926 and 5th February, 1934. It does not fall within the scope of our essay to study this system in detail. We will merely remark that here we find ourselves in the

[1] On the Continent the word 'syndicate' (French, *syndicat*; Italian, *sindacato*) covers all vocational unions, whether of workers or employers, though unless otherwise qualified it is taken to refer to the former, when it is the equivalent of 'trade union.' 'Syndicalism,' before the War (and in some cases after), meant the anti-parliamentary and anti-State revolutionary current of the organized working classes. To-day, however, it means the system by which the 'syndicates' (trade unions and employers' unions) are made the basis of the organization of production and labour, combined at another stage in mixed commissions. In the present chapter, 'syndicalism' has always this sense. The word 'syndicate' will be used either in the wide sense of vocational unions of both kinds, as autonomous associations, or in the sense attributed to it by Fascist legislation, when the word 'trade union' (which we reserve for free associations, whether Christian democratic or Socialist) would be misleading.

presence of a *State Corporatism* possessed of three main characteristics, which we will enumerate as they were set forth by the distinguished Catholic professor, M. Eugène Duthoit, in the course of lectures he gave at the Semaine Sociale at Angers in 1935 :

1. The State acts upon the national economy by organs called corporations. Occupational elements make an appearance in them, but it is the political power which forms the nexus, it is the Duce who presides over each corporation.

2. Syndical liberty has disappeared, adherence to Fascism being a necessary condition of the recognition of every syndicate.

3. There exists an ' intimate and immediate connection between the corporative institution and a new political constitution of the State, whereby the forms of the first are radically modified.'

In its very essence such a Corporatism is obviously irreconcilable with Democracy.

We will not make such a positive assertion in regard to the conception (never yet realized) of certain forerunners of the Social Catholics, of whom the most famous was La Tour du Pin.

The latter was as convinced as the Socialists of the crimes of economic Liberalism, of the capitalism of the bankers, of the individualism that engendered monstrous social inequalities involving the ' merciless spoliation of the weak.'

He wished to re-establish the ' ties of solidarity among men united by the same social function, that is to say, among those who earn their daily bread in association with each other (*solidairement*).' And he recommended the corporative system wherein—as he wrote in his work, *Aphorismes*— ' rights are combined in such a way as not to serve as a weapon in the hands of some against others, but as a protection of the interests of all, these interests being unified by their very harmony.'

In general, however, La Tour du Pin wished only to restore the medieval corporations. He condemned the

work of the French Revolution wholesale. He remained attached to the Monarchist *ancien régime*. Though certain of the ideas he defended were profoundly just (notably in his criticism of Liberalism), and though his lessons ought not to be neglected by the builders of the new world, a *democratic corporatism* could hardly consider him as its master.

The ideas of the great Italian Toniolo are more democratic, more ' Christian democratic ' than those of La Tour du Pin. Profoundly attached to the cause of the working classes, he proposes at the same time as the reform of labour contract and the development of social legislation, the constitution of professional unions which shall resume the tradition of the ancient corporations. He counts on these unions to prevent and mitigate offences against liberty, right, and public order. He admits the principle of the compulsory syndicate and proposes as the basis of society, ' social organisms disciplined in a corporative regime which holds a balance between all classes without confounding them.'

The whole doctrine of Toniolo is, like his life, profoundly impregnated with Christianity. And it is his admiration (which we find in some ways excessive) for the Christian Middle Ages which leads him to seek a reconstitution, on modern lines, of medieval society.

Many other Social Catholics or Christian democrats, following in the footsteps of La Tour du Pin and Toniolo, have recommended the corporative organization of economic life. Nowhere, unfortunately, have they had in their hands the political power which would have enabled them to convert their ideas into facts.

Nevertheless, in several countries, statesmen who were at times their adversaries have at others been forced to turn to them for inspiration and counsel. And the quarry they have opened continues to offer all the necessary materials for the building up of a corporative regime within the framework and in the spirit of democracy.

Liberty and Authority in a democratic corporative regime— Despite the false trails corporatism may have followed and the various caricatures presented of it, democracy, if it

is to survive the capitalist system, must find a form of it which it can assimilate. It matters little what name we give it. Whether it is a question of ' planning,' of ' structural reforms,' of ' vocational organization,' of ' economic democracy,' or even of ' the integration of syndicalism in the State,' the problem to be solved always remains the same : to find a law of economics and of social relations which will allow the human person to grow to his full stature through the development of all his prerogatives, and which therefore will have to be far removed at once from liberal and capitalist anarchy, from levelling and bureaucratized collectivism, from totalitarian and militarized State-despotism. To a democratic political regime, in which the hierarchy of functions is respected, there must correspond a democratic economic regime which maintains the hierarchy of responsibilities and of *cadres*, while leaving the field free for necessary social evolution.

We see at once that a democratic corporatism presents a double problem of liberty and authority.

The problem of liberty lies chiefly at the base of the corporative edifice. It must be understood that this can only be separate syndicates, trade unions, or employer's associations. In our industrialized world, the family workshop has become too much the exception for the new organization to be conceived of in terms of this almost obsolete type. In any case, for a general plan, we cannot start from the basis of the family workshop or the small agricultural holding. It will be sufficient to state once for all that those zones of the national economy in which certain forms of the past survive, will have to be endowed with organisms specially conceived and arranged for them. It should be one of the conditions of a good corporative organization that it show itself extremely supple and susceptible of being adapted to every situation.

But if we are considering the problem on general lines, we must envisage above all big and medium-sized industry, the types of which are perceptibly the same in the industrial countries of Europe and America.

At the base then, are separate unions of workers, of employees, of technicians, of employers. Thus the liberty

of each will find itself safeguarded from the moment it enters into the corporative system. The workers will discuss among themselves the problems which specially concern them, the same with the other members of the corporation. It is only in the higher grades of the organization that oppositions and harmonizations begin.

Certain people, who see in Corporatism a means of replacing democracy altogether, bitterly oppose those who insist on maintaining syndicalism at the base. 'Having never understood anything about the syndicalist idea, they suddenly find themselves illumined by corporative grace, and they embrace the corporation solely in order to be the better able to stifle the trade union.'[1]

Their thesis is to be condemned for a double reason: first, in the name of liberty, which the trade union alone, we repeat, can properly safeguard; second, because, if we wish to see our ideas speedily realized in practice, we must start from existing conditions in actual social life.

But in free countries, syndicalism is an accepted fact. It groups together the organized *élite* of the different classes of the nation, the persons who are most clearly conscious of their role. It would be sheer folly to discard this corner-stone of the corporative edifice we wish to construct.

We shall see later how the new corporations must integrate syndicalism. But we have not yet exhausted the question of liberty as presented by the institution of a corporative system in a democratic regime.

Of particular importance is the problem of trade union liberty as it presents itself in several European countries, such as France, Belgium, and Holland. Thanks to the tolerant spirit of the trade unions, and above all to the moderation of their doctrinal claims, British trade unionism is so constituted as to put no constraint whatever on the different religious, philosophical, and economic views of its members. A Marxist can rub shoulders there with a Catholic without embarrassment. Concerned primarily with the material interests of their members, the British trade unions profess an ideal which is sufficiently wide or vague for each adherent to be able to superimpose his own particular ideal thereon.

[1] M. Joseph Zamanski, *La Semaine Sociale d'Angers*, 1935.

It is not the same in the countries just mentioned (any more than it was, before the triumph of Fascism, in Italy, Germany, Austria, or Czecho-Slovakia). The French worker, for example, has to make a choice. If he has Marxist convictions, the *Confédération Générale du Travail réunifiée* will suit him admirably. Has it not set forth in its charter (the so-called Amiens Charter of 1904) the class war as the basic principle of all working-class action, and the revolutionary general strike as the supreme means of overturning the bourgeois social order?

The worker of no settled convictions but politically of the Left—and these are the majority—will naturally have no scruple in joining the C.G.T., especially as it is the most powerful organization and the one which corresponds best to his aspirations. But this adhesion is impossible for a Catholic who wishes to remain absolutely loyal to the spirit of the Church and to the social teachings of the Popes. Nor is the anti-clericalism which continues to rage, though less violently, calculated to work for the suppression of the doctrinal barriers which prevent the adhesion of Catholics and conscientious Protestants, and even of unbelievers who dislike the idea of a complete social upheaval.

That is why there exists in these countries an independent trade unionism, and a trade unionism above all which is not afraid to affirm itself *Christian*. In France, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland,[1] Christian trade unionism forms a group of considerable importance, and in certain branches of industry and commerce it may even be regarded as the most representative.

The Christian trade unionists have had to fight to have their right to belong to the union of their choice respected, and also to ensure that the Socialist organizations do not establish for their own benefit—sometimes with the connivance of the public authorities—a veritable monopoly of working-class representation.

'A free trade union in an organized profession,' such is

[1] In Holland and notably in Switzerland, Catholics and Protestants get on excellently together in the Christian trade unions. They agree to work to promote a Christian social order based on liberty, justice, and charity, and they are not afraid to advance the boldest theses in the order of economic and social evolution.

one of the slogans of the Christian trade unionists. It is true that certain of them declare, not without some reason, that this plurality is not calculated to facilitate the institution of a corporative system. The countries, they add, which, like England, have managed to achieve unity in their trade unionism, through making it wide enough to embrace every shade of conviction, will be more easily able to build up the economic and social structures of the future.

No doubt. But any corporative regime must be founded on the indisputable principle, the freedom of men to choose the trade union to which they will belong.[1]

. . . . . .

We will now turn to the problem of authority which the introduction of Corporatism will necessarily present to democracy. This depends essentially on the role that is given to the State.

Let us recall the most generally accepted definition of the corporative regime : ' *It is a regime in which certain powers are allotted to intermediate bodies, autonomous and controlled and endowed with a civil personality, for the administration of a common good with a view to a certain end. The corporation is an association of the producers of the same branch for the defence of their common interests in conformity with the general interest.*'

We will confine ourselves to the part of this definition which defines the position of the corporation towards the State : *intermediate bodies, autonomous and controlled.*

The corporation is to represent the intermediate authority between private enterprises and the State. For that purpose the State must grant it a permanent delegation of power or, more exactly, *it must stamp with a legal character all the institutions which will enable the corporation to fulfil its function.* But

[1] Is the right to strike necessarily bound up with trade unionist liberty ? We do not think so, for if the strike still constitutes a legitimate prerogative of labour in an anarchic world in which the law of the strongest holds good, it is none the less a grave disorder which a well-conceived corporative regime should tend to eliminate. The intermediate stage might be the ' democratization ' of the strike : that is to say, before the strike began, it would have to be sanctioned by the majority of the workers after a secret ballot. Likewise employers' lock-outs should be submitted to a discipline of the same kind.

this delegation of power must not be understood as implying any subordination save to the general interest alone.

Ought the State to intervene for the purpose of establishing corporative institutions? It is a debatable point, but the better minds are inclined to favour the idea, on condition that the State confines its intervention to that, and afterwards leaves the corporations to develop themselves according to their own regulations. *Moreover it is eminently desirable that the State should not so much create as generalize.*

An example of this was furnished in France when collective agreements—an essential part of a corporative regime—were rendered compulsory by law. In this precise case, the political power simply extended to the whole field of commerce and industry an institution which had proved itself in practice, in multiple examples of private enterprise.

It goes without saying that the State must preserve a right of control over all the various corporations. It is a question of the hierarchy of problems: everything that is public, political, general, having necessarily a privileged position in relation to what is simply vocational, economic, and partial.

To avoid a conflict and remove the greatest danger, which is the tendency of the State to omnipresence and omnipotence, it is important that the domains in which the two authorities are exercised should be carefully distinguished.

In his course of lectures at the Semaine Sociale at Angers, M. Marcel Prélot, Professor of the Faculty of Law at Strasbourg, fixed the dividing line as follows.

All vocational matters are to come under the corporative authority, it being taken for granted that the public authorities shall exercise control over the latter in the general interest.

Everything, on the other hand, that concerns society as a whole, will come under the authority of the political organs, with the reservation that these latter shall listen to the authorized and legitimate advice of the corporations.

This being granted, it follows that the State has the right to exercise two kinds of control: (1) institutional; (2) direct control.

Institutional control springs from the very conception

of the State, whose function is, in fact, 'to watch over institutions, to reform them, to create them, as the case may be.'[1]

When we asked ourselves, just now, whether the State should itself set up corporative institutions, it was in virtue of its right to institutional control. But this preliminary stage is already passed, and what we have to consider now is the role of the public authorities in face of existing corporations.

It seems to us essential that the State should carry out a task of unification, by promulgating a general charter of corporations.

It is this that Pius XI pointed out in his Encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, when he wrote: 'This is the primary duty of the State and of all good citizens, to abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society. The aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-establishment of vocational groups.'

In order to establish vocational groups and put a final end to the Liberal anarchy, a charter determining rights and duties, functions and powers will have to be drawn up by the various consultative and legislative organs of the State and passed into law. This will be the general statute of the corporative order.

In acting thus, the democratic State will be performing its proper function which is to co-ordinate and legislate. It will maintain an equal distance from the Liberal State which leaves everything to take its course, and from the Totalitarian State which wishes to do everything itself.

The error would arise, if the State went beyond its institutional role, save in certain exceptional cases which we will examine in a moment. 'Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher authority to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies.'

[1] Cf. *Les droits du travailleur et le corporatisme* by Paul Chanson.

So wrote Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*. And he added, so as to leave no doubt as to his precise meaning : ' That the State should leave to these smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance ; it will thus carry out with greater freedom, power, and success, the tasks belonging to it, because it alone can effectively accomplish these, directing, watching, stimulating, and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demands.'

We have referred to certain exceptional cases where State intervention must show itself active as well as protective. In such cases the State has the right to exercise a direct control.

' At all times,' writes Paul Chanson, in the work which we have already quoted, ' the State has jealously reserved to itself certain economic zones, indubitably dominated by the public right. Money, Customs tariffs, import quotas, commercial treaties, no one would dare to suggest that in these domains the State should adopt an attitude of *laissez-faire* and *laissez-passer*.' But on these points there is common agreement. Thus the exceptions bear on prerogatives now in dispute between the political power and private forces.

First of all there is the question of the banks. Under our Liberal regime they operate without control and without buildings, in goods, and because they are restrained by no risk. They occupy a privileged position in relation to industry because their capital is not invested in plant, in considerations of manufacture and costs. The business of finance is the easiest of all to conduct, and it is also the one which confers the greatest power. Speaking of modern financiers, Pius XI said : ' Holders and absolute masters of money, they dispense it according to their good pleasure.'

Several financial scandals of recent years have thrown a lurid light on the secret power wielded by some of these dictators of the distribution of credit. This is not the place to enter into details of possible reforms. But we may be quite sure that if, in the corporative reorganization, democracy should neglect to make special provision for keeping the financial powers in check, these latter would quickly set to work to ' torpedo ' the new institutions with the sole object of maintaining their monstrous privileges. And the pros-

perity of the corporations will largely depend on the degree of protection they receive from the State against the stranglehold of the banks or the manœuvres of the Stock Exchange.

In fact, under the present regime of Liberalism which witnesses the predominance (frequently secret) of financial and economic forces at the heart of politics, we have experience only of semi-democracies. Conservative governments in England are under the domination of the City ; the manœuvres of Wall Street have been directed almost unceasingly during the last six years to thwarting the boldly progressive policy of President Roosevelt ; the majorities of the Left in France have always found raised up against them, especially in 1926 and again in 1938, what M. Edouard Herriot so justly called the ' money wall ' ; the Catholic Van Zeeland has finally had to abandon his experiment in face of the coalition of the Catholic and anti-clerical Conservatives of Belgium.

In saving democracy from the tyranny of plutocracy, the corporation will play a great and liberating part.

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On the economic as on the financial plane, there are certain fields in which a wide scope may properly be given to State intervention. We refer specifically to enterprises of great public utility which enjoy a practical monopoly. No one objects to the State's being in charge of the postal services. Similarly it may be accorded a privileged, if not exclusive, position in the organization of most of the other public services, such as transport, electricity, armaments, and so forth. In many cases the ownership of these services is in the hands of trusts, which means that their administration rarely accords with the public interest. In general, however, it is desirable that the State, instead of assuming direct control of these services, should entrust it to a corporation of shareholders, technicians, and workers.

Finally, before we leave the problem of the division of authority, it remains to recognize the State's right of social control.

Thus while, as a normal rule, it should be left to the corporations to determine labour conditions on all the

secondary points which vary with the character of the enterprise, regulation of a general order—e.g. hours of work, minimum age for child labour, certain principles of hygiene, etc.—is naturally the province of the State.

With a corporative system the intervention of the political power will, in most cases, be confined to supplying a want or generalizing a happy reform, while—and this is the point of argument—full liberty will be given to the occupational groups to hasten on the work of social evolution by outstripping in generosity the reforms and obligations prescribed in the laws.

And now having established the position of the corporation in regard to the State, and having made liberty the basis of our structure, we can more easily envisage the general architecture of the building. But in our actual democracies, it would be a mistake to conceive of this architecture according to an ideal plan, and without taking account of the substructures already in existence, that is to say, of the pre-existing socio-economic legislation, of the stage already reached by vocational organization.

Instead of starting from arbitrary abstract theories not yet tested by facts, the builders of the new corporations will rather have to gather together scattered materials.

Every country which at present enjoys free institutions can offer us a certain number of them. Let us briefly consider them.

Pre-existing elements of a Corporative Organization. (i) *Great Britain.*—A cursory glance over the socio-economic organization of Great Britain may suggest that the country that saw the rise and growth of industry, is not concerned with the corporative problem. Do not the old trade unions, models of workers' unions for the whole world, appear sufficient of themselves and needing no organ of co-ordination ?

However, the relations that have existed from the beginning between the trade unions and the group of employers on the one hand, and between the trade unions and the State on the other, constitute favourable elements for the building up of a corporative order.

As regards the relations between employers and workers in England, the observer is struck by the small success encountered by the theory of the class war. No doubt, at certain moments, the trade unions have shown revolutionary yearnings ; in 1926 they declared the General Strike. But this was followed by a law restricting the right to strike and, in 1928, by a conference between delegates of the trade unions and representatives of the federation of employers, which agreed to create a national economic Council on a basis of equal representation. Thus a preliminary step towards Corporatism has been taken entirely through private initiative. But if the State has intervened little in the domain with which we are concerned, we have seen how its relations with the workers' unions are favourable to the advent of a certain kind of corporatism. Fully autonomous in face of the political powers, the trade unions exercise an influence upon the Government and assist in the democratic evolution of English society. It is certain that they could serve as a basis for the construction of an organized social economy.

It is to be noted that English legislation has occupied itself only in fragmentary fashion with the gravest corporative problem : discipline in production. It was to save the coal industry that special laws were voted in 1926 and 1930, establishing a Commission of Mines with power to compel the owners to join together and amalgamate. It is to be hoped that more general laws will be passed, such as will enable Great Britain to take a decisive step towards a corporative organization.

As examples of practical developments which may serve in England as stepping-stones, we may mention two industries in which workers and employers are both particularly well organized and which have worked out a system for settling their disputes. One is the Iron and Steel industry. When a dispute arises, the two parties meet in conference ; if this comes to nothing, the matter is referred to a neutral committee, and in the event of a further check, to a wider joint conference. In some districts permanent boards of conciliation and arbitration have been set up.

The Boot and Shoe industry has gone even further in its

procedure for the prevention of disputes and joint regulation of labour conditions. A national conference of workers and employers adjusts all general questions relating to wages, hours of work, overtime rates, and child labour. In cases of disagreement appeal is made to an impartial chairman. Local boards are charged with adapting to each district and to particular cases the decisions taken by the industry as a whole. But the best illustration of the progress made in this important branch of industry is afforded by the system of monetary penalties that have been introduced for cases of unconstitutional strikes or lock-outs. Impartial tribunals fix the amount of the fine in each case, and payment is guaranteed by a fund vested in trustees, which has been established for the purpose by both parties.

It must be pointed out that these developments are entirely voluntary. They spring from the feeling of professional solidarity which is happily tending to prevail more and more in the various departments of British industry.

We could mention a number of other examples, all of them differing from each other in various ways. Thus there is the special case afforded by the Port of London Authority, or, again, the experiment that has been tried, this time under the ægis of the State, in the Cotton industry. It has to be recognized, however, that in all these examples we find only the rudimentary stage of real occupational organization ; a stage concerned with basic problems specially affecting the life of the workers and the disputes which may arise between them and their employers. It is a case, in fact, of conciliation and arbitration, and of nothing else.

There was one man who dared to look further in the direction of corporative evolution and to advocate the application of these methods to the very life of the industrial unit, and also to the larger social and economic questions that gravitate round the industries. Mr. J. H. Whitley was working on genuinely corporative lines, when he granted at once autonomy and a wider competence to the 'Joint Industrial Councils,' better known as the 'Whitley Councils.' He envisaged a triple organization : in the workshop, the district, and the industry considered as a

national whole. Unfortunately the ideas of this courageous innovator found little support; even those who borrowed from his system generally cut out the part which deals with matters other than labour conditions, and without which there can be no corporatism.

(ii) *United States.*—The American depression had reached its peak when President Roosevelt came into power at the beginning of 1932. In order to fight this depression, which to a great extent was caused by unregulated production, Roosevelt was led to suggest the institution of professional organization on a corporative basis. Unfortunately, his experiment was to suffer from the absence of a solid foundation. Neither the employers nor the workers, both inspired as they were by an insensate individualism, had till then felt the need to combine—save in the case of some of the former, in the shape of trusts. There were shadow trade unions called 'Companies' Unions,' real *blackleg unions*, which were subject to the authority of the employers and were the only ones which they recognized.

Roosevelt, however, was pursuing three aims:

1. To fight unemployment by reducing working hours.
2. To remedy under-consumption by raising the level of wages.
3. To regulate production by suppressing ruinous competition.

To secure these objectives, the President of the United States had to create a corporative organization out of nothing. It was inaugurated on the 16th June, 1933, in the shape of a law, the '*National Industrial Recovery Act.*'

Two instruments were created; the loyal competition codes and the 'National Recovery Administration' (N.R.A.) whose function it was to promote and apply them.

The 'codes' were actually corporative professional regulations. The code of each industry had to be adapted to its own conditions, and the President provided that the codes should apply to the entire profession once they had received presidential approval.

The codes were corporative in the full sense of the word,

since they had to fulfil a double economic and social mission.

In the economic sphere their purpose was to limit competition which was both disloyal and ruinous, therefore to fix, together with a certain level of prices, various obligations concerning the specialization of manufactures and the quality and quantity of the goods produced. In the social sphere, which is closely bound to the other, the law of 1933 specifies three conditions without which no code may receive the presidential approval :

(1) The right of employees to organize themselves as they think best, and to negotiate with the employers collectively and without coercion ; (2) a condition which follows from the previous one, namely, that employers should cease to oblige their workers to become members of the ' Companies' Unions ' ; (3) the obligation on the part of employers to respect the length of working hours as well as the minimum wage scales and other prescriptions laid down by each code.

It is interesting to note that the ' National Recovery Administration,' which was entrusted with the task of directing the establishment of the codes, started by carrying out an investigation amongst the employers, the workers, and the consumers.

The loyal competition codes met with great obstacles, and if they have not fallen to pieces altogether, it is because they rendered such great services that, even when the State ceased to make them obligatory, they continued to exist in a great number of industries.

One of these obstacles was the deep-rooted liberalism of the American middle classes. As soon as prosperity came back, thanks to Roosevelt's energetic measures, they began to accuse his work of every misdeed. In their opinion, it had committed the crime of interfering with the limitless freedom which had previously existed.

A second obstacle, similar to the first, was the lack of discipline of the working masses. Having had little experience of trade unionism, they did not know how to utilize it ; they asked for too much and estranged public opinion during the great strikes of 1934.

Lastly, the conservative administration of the States, who were jealous of their prerogatives and were readily antagonistic to federal initiatives, began to complicate the task of the N.R.A., and of General Johnson its first head. This opposition found its highest expression in the Supreme Court, where a majority of retrograde judges did not hesitate, by means of a judgement given on the 27th May, 1935, to declare the law of 1933 on national industrial recovery to be unconstitutional. In giving the reason for judgement, they declared that Congress had encroached on the legislative autonomy of the States.

The Roosevelt experiment has continued nevertheless, with less impetuosity, and relying more and more on the voluntary acceptance of the people.

In any case, it has provided the basis for a corporative organization in a great country, which had until now opposed any sort of professional organization.[1]

(iii) *France.*—It is interesting to notice in France—a country in which professional organization is more advanced than in the United States—two phenomena to a great extent similar to those which handicapped the Roosevelt experiment. In spite of a great many mistakes, the so-called Popular Front Government, especially the first Blum Government, was responsible for measures which clearly tend towards corporatism. But they were met in the first place by the revolutionary insubordination of the masses, whose Marxist leaders were hardly prepared for collaboration between classes; and, on the other hand, by the resistance of Big Business which was desperately attached to its privileges, and reluctant to part with the slightest bit of its authority.

[1] According to the report presented at Montevideo (Uruguay) at the International Congress of American Democracies in March, 1939, the trade unions of the United States unite about eight million organized workers. Four million (in round numbers) are in the American Federation of Labour, 3,250,000 in the unions of the Congress of Industrial Organization, and 750,000 in the I.L.G.W.U. (International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union). There are besides special unions, like the Railwaymen's Brotherhoods.

The right of collective representation is regulated by the Federal law (National Labour Relations Act), which took the place of Section 7 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of President Roosevelt's New Deal.

The social legislation introduced in France as a result of the elections of May, 1936, is chiefly characterized by two great reforms : compulsory conciliation and arbitration and the generalization of collective agreements. We will not dwell on the first, as it consisted only in making compulsory and extending to the whole of French industry a system which experience in other countries had proved to be sound. Although it may be objected that the State and its officials play too great a part in the organization of arbitration and conciliation, this is due, especially to the fact that a spirit of class-warfare existed on both sides, and that the State alone had sufficient authority to impose just solutions.

This is a lesson for those who think it possible to create corporative institutions overnight and make them acceptable to all. These are doomed to failure if they have not first made sure of the voluntary assent of both workers and employers, but especially of their intellectual and moral preparedness for class collaboration.

The generalization of collective agreements constitutes an extremely valuable progress towards a corporative regime. As we know, they substitute the collective contract for the individual contract. This is a complete transformation of the relations between employers and employees. The workers in each enterprise form a joint body, not only virtually but effectively, which is recognized as such, and is empowered to sign with the employer undertakings which are valid for all its members. When the representation of the workers is shared by several trade unions, the agreement must be signed by all of them. The agreement may embrace more than one firm ; it may be concluded on a local or regional basis, and it may even cover the whole of the country.

The law making collective agreements compulsory marks a stage of the highest importance in the evolution of French social legislation. One of its corollaries had been the creation in concerns of delegates from the workers, whose mission is to discuss with the management all problems concerning the staff.

Thus, for the first time, the divine right of the employers

was successfully challenged. The substitution of collective law for individual *laisser-faire* has overthrown one of the idols of liberalism.

The worker's delegate is the first witness of a new order in which the employees will be bound more closely still to the life of the factory and the workshop, which they make possible by their work.

A proof that the reform of collective agreements can be considered as a step towards corporative restoration, is the opposition shown to it for a long time by the Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.), which felt that such a measure was contrary to all its revolutionary theories.

Among the pre-existing elements in France of a corporative regime, we must also point out two national institutions, founded and patronized by the State : The *Conseil supérieur du Travail* and the *Conseil National Economique.*

The *Conseil supérieur du Travail* was appointed by the Government to advise it about possible reforms of industrial legislation. It consists of thirty-two delegates from the employers and thirty-two delegates from the workers, elected by trade unions of every tendency ; a number of other people, civil servants and parliamentarians also sit with them.

The *Conseil National Economique* has a much larger composition, and its field is wider. It groups representatives of all the economic interests of the country ; manufacturers, workmen, clerks, engineers, farmers, delegates from municipalities, consumers, co-operatives, etc. . . . It is a consultative body, to which the Government submits for consideration the various proposals of a professional and economic nature which it wishes to place before Parliament. The results of the meetings of the Council are published in the form of reports and recommendations, which are inserted in the *Journal Officiel.*

On several occasions, the composition of the *Conseil National Economique* has been altered in order to make it more comprehensive.

A number of proposals to make this organization more representative of professional France have been put forward ; and also to extend it and give it greater powers. Many of

those who are working for a better social order envisage its transformation into a real vocational Senate, placed on an equal footing with the political Chambers.

(iv) *Belgium, Switzerland, Holland.*—It is perhaps certain small countries which offer the most suitable bases for the construction of a democratic corporative order.

In Belgium, the law provides, since 1919, for the creation of national or regional joint committees appointed for the purpose of fixing the rates of wages and the conditions of work. And many industries apply this important legislative measure. On the other hand, private enterprise has developed the formation of agreements among producers, and has attracted the attention of the public authorities, who intervened in 1935 by means of a law which marks an important step towards corporative organization. But this is only a partial measure, as none of the clauses concern workers. Belgium has moved cautiously.

M. Van Zeeland intended to complete the professional organization of his country, but the coalition which removed him from power prevented him from continuing his experiment in this direction.

The example of Switzerland is particularly interesting for us, because its effort, although it is only a partial one, respects in every particular the principle of liberty, which is the basis of trade unionist legislation in the Swiss Republic.

It is the Canton of Fribourg, where Catholics are a majority, which gives us the lesson we were looking for. By means of a law passed on the 3rd May, 1934, it set up a complete corporative organization, which does not omit from its cognisance a single question concerning each trade or calling. But the corporations remain *optional*; no coercion is exerted in order to bring the members of the profession into the corporation. The legislator has simply built the corporative structure and left the door wide open; those who wish to enter it do so.

'The framework provided is as elastic as possible. The professional groups establish freely their own corporative statutes. Two conditions only are imposed on all corporations: (1) the existence of a corporative council elected by

the groups of employers and employees on an equal basis ; (2) the existence of an arbitration and conciliation committee. The corporations thus freely constituted on these bases are recognized by the State if they fulfil these conditions, and they may not only take measures concerning their members, but even make regulations which become compulsory for the whole profession if they are approved by the Council of State. This approval will only be given if the decisions have been taken by a majority of votes in each one of the employers' and employees' delegations to the corporative council, and if, also, a public enquiry finds that the general interest is safeguarded. Where there are several corporations, the Council of State takes the necessary measures to co-ordinate their decisions.'

M. André Rouast, a Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris, from whom we have borrowed this analysis of the Fribourg Law, adds that it is directly inspired by the teachings of the Church, especially the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno.*

Holland gives us the double example of the law on professional Councils (7th April, 1933) and of the law on professional agreements (27th May, 1935). We shall not analyse them in detail, as they include in several instances regulations which we have met elsewhere. The intention of their authors was that they should serve the purpose of establishing the bases of an economy on corporative lines. The object of the first is to replace in the hands of the interested parties all regulation of work. We may note in passing that collective agreements are a common practice in Holland. As to the law on professional agreements, its purpose, as its name implies, is to encourage producers to effect among themselves the necessary agreements for the harmonization of production. Unfortunately, as we have had occasion to notice in other countries, there exists no link between the social side and the economic side. It seems that whilst industrialists have agreed to envisage the former in a democratic framework, they intend to maintain the latter under their own monarchic direction.

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We can here conclude our study of 'corporatism and democracy.' The purpose we had in mind, when examining the pre-existing corporative institutions in democratic countries, was to show that wherever liberty is still alive there is a tendency towards a new order in professional relations. We also think that each nation must pursue its own experiment in its own way and under its own particular conditions. It would be senseless to impose identical formulas and standardized methods on all States without distinction. In the Swiss cantons the new corporations will always be very different from those of Manchester or Detroit.

Although the technique must remain specialized, the moral and spiritual principles must be common to all democracies in their work of regeneration.

In actual fact, it is for them a question of life or death. For too long they have provided the paradox of associating political liberty with social bondage, humanistic and Christian personalism with the materialistic dictatorship of money. If they do not hasten to be logical with their principles, they will perish. The internal logic of democracy demands that it should accomplish on the social plane the same revolution that it effected in the past in political life.

On the social plane, the way has already been to a large extent mapped out, and in some countries it has been more than half covered.

Faced with progress in the regulation of work, the inhuman capitalism stigmatized by Pope Leo XIII has had to give away much ground, but it continues violently to defend its privileges in all problems of an economic nature. Now, professions have a social as well as an economic side, and if the former has already placed itself under the sign of Justice, the latter still remains in the shade.

In our democracies, Work must regain first place, a place it should never have lost. In order that liberty may live, we must realize a new economic order. In order that the human person, body and soul, may flourish, it must receive back its full dignity, consequently it must be replaced within a vocational framework which will be both harmonious and just.

It is useless to defend democracy if we do not endeavour to release it from the golden chains of High Finance and the rotten bonds of Big Business.

When we have established economic democracy, political democracy will have no difficulty in defending itself.

CONCLUSION

XIII

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

By Luigi Sturzo

SINCE the present book is entitled *For Democracy*, readers will expect a comprehensive conclusion to the various studies that form twelve links in an unbroken chain. They will not be satisfied to remain on the historical or critical plane or on that of theoretical construction, and will ask for practical indications as well. This indeed is the view of the editors of the book and of its contributors, who, whatever their personal feelings or experiences in regard to certain concrete problems—when each is bound to have his own country particularly in mind—share a common outlook which unites them, closely or loosely as the case may be, to the Catholic democratic and social tradition as it has shaped itself in over a century, from the first vindication of political liberties by O'Connell and Lacordaire, to the recent experiences of Brüning and Van Zeeland.

This does not mean that they accept the past as it stands, uncritically and indiscriminately, but from that past they seek to carry forward those lasting elements to which a new experience can give new life. In the same way all other experiences in democracy that have had any breadth or depth hold elements that may and must be utilised in a truly new democracy.

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Above all, we do not seek to defend this or that particular institution, or present-day democracy in the shape it has assumed say in Great Britain, or in the other countries that

still call themselves democratic, but we wish to defend the *spirit of democracy* in modern society. To us the spirit of democracy is freedom actuated in social life as correlative to authority, an authority in which the whole people shares according to the capacities and position of each, in co-operation for the common good.[1]

We have defined democracy as 'a political and social system based on the free and organic participation of the whole people for the common good.'[2] Here we find the true spirit of democracy, its most comprehensive ideal, as it should be realized in civilized and Christian countries.

This, as an ideal, is our starting-point; this, as practical aim, is our goal.

Between the starting-point and the goal there is a space to be traversed; it is the historical space that God has given to men for their experiments which will always be a mixture of good and evil, of truth and errors, of successes and failures. Such is reality.

We start from a present reality which cannot satisfy us. In the course of the book we have piled criticism on criticism, we have sought the underlying reasons; we have shown ourselves wiser than our ancestors, who little by little by their sacrifices built up the democracies in which we play our part to-day; it is easy to be wise after events.

Must all that they have built be thrown on the rubbish heap? Have we nothing to defend? Are there those among us pessimistic enough to say: 'Let us make a clean sweep and start again from the beginning?' But history does not proceed in this way. When anyone, a dictator for example, even a man of genius like Napoleon, seeks to do so and seems to change the face of the earth, in the space of a few years what was believed dead and done with reappears under other aspects. Violent action cannot last.

History proceeds by slow evolution even when superficial changes are sudden and clamorous. It is like the sea which through the centuries eats away the shore; the storms do only superficial damage, or carry away what time has already corroded.

To destroy the present democracies for the sake of better

[1] See Chapter VI. [2] See Chapter I.

ones would be an attempt at suicide. And he who attempts suicide either dies or lives on blind or maimed, and with less confidence in himself than ever. By this, however, we do not mean that we must defend the present democracies just as they are, their defects, their crises, or the men who represent them.

We must start from the present as it is, and act in it, striving for those further realizations that we believe to be not only the best but possible of attainment. Hence we do not uphold the present democracies where they are open to criticism, but in so far as they are really democratic, and at the same time hold something fundamental and permanent.

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Popular suffrage is the basis of democracy. It is an elementary but genuine means of giving the people a share in collective life. Any arbitrary limitation, any authoritarian exclusion, would impinge on its genuineness. We are therefore in favour of woman suffrage, and if this sounds a truism in Great Britain and the United States it is not so in France and Belgium, where women still lack the vote. And even in England to-day it has still to be defended against certain mysogynists. We have faith in the work of women for a better democracy when they have had time to form and develop the *élites* necessary for an effective influence on public life.

A democracy cannot do without a parliament. Those who abuse parliament have in mind the parliamentary crises of the day, but if the brain is diseased, should we remove it entirely ? What is needful is treatment or such operations as will remove the evil, not decapitation !

The same could be said of the political liberties, freedom of vote, speech, meeting, and Press. A reformed, renovated democracy, re-fashioned according to our ideals, could never do without these institutions, or it would no longer be democracy. Indeed, we would wish to see them corroborated, strengthened, and better exercised, with a full sense of the responsibility they imply. Therefore we should not look askance on the introduction of the Swiss referendum

into the big countries, for certain types of laws affecting the whole people, or for determining certain trends of public opinion. In England this function has been fulfilled by the private ballots (like the League of Nations Union Peace Ballot), but these are either inadequate or have been discredited.

But apart from this or that particular institution, this or that reform which may suit a particular country, there is a democratic basis that must be looked upon as established, and which we must defend as fundamentally concordant with our ideals. It consists above all in *freedom in public life*. It is this that is most threatened by totalitarianism, and at the same time it is the least appreciated and the most misunderstood by certain reactionary currents, which include not a few Catholics in their ranks. It is well that we should pause a little on this point, in view of present political trends.

(*a*) When we see in the totalitarian countries that certain classes of persons—for diversity of race, or political opinion, or religious faith—are outlawed, expelled, or imprisoned in concentration camps, liable to see their goods confiscated, without protection from the assaults of mobs egged on against them, we shudder with horror, as at a return to what are called the Dark Ages. We should do well to realize that this might happen to us ourselves, if a similar power were installed in Great Britain, or in other countries where civilized usage still prevails. The protection of a law common to all, without distinction of race or opinion, is the first, the lowest rung of freedom. If this no longer exists, a country has no right to call itself civilized or Christian.

From this rudimentary respect for personal freedom and dignity civilization begins, but so, too, does democracy.

(*b*) A further step : the rights of human personality are not only negative, but also positive. The State cannot absorb them into itself, nor can it absorb the rights of those social nuclei in which the individual is enabled to develop and widen his personality, such as the family, the school, the profession, the municipality, and so on. To-day the State seeks to invade every field, to centralize everything in itself, to enslave the human person to the Community.

The democratic State, especially on the Continent, has tended to centralization (France more than all), and even Great Britain has caught the infection, though more slightly. But what is known as the totalitarian State has outstripped all foresight, seeking as it does for dominion over the whole personal activity of its citizens, and for a monopoly of common and even of personal life. What remains of the moral values of family, school, calling, municipality, which formed, even in the so-called Dark Ages, so many oases of refuge, only those who live under such regimes can tell.

We in the democratic countries have still a certain freedom in family life, in education, in professional activity, in municipal and county organization. And we are not wholly satisfied with it. English Catholics justly complain that their schools are partly a charge on the parishes (and therefore on the families that maintain them), whereas the board schools and county schools, where religion is not taught, are favoured. The French school system is even more unjust. There are still grounds for criticism in various democratic countries of the legal position of woman in the family and in the civic and economic fields (apart from political disparities). And so on, in all the extra-State organisms.

Those who believe that democracy is only a political department of community life may be surprised at what we have said. They do not realize that democracy begins with freedom. Where there is no freedom there is no democracy ; where freedom is denied to bodies with a common life and specific ends (like the family, the profession, the municipality), there can be no democracy ; where the human personality is not respected in all its rights to moral and material life, there can be no democracy.

By this we deny the claims to democracy of Communism and Marxist Socialism. In these systems there can be neither personal freedom nor the freedom of autonomous bodies ; they are by their very nature levelling systems on an economic plane, and from the economic plane (which for them is primal) this levelling extends to all others, including that of religion.

When certain Socialists speak of accepting democracy

and defending freedom, theirs is a Socialism of compromise. If they are sincere, they stop short of Socialism, at a type of social radicalism ; if they are not sincere (I do not say morally, but intellectually) they envisage two stages—a transitory stage, that of free democracy, and a final stage, that of a class dictatorship.[1]

For a more fundamental reason, that of the active suppression of all personal liberty, we deny the right of the totalitarian States to call themselves democratic simply because they stage plebiscites and general elections of alleged parliaments, or because their leaders gather round them applauding crowds who answer them by a prearranged 'yes' or 'no.' It would be absurd to take such claims seriously.[2]

But the democracies themselves suffer from the disease of the age, that of impinging on personal liberties, for three reasons : (*a*) that which we have already mentioned, State centralization at the expense of the nuclear societies and of individual activities, and the lack of organicity caused by a prevailing and ever more restless individualism ; (*b*) the domination of capitalism over the masses and the Press and in government spheres ; (*c*) the weakening of the moral values of society, through the spread in every class of an education that is at bottom materialistic.

Thus the principal task in the defence of democracy to-day is the defence of freedom.

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We have seen how freedom is to be regarded[3] and how (thus conceived) the defence of freedom is at the same time the defence of authority and of the social order. This need not be repeated here, but we wish merely to emphasize very strongly that it is not a matter either of pure philosophy or, worse, of arbitrary constructions or fantastic idealism.

There are anti-democratic Catholics (they may not call themselves so, but are so in spirit) who insist on the need to be *realists*, to see facts as they are, to avoid illusions, however generous. Human society, they hold, is not an Arcadian idyll, and human instincts are evil. Our democracy, they

[1] See Chapter XI. [2] See Chapter X. [3] See Chapter VI.

have it, presupposes that all men are good, which is not the case.

To these and similar ' realists ' we can reply with concrete data and with practical, even ' realistic ' reasons. But first we must make a kind of act of faith, which corresponds to our deepest convictions as Christians.

The moral values that we defend are worth a thousand times more than the material values that go by such names as national greatness, national honour, political hegemony or the wealth to be garnered from vanquished countries and subjugated colonies and so forth. Moreover, we are of those who believe, even in the realm of politics and collective life, in the saying of Christ : ' Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.' ' All these things ' stand for precisely what the realists seek, that is not only that material well-being that it is lawful and necessary for a community to pursue, as a part, though not the whole of the *common good* (for the scholastics, the aim of collective life), but also those which by permission or will of Providence, come to nations in their formation, growth, and decline.

We demand that such historical happenings should not be the fruit of violence, robbery, treachery, or oppression either at home or abroad. Therefore we will have nothing to say to a so-called realistic policy that presupposes the suppression of civil and political liberties in order that the leaders may have their hands free and realize their dreams of dominion and greatness by every means, without concern for morality. This would mean the *politique d'abord* of the *Action Française*, which was justly condemned by the Church. We would have politics at once moral and useful, that is that they should not lose their specific character of seeking what is useful to the community, using their own technical means, and that they should remain within the lines of the moral law, the precepts of which are binding upon all. In the same way economics, whether private or public, can be true economics without thereby overstepping the limits of morality and becoming abuse, robbery, or fraud.

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After this unequivocal declaration, which is for us an act at once of Christian duty and of human wisdom (and in this we have also defended the supreme reasons of a true democracy), let us continue our enquiry into the practical conclusions of our defence of democracy.

The *problem of education for democracy is fundamental.*[1] It is necessary in democracy to have *élites*, *élites* drawn from all classes and categories, open to all, *élites* ever renewed and bringing renewal.[2]

Can these be formed without an adequate education? This must be on three planes. (*a*) The first is culture, and it must be admitted that to-day this branch is almost everywhere neglected; culture is becoming more and more technical, specialized, partial. The idea of general, humanistic and religious-moral culture (we say culture and not merely knowledge) is being lost to sight. (*b*) The second plane is that of the exercise or practice of political life. This to-day exists among certain sections of citizens and in certain countries where it is a tradition, above all in Switzerland and Great Britain. But we must note that in Switzerland, a small country, divided into federated cantons, where the referendum is in force and parties are well organized, political experience extends to the most remote mountain villages. In Great Britain, where local life is still autonomous up to a point and where there are many free bodies, such as the universities, collective life is still fairly well articulated. The place of the referendum is taken by the 'ballots,' and other private enterprises of the kind, including letters to the Press.

But this is not enough. The Socialist parties have brought an education of the masses, but it is not a political education; it is too much confined to economics, too materialistic, or at least, too class conscious. There must be a widening of the field of vision to include political and moral, national and international interests.

It is often said that certain countries are not suited to freedom and democratic institutions because the people have not been educated for them. Those who speak thus seem

[1] See Chapter I. [2] See Chapter VI.

to have in mind a kind of preliminary education. They might as well speak of learning to walk without walking, or of learning to swim without going into water—which does not mean that there should not be guidance or preventive measures to avert possible harm.

(*c*) Finally, education for democracy demands conviction, that is, it must reach the heart. An education that is solely intellectual or technical without education of the feelings is impossible. To-day some say that there must be a 'mysticism,' adding that in the totalitarian countries this mysticism exists, but not in the democratic ones.

This is a point that must be fully cleared up. First of all, we must not confuse the feeling that springs from a thoughtful, moral conviction, with the sentimental fanaticism or blind instinct of the crowd. Such states of mind are altogether different, indeed antithetical. The first is enduring, strong, and worthy of man; the second is superficial or instinctive. The first is good, the second maleficent, or may, consciously or unconsciously, become so. The first is based on affection and is comprehensive, the second on hatred and is exclusive.

Anti-Semitism, to-day so widespread and even imposed by authority, is one of the worst forms of fanaticism of the age. Racialism is an intellectual deviation, founded on overweening pride and egotism. To make 'mysticisms' of these is an aberration and a perversion of the human conscience. These are fanaticism, not mysticisms.

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The education of the heart to which we appeal for the ideals of democracy holds nothing turbid, immoral, or fanatical, but rests on permanent moral values, worthy of man and in harmony with the principles of Christianity.

For this reason we are careful to separate the modern idea of democracy from those erroneous premises that once caused many Catholics to look upon it askance, holding the two to be inseparable. We say with Leo XIII: 'If democracy is to be truly Christian, it will bring much good to mankind.'

First of all we cannot start, as Rousseau does, from the idea of human nature as good in itself, spoiled only by society. On the contrary, we see nature as fallen, and the social ties as necessary to civilize it, that is to bring out good instincts and check and correct evil ones. Without society there is no civilization. This the sages of ancient paganism saw.

We do not see in the popular will an unlimited sovereignty, just as we do not see in the will of the monarch an unlimited sovereignty.[1] For us authority, like liberty, has its ethical limits (which always find concrete expression in a religious system), and the two have the internal limits born of their mutual relationship. The extension of this relationship to the whole community gives us the characteristic of democracy.

Finally, we do not conceive of the will of the people as the sum of the individual wills, but as something specifically different, in that it has been ripened and expressed by the vital organisms of society. Thus we are opposed to individualistic democracy in the name of an organic democracy. It is not the majority principle that makes a law good, but its intrinsic value ; it is not the result of the elections that creates the right of a majority, but the conviction that it will arrive at expressing the law, with the consciousness of the mandate it has received. Thus, every time a majority fails to fulfil its mandate, in a true democracy the social structure will provide the means for correcting it and rendering it conscious of its error. In England this is the office of public opinion, which is very strong, though it is not always effectual nor always equal to its task.

It is the duty of the *élites* of the minority, or of extra-political *élites*, of the free associations, and of the churches, to intervene to imprint this character of self-correction on the political currents. Just as it has been said that freedom must be won daily (to-day our French friends like to speak of it as a daily creation), so democracy, the union and co-operation of freedom and authority[2] must be daily won or created ; hence a continual struggle against the

[1] See Chapter VI. [2] *Ibid.*

adverse forces (within ourselves and without) that undermine its existence.

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If a good is to be consciously defended, it must be loved, it must be quickened by daily labour and given efficacy by the life we bring to it. Thus the peasant with his field, which he tends lovingly according to the season, in order to reap the harvest when the time comes for it. His field or garden arouses in him no frenzied fanaticism ; he has the calm affection of an owner and the tranquil ownership of one who loves and labours at it.

To-day a section of the young feel they are drawn neither towards freedom, of which they no longer appreciate the benefits, nor towards democracy, which they see disfigured by barren struggles, by weaknesses, and by flagrant and incomprehensible injustices. And they are at once right and wrong. They are right in what they see and hate, wrong in what they fail to see, the good it holds and the good that it should and must be made to yield.

When a traveller finds himself with others in an airy railway carriage, he does not think about the air, but reads, smokes, looks out of the window, talks to his neighbour. If it is not airy enough, he asks (or takes) permission to open the window. But if he is in a compartment full of people smoking and drinking beer and the window cannot be opened, then he feels the need of air, and sits, sweating and panting, till he may end by feeling really ill. So it is with freedom. Where it exists, no one thinks about it. When it is lacking, it must be sought.

There is an anecdote of a conversation between a German and a Dutchman that is illuminating.[1] The German boasts of the greatness of the Third Reich, its power, its future. ' It is true,' replies the Dutchman, ' we are a small people without a great future, but when early in the morning we hear a loud knocking at the door, we *know* it is only the milk.'

This homely vision of freedom must not lead us to think that the democracies, whether small or great, have neither

[1] See *The Sower*, January, 1939.

risks nor adventures; without them, they would have no history. They have them indeed, and even in the democratic countries to-day there is that which should appeal to the adventurous spirit of youth.

It is not true that men do not risk their life for liberty (as is foolishly said by those who stand in admiration before the dictators), whereas they will risk it for imperial greatness. In Spain men on both sides fought for two and a half years for ideals which might be false or true, unreal or real, the Basques and the Catalans, moreover, in conditions of overwhelming inferiority, heading towards a tragic unknown. If war came and the Belgians, Dutch, or Swiss were attacked, they would die to defend their liberties, and not for causes of imperial grandeur, which could not affect them. To say that only Fascist or Nazi youth is capable of sacrifices is a falsehood magnified by an arrogant and insolent propaganda.

Is England perhaps suffering from an inferiority complex, that brings a feeling that she has no ideals to defend? Some say that the Empire does not interest them because each Dominion has its own personality, and can get on very nicely without belonging to the British Commonwealth. Or that the world has no need of leadership from London. Or that the capitalism of the City is not an ideal for which other classes must sacrifice themselves, and so on. All these are half-truths, half untruth. Is England's mission an empty word? Is all this the defeatism of satisfied people or of people who are afraid of sacrifices? Such bitter criticism, the fruit of disillusionment and snobbery, can void the whole history of a people of its significance. But those who are able to appreciate the facts of history and the present position in the light of a moral and civilizing mission ordained by Providence, feel that every people has its place given it by God, the desertion of which would be a failure in duty.

We should like to emphasize this point which is too much overlooked, not as an argument for present or future democracy (this providential rule appertains to all peoples, whether democratic or not), but in order to see the place of the democratic experience (like every other historical

experience, even Bolshevism) in the divine plan. By this, we mean simply that every experience is either an assertion of moral values that must be actuated, or a denial of moral values that must be reasserted, or a concrete expression of moral values which must be defended. It is thus that we understand the appeals of the bishops of France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States in favour of the free and democratic institutions of their countries. It is thus we understand the reality of a wholesome national feeling, that which repudiating nationalist fanaticism has the sense of a national vocation and mission.[1] In this sense we can wish the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth to hold together, as an experience of civilization and a peacemaking force unique in the world. A people that has reached exceptional power and wealth has corresponding duties. The fulfilment of these duties, by improving domestic organization and relations with other countries, demands the co-operation of all for the ideal of a common good.

Democracy for us is here a means to this end, for it is the stage of civilization which we have reached, and it is the most suitable system (with the improvements and developments it demands) for seeking this ideal. Others who have ideals of unsatisfied imperialism and believe that by subjecting the small nations by force they will live up to their character of a chosen people, have found another system, the totalitarian, with the results that are before our eyes. Whether they are thus fulfilling a providential mission can be judged only by the means they adopt. Those who use immoral means cannot fail to incur the blame of men and the judgement of God.

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It may be said : These are fine ideas, but in the meantime are there not injustices and immoralities in the democracies ? By what means can they be done away with ? We are for legal means, and hence we are for that system (the free interplay of civil and social forces) that maintains us in the realm of law.

[1] See Chapter VIII.

Both within a country and in its foreign relations, we are opposed to the methods of violence and armed force. Neither revolts and civil wars at home, nor invasions and wars abroad. Injustices and immoralities must be corrected by the Christian method. It takes long, but it is the surest, for it is founded on the penetration of spirit into matter and on the development or change of institutions.

Christianity rigorously proclaimed monogamy; for this to become a recognized social institution to the exclusion of others, it needed the victory of Christianity over Greco-Roman paganism and over the barbarians. So it has been with slavery, serfdom, the law of talion, so it has been in our own times, and so it will be to-morrow.

Democracy to-day has three battles to fight and win. (*a*) An economic one against the oppression of capitalism and against the threat of a tyrannical Communism. The one is actual, the other in prospect. The two face each other on the political plane as though they were alternatives, under the names, here inappropriate, of Fascism and Bolshevism. Leaving aside political references, and confining ourselves to the substance, both, capitalism and Communism, are contrary to a true democracy, and both make it difficult to bring about a distributive justice in economy without impinging on liberty.

In the present book the thesis of Christian Corporatism is brilliantly treated[1]; this seems to us a path towards a new economic and social order, more humane and organic. But many more legislative measures will be needed to set a just limit to invasive and oppressive capitalism, and these can be brought about only if the need for them enters into the consciousness of public opinion through the work of democrats. The road will be long, the fight a fierce one, but one worth fighting, not in the name of materialistic Communism nor in that of an anti-social Utopianism, but in that of democracy, which here is social democracy, and on the moral basis of Christianity.

(*b*) The second battle will be in the political sphere, to modify the present organization of the State, which was

[1] See Chapter XII.

given its concrete form by the liberal middle classes of the last century, and has been rendered inadequate by the advent of the working masses into electoral and parliamentary life, while it is also undermined by the totalitarian leanings of the extreme Right and extreme Left.

Here there can be no single recipe suitable for every case, nor ready-made doctrines, nor philosophical schemes of perfect societies. Plato's *Republic*, St. Thomas More's *Utopia*, and Campanella's *City of the Sun*, are visions born of real needs projected on to an unreal plane in order to give them a sense of breadth and depth, not as solutions of practical problems. Such problems must be faced in each country according to its own history and genius, and the needs of the hour.

It is often repeated that the Continent in copying the British Parliament embarked on a false road. The truth is that the Continent never copied the English Parliament. Nature and history do not copy, but create. The studies of jurists are posterior to the facts when the facts are really historical, that is when they arise out of real needs or real impulses. Speculative theories never create reality, though they may prepare the way for it.

Thus it would be useless to consider here whether England would do well to adopt Proportional Representation (which has an active society seeking to promote it) or the Swiss Referendum (in place of the free ballots) ; or if the House of Lords should be abolished or altered, and if the House of Commons should hand over to the County authorities or to special Commissions the weighty burden of minor laws. These and other technical problems in Great Britain as in other countries will have to be discussed in the proper place by those directly interested, by political men and by experts, to be carried before the meetings of the societies which have made them their specific objects, and finally before the public at large, as soon as one or more of them arouses a general feeling, and a sense of urgent need for a solution.

Thus the true democratic spirit of a country is formed, and contributes to the re-shaping of political organs better suited to the present times and needs.

(*c*) Finally, the third battle of democracy will be in the international field. This battle began soon after the Great War over two main themes, the *League of Nations*, *Collective Security*. The failure of the League of Nations (or rather of the great Powers which held the leadership of the League) has been a misfortune for democracy and for peace. To-day we are no longer dealing with collective security but with the Balance of Power, a balance so precarious and oscillating that it seems unlikely to persist for much longer.

There is only one alternative. Either the democratic Powers will restore collective security in time, or we shall have war and a European catastrophe surpassing imagination.[1]

Here is the task incumbent upon the present democracies in spite of their weaknesses and past errors, a task at once arduous and noble. Why the democracies? Because they are not imbued with a spirit of conquest, they want peace, they have conceded to the dictators more than right and morality allowed, and bear the responsibility for the collapse of the League of Nations. It is their duty, to themselves and to the rest of the world, to return to the forsaken path and to restore the international order that has been compromised.

Can this be done? And at what cost?

While we write, the post-War system continues to fall away piece by piece under the violence of the dictators. The smaller and weaker are threatened, but the greater and stronger enjoy no greater tranquillity. There can be no return to the past, but neither can matters be mended without a moral basis, without sacred ideals, without the co-operation of the feelings of the peoples, that is without combining at once democratic principles, national feelings, and Christian moral values.

If it becomes necessary to have recourse to arms to drive back aggression or to defend the weak, the only sound basis will be this union of principles, feelings, and values, to give to each the surety of being on the side of justice and truth, and of wanting peace and defending it against the attacks of the dictators and the acts of violence of totalitarianism.

[1] See Chapter IX.

Maybe, indeed, a basis of collective security and the principle of a better League of Nations will be restored in time to prevent a catastrophic war, towards which the countries have drifted with such carelessness and folly.

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The melancholy days that we are passing in a Europe without stable structure, in countries agitated by the clash of feelings and passions, in the midst of so much hatred and jealousy, must not make us fall into despair or into barren criticism and inaction. We have in Christianity an optimistic faith, and can have no use for a pessimism that leads nowhere, a criticism that demands no sacrifice.

That is why we want democracy to be remade Christian (to be baptized, as the phrase went half a century ago) ; that is, that it should be inspired by the Christian impulses in present-day civilization and at the same time deepen them, that it should return to the moral and religious principles of the Gospel in order to realize them even in public life, that it should quicken the material and earthly needs of social life and of the relationships between classes and between countries by Christian charity.

We understand the difficulty of bringing such a programme into an environment in which no small part of the population has lost its religious sense or, at least, no longer feels the inner urge of a Christian faith. But all the great reforms have started from small beginnings and from small groups, full of faith in their ideals.

We Catholics can register three historical movements for freedom and democracy (we mentioned them at the opening of this Conclusion).[1] The first runs from O'Connell to Montalembert ; it is the experience of freedom coloured by romantic feelings, liberal aspirations, with the beginnings of the democratic movements, based on the new Constitutions of the Continental States. The most famous names besides the two we have mentioned are Lacordaire in France, Ketteler and Windthorst in Germany, Gioberti, Rosmini, Manzoni in Italy.

[1] See Chapter IV.

The second experience is on the social plane and leads up to the period of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII and of Christian democracy. Here our great figures are Decurtins in Switzerland, l'Abbé Pottier in Belgium, Toniolo in Italy; l'Abbé Naudet, l'Abbé Lemire, Léon Harmel in France—Mrs. Crawford deals with them in her interesting chapter.

The third experience begins with the post-War period, with what were known as the Popular Parties, or democratic parties of Christian inspiration. The political movement among Catholics gained a breadth and responsibility such as it had never possessed in the past. The Centre was the leading party in German affairs and the Popular Party the motive force in those of Italy. Their struggle against combined Socialists and Communists and against nascent Fascism and Nazism carried them into a thorny and difficult field, in which the totalitarian parties won the day. There remain the Catholic democrats of France, Belgium, Switzerland and Holland, and small centres in Lithuania and Poland. The experience has not been lost.

Outside the militant political parties there are Catholic centres and organizations for serious political and social studies, active labour leagues and trade unions, numerous youth associations, which take their stand on a platform of political liberties, with aspirations, more or less clearly defined, towards democracy (at least, in the social field), and which appeal to the present democracies to guarantee their rights and to vindicate the Christian spirit by which they are animated.

Of such historical experiences and of the kindred movements there has been harsh and sometimes ungenerous criticism, but this network of activities over a century old holds fast the tradition of freedom and democracy of Catholics in the world.

When their work is better known by friends and adversaries, and our contribution comes to be better appreciated, when the great democratic currents have regained consciousness of themselves and have succeeded in resisting totalitarian perversion (inhuman racialism, exaggerated nationalism, pretentious Fascism), and have contributed

to free the masses from Marxist and Communist poisons, they will by this very fact have contributed to remaking society on the basis of a humane and Christian morality.

To this end it is necessary that care should be taken not to shake the democratic and free foundations of countries that still rest on them, but at the same time there is the need for an active co-operation and every effort to improve present public institutions and democratic organisms, and to imbue a free political life with the Christian spirit.

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